

Universal Periodic Review (UPR) NGO Alternative Report (41st Session)

United Kingdom

Prepared and Submitted on 24 March 2022 by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (UK)



Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) is a not-for-profit campaign, research and advocacy organisation founded and based in the United Kingdom. It was set up in 1997 and works for redress of human rights violations and a better understanding of rights and norms across confessional, ethnic, national, political and other boundaries.

IHRC has consultative status with the UN – ECOSOC.

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About IHRC

IHRC is a not for profit human rights organisation based in London, UK. It has held consultative status with UN since 2007. It was founded in 1997. Since its founding it has been active in advocating for victims of rights abuses, campaigning on policy and structural issues, and researching the violations of human rights inter alia in the UK. Its key documents prepared in the period of this UPR cycle are addended and include the UK reports in the state of the art **Counter Islamophobia Toolkit project** (Merali 2017, 2018a, 2018b addended in Appendix B, C and D) prepared by IHRC, and the **IHRC report on the chilling effect of shrinking civil society space** in the UK (Bodi, 2019, addended in Appendix A). The IHRC website is www.ihrc.org.uk. To contact IHRC please email info@ihrc.org or call +442089044222.

Executive Summary

This report refers to the letter from the UN Human Rights Commissioner to the (then) UK Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, in 2017 as the basis of its submission.

1. IHRC is deeply concerned that notwithstanding the adoption of certain recommendations and a generally favourable rhetoric from the UK government regarding, that UK is in fact working in retrograde fashion.
2. **The main cross-cutting issue of concern for IHRC is the instrumentalization and reproduction of Islamophobic and racist narratives by the elite members of the government, institutions, media and think tanks which are then implemented in policy and law.**
3. This report specifically highlights a number of areas where we feel the **UK government has undercut previous gains** or entrenched further draconian measures. This includes but is not limited to the introduction of further **legislation both within and outside the counter-terrorism framework that criminalises discrete groups**; undermined the **independence of commissioners and review bodies and processes by appointing figures who have openly questioned human rights and equalities norms and / or made discriminatory and or racist statements**; re-produced **policy and narratives that are discriminatory and exclusionary**. Additionally, we note that these measures are **shrinking civil society space** at an alarming rate and **excluding, demonising and in some cases attempting to criminalize wide-ranging civil society voices**, particularly but not solely from Muslim communities.

National Human Rights Framework

National Human Rights

4. IHRC concurs with OHCHR's concerns that the **mooted Bill of Rights** set to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 will have a detrimental effect on the quality and accessibility of rights for the generality of the population, with an increased detrimental effect on marginalised groups and their members.
5. The context of this Bill should also be considered in the light of the fact that changes to laws regarding Legal Aid have created a **justice deficit across the UK**. Legal aid provision has been drastically cut across the board (criminal and civil proceedings, including counter-terrorism, immigration and equalities and non-discrimination cases) meaning that **effective representation in straightforward cases, not simply complex cases, is now hard to access**. The number of lawyers providing legal aid services has declined to such an extent that certain geographical areas have no lawyers available to represent clients who require legal aid. The amount of legal aid is so curtailed that lawyers are unable to do an effective job (see Ahmed, Choudhury and anonymous in Merali, 2018a pp15-17)
6. IHRC concurs with OCHR on the need for **national human rights plan(s)** with extensive and wide consultations with civil society. However, as the following outlines, the UK government has proceeded to demonise and come close to criminalising many civil society groups **using the narrative of (non-violent) extremism and the mooted Counter-extremism Bill**.
7. We will discuss these issues, alongside the second recommendation under the framework and throughout *Cross-cutting Issues* below.

Cross cutting Issues: *Equality & Non-Discrimination & Human Rights & Counter-terrorism*

8. **Recommendation:** The independence of commissioners and review processes needs to be strengthened, moved from ministerial fiat and the process made transparent. IHRC believes that the government is not only failing in implementing the Commissioner's recommendations but is actively undermining them.
9. The controversy around the selection of commissioners for the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) remains unaddressed. 'Baroness Meral Hussein-Ece, then the sole Muslim commissioner, and Lord Simon Woolley, then the only Black commissioner, [said recently](#) that they lost their roles in 2012 because they were 'too loud and vocal' about race issues' (Shabi, 2020). The current chair of EHRC, Baroness Kishwer Falkner has opposed calls to define Islamophobia as a form of racism, and claimed "anti-Muslim public sentiment as "understandable" because of its association with "violent religious extremism, terrorism and... sex grooming gangs" (Hooper, 2020).
10. As a parliamentarian she has hosted events in parliament for the neo-Conservative Henry Jackson Society. HJS is a controversial think tank that has a revolving door with government and media (Ramesh, 2014; Griffin et al., 2015). It has been accused of stoking Islamophobia. A number of current and former ministers, MPs and journalists have worked for, signed the original statement of principles or been patrons of HJS, including the former head of the Charity Commission and current reviewer of the CVE Prevent program, William Shawcross, who was a former HJS board member. He is quoted as having stated: 'Europe and Islam is one of our most terrifying problems of our future.' Three more current EHRC commissioners have come under criticism from equalities and anti-racism campaigners for variously undermining the ideas inter alia of misogyny and homophobia and liking or making comments on social media critical of the Black Lives Matter Movement, subscribing to the ideas of female and Muslim victimhood narratives (Hooper, 30 Nov 2020, Siddique, 30 Nov 2020'). One of those, Adam Goodhart, even praised the UK government's 'hostile environment' policy, which the EHRC itself had found broken equalities laws (EHRC, 25 Nov 2020) and whose report claimed that there was little evidence of institutional racism in the UK.
11. Similar concerns have arisen over the appointment of, or continued work of among others:
12. Tony Sewell, as chair of Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, whose previous views that institutional racism did not exist in the UK were reflected in the report of the commission (Martin, 31 Mar 2021); Dame Louise Casey to a number of positions including reviewer / 'czar' of homelessness (1999), 'crime and punishment' (2008), 'anti-social behaviour' (2011) 'troubled families' (2012) and 'social integration (2016) (Merali, 6 Dec 2016); Amanda Spielman as chair of OFSTED (Merali, 5 Feb 2018) who supported a ban on Muslim girls wearing headscarves at a school in London; and Katharine Birbalsingh as social 'mobility tsar', who has criticised 'woke culture' (Spielman, 29 Aug 2021), claimed 'The Woke are racist' (Birbalsingh, 2020) and has been accused of ableism in her profession as a school principal because she refuses to recognise dyslexia, ADHD, dyspraxia and ADD (Vessey, 8 Mar 2022).
13. The named figures as well as the general culture in such appointments is increasingly controlled by unaccountable and untransparent ministerial decrees and reflects narrow political thinking that often openly rejects established human rights and equalities norms. Further, the revolving door between parliament, government, public appointment and right leaning think tanks (Griffin et al., 2015, Public Interest Investigations: Powerbase, various) has resulted in a culture which literally and ideologically keeps expert voices whether professional, academic, civil society or a combination out of consultation spaces. Moreover, the animosity of this political culture to equalities, justice for Palestine, tackling institutional racism including but not solely Islamophobia, has led to the setting up of the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) (Merali, 26 Jul 2019).
14. The CCE was set up by the government in 2017, and alongside various ideologically similar think tanks, notably the Henry Jackson Society, Policy Exchange and the Tony Blair Institute, has commissioned work that targets activists, academics and civil society groups accusing them of 'extremism'. The

government has been unable to settle a working definition of extremism for the purposes of its Counter-Extremism Bill which it has been attempting to introduce since 2015 in some form or another. The reports from CCE, PE, HJS and TBI all try to fill this void by targeting key Muslim civil society organisations working on Islamophobia and anti-racism both in the UK and global context and in many cases on the issue of Palestine (Bodi, 2014, 3 Jun 2019, 16 Oct 2019). The CCE has gone beyond this remit to also target non-Muslim or secular human rights groups working on the issue of Palestine, as well as left-wing civil society organisations using the concept of ‘non-violent extremism’. IHRC is concerned that once it has become law the Counter-extremism Bill will be used to criminalise the groups named in these reports and create a criminalised culture around support for Palestinian rights, anti-racism in the UK and other ideas and activities (see below).

15. The chilling effects of the Prevent program continue undiminished and we defer to the findings of the People’s Review of Prevent (2022), with regard to the details of this. We note however here that aside from the human impact of targeting in particular children as young as four in schools, and vulnerable people in medical, educational and other public sector settings, the Prevent program has had a chilling effect on free speech, causing minoritized communities to censor themselves on the individual and collective level. Further the program has been used to target expressions of faith and service delivery for faith communities particularly Muslims, with Muslim clothing and prayer spaces banned in many educational settings (Bodi, 2014, Kundnani and Hayes, 2018).
16. Initially using the narrative of security but increasingly now using the ill-defined term extremism as a catch all, religious practices and political practice (in particular supporting the Palestinian struggle for rights) have been demonised in policy, practice and public discourse.
17. Whilst a number of controversies and demands have eventually resulted in the government setting up a review of the Prevent program, as stated above, they have William Shawcross whose views on Islam and Muslims – the community mainly targeted by Prevent – as the reviewer.
18. An example of this is the so-called Trojan Horse affair. The initial affair itself took place outside this cycle but a new investigation by journalists Brian Reed and Hamza Syed (2022) as well as the study by Professors John Holmwood and Therese O’Toole (2017) have both exposed that the national and local government were involved in promulgating a fabricated narrative against a group of governors and teachers of schools in Birmingham which resulted in loss of livelihoods and bans from professions, as well as the demonisation of children attending those schools and the collapse of educational standards at those schools. A summary of the case is appended (Appendix E: Holmwood, 2 Oct 2018). Part of the process used by the government was the setting up of reviews into the ‘affair’. The reviewer appointed by the national government was the former head of anti-terrorism police, Peter Clarke. This was despite the fact that no accusation of terrorism or incitement to violence was made in the case. The effect was to conflate Muslim aspirations in general and their desire for good school governance and academic standards in particular with political violence, hatred and ‘terrorism’.
19. The reports by Reed and Syed (2022), Holmwood & O’Toole (2017) and Holmwood (2018) attest to the failures of these inquiries to adhere to any form of due process, allowing fabricated evidence to become the basis of investigation and excluding statements and evidence that exonerated or explained the actions of those accused.
20. The affair was used to justify measures in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which made the Prevent duty statutory.
21. Evidence that the secretary of state for education at the time, Michael Gove, had knowledge of the fabricated material further strengthens our concerns about the way that demonised narratives are propelling corrupt and highly discriminatory practices.
22. The post of independent reviewer of the Anti-Terrorism Laws has also been the subject of controversy. For further information please see the addenda (Appendix F: Merali, 24 Feb 2017). IHRC limits its concerns within the body of the UPR to the volte face of the current reviewer of terrorism legislation Jonathan Hall QC, on the issue of UK citizens travelling to fight in a war. Muslims travelling

to Syria and other conflicts have faced prosecution under anti-terrorism laws, stripping of citizenship and other punitive measures under various CT laws. However after the current foreign secretary Liz Truss stated that she would support and encourage British citizens to travel to Ukraine to fight on the side of the government, the current independent reviewer of anti-terrorism laws published advice on Twitter (Hamilton, 15 Mar 2022) that this was indeed acceptable and did not violate anti-terrorism laws, despite the fact that many observers pointed out that many of those travelling were doing so to fight with neo-Nazi militia and other far-right groups within and outside the Ukrainian army structures. This was advice that was refuted by a former UK Attorney General (Sparrow, 28 Feb 2022). The hitherto discrepancy between prosecutions of Muslims going to fight in wars where human rights abuses may take place and of Jewish British citizens who join the IDF has already been flagged up (Worrall, 2014). This further development has cemented concerns that the CT laws are simply politicised pieces of legislation which are particularly targeted against Muslims including the amended Terrorism Act 2000 (amended in 2018).

23. Citizenship stripping has been entrenched further with the Nationality and Borders Act 2021. This law now allows the Home Secretary not only the power to revoke citizenship which s/he has historically always had and the rules for which were relaxed circa 2005 (since which time it is estimated that almost 500 people have been deprived) but now gives her / him the power to do so and not inform the person concerned. The threshold of evidence upon which citizenship stripping is based does not pass international standards (see Ansari, 2022). Further, it has been used in cases where people have been rendered stateless, notably in the case of Shabina Begum, who despite being born in the UK and only ever holding British citizenship, has had her citizenship revoked on the alleged basis that her Bangladeshi heritage opened up the possibility for her to attain citizenship in Bangladesh (a matter the Bangladeshi authorities refuted) (Johnson & Fernandez, 2019).
24. Despite the recommendation of the UNCHR for the strengthening of measures and implementation of legislation that criminalises hate speech under the provisions of the UK's CERD commitments, the UK has continued to prevaricate. Further prominent and ministerial political figures as well as aligned public intellectuals and journalists have fostered a narrative of 'cancel culture' creating a political impetus to prevent such laws being enacted on the basis that they violate free speech principles. Conversely, via the mechanism of narratives of extremism, there is a clampdown on expressions of support for Palestinian rights, advocacy against structural racism particularly but not solely Islamophobia, political Islamic theory, different facets of 'woke culture' and critical race theory. This again has had a chilling effect, with policies in education imposed requiring teachers not to use CRT, and to teach issues like the British Empire in a 'balanced' fashion (Martin, 20 Mar 2022). IHRC is concerned that given the upcoming Counter-extremism Bill, various expressions of these ideas will go from being demonised to criminalised.
25. Current Home Secretary Priti Patel introduced proposed legislation set to become law this year which will give police powers to curtail and even stop protests. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill has been widely decried as curtailing ICCPR and other rights to peaceful protest. The Home Secretary has introduced these measures in the wake of Black Lives Matter protests in 2020 and environmental protests since 2018 (Global Citizens, 2021) again raising concerns that the new laws will target discrete and often racialised groups: 'The Bill would give the police the right to set limits on protests, even of a single person, that cause "serious annoyance" or "serious inconvenience". This could be used to shut down and prevent protest...' and 'is also designed to give police greater powers against Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities for the new 'crime' of 'trespass with the intent to reside', enabling police to seize property and move traveller communities on when they are simply going about their lives' (GMLC, undated).
26. A briefing on the demonisation of pro-Palestinian protests is added (Appendix G: IHRC, 26 May 2019). It is a fair assumption that having failed to stop such protests with political pressure, the government and authorities will use the new laws to prevent and or criminalise such events in future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

27. The UK government needs to immediately:

28. Remove the appointment of commissioners, independent reviewers and similar positions e.g. issue 'tsars' from ministerial fiat and create appointment procedures that are independent of government interference. Candidates must be able to demonstrate professional fitness for posts and conflicts of interest, accusation of discriminatory bias etc. must be thoroughly investigated before any appointments are made by the new appointment process.
29. Set about reviews of the aforementioned existing legislation in terms of their impact on the UK's obligations under various human rights norms.
30. Initiate an in-depth review of the impact, including the manifest harms of institutionalised racisms, of the existing CT regime, including but not solely the Prevent program.
31. Halt plans to introduce any more CT legislation until such time as a properly independent review of the current CT regime is undertaken.
32. Halt the introduction of the Police Crime Sentencing and Courts Bill.

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APPENDIX A

**Islamic Human Rights
Commission Briefing:**

**THE SHRINKING
POLITICAL SPACE FOR
CSOs IN THE UK**

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FOREWORD

For there to be effective political debate and actual functioning democracy, there needs to be effective and protected spaces to challenge political ideas and functions, and to hold the political class to account. An independent media is one facet of this, and civil society, its institutions, members, leaders and constituencies another. Both are under extreme stress in across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This briefing will discuss the impact on Muslim civil society of this stress, not just for Muslims but as an example of the serious deterioration of the current political culture, which must be urgently addressed. Whilst there are still sections of civil society attempting to fulfil their functions and potential, they are increasingly under attack and this bodes extremely ill for the future.

We are living in a moment described as an environment of hate against Muslims. This environment is the product of the cross fertilising and mutually reinforcing of anti-Muslim racism political, media and policy discourse. Attacks on Muslim civil society must be understood as part of this climate which is part of the deeper crisis of the political and social culture we live in.

This briefing outlines summarised concerns and is not exhaustive in its analysis or recommendations. We urge relevant political actors to engage with its contents in a serious fashion and work towards better outcomes as well as a long term transformation and opening up of political culture.

**Massoud Shadjareh,
Chair, IHRC**

The shrinking space for civil society organisations in Europe has been well documented and analysed.

In January 2018 the European Union's Fundamental Rights Agency published a report on "**Challenges facing civil society organisations working on human rights in the EU**".¹

Recognising that civil society organisations (CSOs) in the European Union (EU) play a crucial role in promoting fundamental rights, and so contribute to the functioning of democracies, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency cooperates and regularly consults with such organisations. They increasingly report that it has become harder for them to support the protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights within the Union – due to both legal and practical restrictions.

The FRA report found CSOs facing difficulties in the following four areas:

Regulatory environment: (changes in) legislation that affect CSOs' work;

Finance and funding: hurdles to accessing, and ensuring the sustainability of, financial resources including long-term support and immaterial resources;

Right to participation: difficulties in accessing decision-makers and providing input into law- and policymaking;

Ensuring a safe space: attacks on, and harassment of, human rights defenders, including negative discourse aimed at delegitimising and stigmatising CSOs.

The report concluded: "These challenges make it difficult for CSOs to promote and support human rights and their implementation. Beyond the impact that this has on the organisations themselves and on human rights, it can also have wide-ranging negative consequences for the democratic functioning of our societies. It is therefore vital that policymakers understand the role of civil society and its importance, and publicly support and adequately finance civil society organisations – both those engaged in service provision and those engaged in watchdog activities and advocacy."

In the UK, nowhere has the impact of this shrinking space for effective CSO participation been more keenly felt than in the Muslim CSO sector.

For the best part of two decades, successive governments and those opposed to Muslim participation have forced to the margins authentic CSOs from the Muslim community that do not conform to preconceived official strategies or desired policy outcomes.

The effect of this has been to produce policies that are often counterproductive, discriminatory and which do not address the fundamental concerns, needs and aspirations of Britain's approximately three million Muslims, and which often ultimately impact other minoritised groups and on occasion the majority too.

¹ <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/challenges-facing-civil-society-orgs-human-rights-eu>

CONSULTATION

One of the FRA's findings is particularly apposite for Muslim CSOs.

“Lack of clarity and transparency regarding who is consulted before decisions are made. CSOs also report that often there is no systematic consultation of all key players.”

It has become standard practice for recent governments to ignore genuine Muslim voices in consultations that directly relate to their communities. Instead officials have sought out deferential and conformist CSOs and CSO figures that serve as an echo chamber for government intentions.

The recent review of ‘Shariah councils’ is a case in point highlighting an instance where the government appointed panel failed to include any CSOs or individuals that could be said to be representative of the Muslim community.

Another example is the government's appointment in January 2018 of a deeply divisive counter-extremism campaigner, Sara Khan, to lead the Commission for Countering Extremism. Even the erstwhile Conservative chairwoman Sayeeda Warsi condemned it as “a deeply disturbing appointment”.

“For the commissioner to be effective the person had to be an independent thinker, both connected to and respected by a cross-section of British Muslims. Sara is sadly seen by many as simply a creation of and mouthpiece for the Home Office,” said Mrs Warsi.

Even where Muslim CSOs face no barriers to participation such as in public consultations they often find their expertise and views ignored. In January 2015 IHRC formally discontinued its long-standing policy of engaging in government anti-terrorism consultations after it became obvious that the government of the day had no intention of rolling back the draconian/disproportionate legislation the state had imposed over the last two decades.

Although on occasion our submissions have helped to mitigate the severity of the curbs (our briefings on Section 7 of the Terrorism Act are a case in point) on balance the effect of groups like ourselves on the eventual outcome is too minimal to be worth the effort and our contributions lend themselves to be used by governments to claim legitimacy for their policies.

VIOLENCE AND SMEAR CAMPAIGNS

The FRA report identified acts of intimidation and violence by non-state actors and smear campaigns as one of the main challenges to ensuring a safe space for civil society. Human rights CSOs have been subjected to verbal attacks, such as online hate speech, threats, damage to their property, and even violent attacks.

CSOs like IHRC, MEND and Cage have been subjected to targeted vilification campaigns by sections of the media designed to discredit them and frustrate their work. As recently as 22 December 2018 the Daily Telegraph published an article criticising the EU's decision to fund IHRC for the research it carries out into Islamophobia and racism on the spurious grounds that it was anti-Semitic. In recent years the annual Al-Quds Day demonstration in London in support of Palestinians, which is jointly organised by IHRC, has also been subjected to a concerted demonisation effort by pro-Israel groups who have tried to get it banned, and failing that, joined forces with far-right individuals and organisations to intimidate and harass those taking part. This demonisation has been accompanied by increasingly aggressive pro-Israel and fascist groups confronting participants at the march each year. In 2017 Darren Osborne sought to attack the march by driving into it. Unable to get past a police cordon he instead killed and maimed worshippers in Finsbury Park returning from prayers at a local mosque.

What makes matters worse is that rather than supporting Muslim CSOs like IHRC who are the victims of racist intimidation and harassment, officials such as the Mayor of London have sided with the hatemongers in trying to have peaceful, lawful activity shut down on the basis that they do not share some of the political sentiments being expressed. This type of mutual reinforcement between media and political discourse exacerbates and directly contributes to vilification, delegitimisation and violence.

Accusations of entryism against Muslim CSOs or indeed any grouping of Muslims are becoming increasingly common. Despite the almost complete vindication of all involved in the so-called 'Trojan Horse' affair, the damage from this state sponsored witch-hunt against Muslim parents, governors and teachers continues. Unsupported and defamatory accusations against parents or parent groups concerned about school policies of being akin to 'Trojan Horse' continue to be reported. Those schools involved in the affair have seen complete changes of leadership teams accompanied almost always with a catastrophic decline in standards (it is worth noting that the leadership of the schools, now displaced had in large part transformed those schools academically). The accusations of entryism and extremism levied against those involved were for doing no more than other parent groups of other faiths and none had done and still do and are applauded for doing. Sir Tim Brighouse, former chief education officer of Birmingham and schools commissioner for London, described these actions as 'a very British tradition' (2014). Professor John Holmwood and Therese O'Toole describe the magnitude of the injustice of the Trojan Horse affair as on the same scale as that of the Hillsborough disaster (2018).

THE COUNTER-TERRORISM REGIME

With the rapid expansion of anti-terrorism legislation and policy, state actors have also found it expedient to hitch Muslim CSO participation to the degree to which they buy into the various initiatives.

Dr Fahid Qurashi notes in “The Prevent strategy and the UK ‘war on terror’: embedding infrastructures of surveillance in Muslim communities” (2018) that “Institutionalised relations between Muslim civil society organisations and various local authority organisations (whether it is the local police, counter-terrorism unit (CTU) or Prevent officers) have been cultivated in various ways. For Muslim organisations, access to new sources of funding was a major factor that informed their decision to engage with local authorities on the Prevent agenda. The funding from the Prevent stream provided a much needed income, and engaging with the Prevent agenda also raised the profile of an organisation.”

Making support for often struggling CSOs conditional on their support for government objectives undermines one of the fundamental purposes of CSOs which is to hold officials’ feet to the fire and convey the concerns of the communities/interests they represent. It also risks rendering any government output redundant by making consultations an echo chamber of the state.

Muslim and Muslim-led CSOs have also found their room to operate squeezed by the obsession with framing policy towards Muslims inside an anti-terror/extremism rubric.

If it wasn’t already wide enough, an expanded definition of extremism adopted by the government in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 pulled in opposition to so-called Fundamental British Values as a signifier of extremism. The Prevent strategy criminalised “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.” The definition homed in on the pre-crime space, and the non-violent sphere of vocal opposition to FBV, and non-violent views the government defines as extremist. These views are not defined by the police, government, or other state institutions, but it has been widely reported that Prevent training has included citing pro-Palestinian views, anti-fracking, anti-capitalist protestors and other civil rights movements as indicators. People who support justice for the Palestinians, people who opposed the Iraq war, those protesting refugee deportations, even people who protested against domestic policies on austerity have been arrested and often sentenced using these laws. Others have stopped expressing their legitimate views out of fear. Universities for example have banned speakers on the basis of their (non-violent) views, prohibiting discussion of political and social issues. The impact of the legislation has been to inhibit the expression of views that are perfectly legitimate but which may be perceived by the authorities as skirting too close to or falling foul of the new definition.

Multi-agency research involving IHRC and carried out on behalf of the EU (Counter Islamophobia Toolkit 2018) has cited state institutions such as the Charity Commission as being accused of promoting an Islamophobic agenda, in particular after a former Henry Jackson Society member became its chair in 2012. In particular the focus on Muslim charities under the new regime as possible incubators or supporters of ‘extremism’ (Belaon, 2014 for Claystone) has added to pre-existing charges from Muslim civil society that their charities were always under more intense scrutiny than similar charities from different faith and non-faith backgrounds (Kroessin, 2007).

In 2014 an investigation by the think-tank Claystone revealed that 38% of all disclosed investigations initiated between 1st January 2013 and 23rd April 2014 by the Charity Commission were against Muslim charities. The sheer scale of the revelations surprised even those who have suspected Charity Commission bias. Muslims comprise less than 5% of the total UK population so to be over-represented over seven-fold in investigation statistics revealed much about the operations of the statutory regulatory body governing UK charities. In recent years scores of Muslim charities have been subjected to a disproportionate number of inquiries by the Commission, some of them on more than one occasion, often after complaints from politically motivated groups such as the pro-Israeli Zionist lobby.

The injustice of this is compounded by the lack of action or limited action taken against avowedly Zionist organisations when found in breach of Charity Commission guidelines. A case in point involves the various complaints against the charity UK Torem (White, 2014 and IHRC, 2014). The charity was found to be sending funds to organisations in Israel operating in illegal settlements as well as some which fund avowedly racist personnel and or send military equipment to IDF soldiers.

GATEKEEPING

The operation of pro-Zionist groups and individuals as gatekeepers to Muslim CSO participation is a prominent feature of the UK's political architecture at the current time. CSOs that toe an Israel-friendly line routinely find themselves selected for participation while those who are avowedly anti-Zionist find themselves treated as outcasts. It cannot be right that the pro-Israel lobby determines which Muslims are or are not consulted by the government.

The furore in 2018 surrounding the Labour Party's adoption of a controversial definition of anti-Semitism highlighted a further shrinking of the political space available to CSOs. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's definition with its eleven non-exhaustive examples has been foisted upon countries and institutions in what amounts to a cynical political campaign to render off-limits any criticism of Israel and its founding philosophy.

The aim of those who wish to equate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism is simply to curtail opposition of any kind to Israel and its policies. Although the distinction between the two is self-evident and well documented some supporters of Israel would like CSOs and other critics to sign up to a collective act of intellectual self-censorship so that the uncomfortable facts remain unspoken and, by extension, unchallenged.

Bizarrely this targets many Jews and Jewish groups, who often work with Muslim CSOs in their pro-Palestinian activism and solidarity work and delegitimises equality and social justice movements everywhere.

CONCLUDING THOUGHT: DELEGITIMISATION

All of the above have contributed to the delegitimisation of some Muslim or Muslim led CSOs in particular but also Muslim civil society and wider aspects of civil society in general. Political actors and groups need to urgently consider the direction of travel and the precedents set by the above as they determine what type of society we have already become, but also indicate a future where political space and the possibilities for social transformation have shrunk enormously. At the same time, we are already looking at upsurges in street level violence as well as far-right mobilisation, and the shift in all respects of political discourse to nationalist and populist policies.

The direction of travel is more than worrying. Urgent action needs to be taken by political actors and parties.

In view of the above we make the following recommendations:

1. The government must protect the right to question the legitimacy of the State of Israel and not allow it to be subsumed under anti-Semitism definitions.
2. The government must abandon its current policy of favouring and accepting the views of only those CSOs which sing from its hymn sheet. Such an approach is counter-productive. Consultations should be broad based and policies/appointments made should carry the backing of the communities they impact.
3. Muslim charities must not be arbitrarily investigated or subjected to stricter surveillance than other charities. If charities' activities are restricted only to be later cleared, a full public apology must be issued to help restore their credibility alongside the offer of compensation.
4. Political parties need to robustly challenge the culture of cynical opportunism that has seen political figures, often in senior positions, cynically exploit anti-Muslim narratives to curry favour in an increasingly racist, Islamophobic and xenophobic environment. Legitimate and uncontroversial political opinions must not be allowed to become the subjects of vilification and even criminalisation simply because they are not supported by political parties or figures in power.
5. Effective mechanism both within political parties and governmental institutions that challenge defamatory and hate speech by political actors, institutions and the state need to be created and implemented.
6. As with (5) with regard to the media. There also needs to be a re-evaluation regarding the relationships between political parties, actors and certain media groups and journalists.
7. CSOs and civil society space needs to be removed from the securitised gaze.
8. Civil Society space must be widened and political parties and actors need to take a moral stance when CSOs – particularly those they may not agree with – are egregiously attacked and vilified.



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APPENDIX B

Counter-Islamophobia Kit

Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives - UK

Ms Arzu Merali

July 2017

Working Paper 10

Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States.

CIK Project (Counter Islamophobia Kit)

Ms Arzu Merali

Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives - UK

CERS, 2017

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Counter-Islamophobia Kit



About the CIK Project

The *Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States* (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the first workstream of the project which was concerned to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. This output comprises eight papers on conditions in individual member states and a comparative overview paper containing Key Messages. In addition this phase also includes assessment of various legal and policy interventions through which the European human rights law apparatus has attempted to conceptually analyse and legally address the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamophobia. The second workstream examines the operation of identified counter-narratives in a selected range of discursive environments and their impact and influence on public opinion and specific audiences including media and local decision-makers. The third workstream will be producing a transferable EU toolkit of best practice in the use of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, the key messages, findings and toolkits will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

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1. Introduction

This report overviews narratives of Islamophobia in the United Kingdom using the Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR) (Ameli, 2010) to map the overlapping and interlocking prevalence and impact of such narratives on social and political discourse. This report will overview existing work in the field that measures and narrates the impact of Islamophobia, a background to the Muslim community/ies in the UK, the discussion around definitions of Islamophobia, historical and current events that impact the relationship between the understanding of Muslims in society and their experiences, before outlining the key anti-Muslim narratives operating in British political, media and other discourses. The praxis that reproduces and sometimes undergirds such narratives is pivotal in understanding what Islamophobia is and provides a key tool for policy makers and academics to assess what and how impactful a narrative of Islamophobia is, and Sayyid's (2012) argument regarding the performative functions of Islamophobia provides a key frame for this report in its presentation of the relationship between the environment created by hate discourses (Ameli and Merali, 2015) and its impact.

Quantitative survey results conducted by Ameli and Merali in 2014 survey results on experiences of Islamophobia found that in comparison to four years earlier, all but one of the 17 experiences measured in terms of experience of had worsened, and in some cases catastrophically so. In the cases of discrimination at work or school, the experiencing of Islamophobia almost doubled (Ameli and Merali, 2015). In terms of the recurrence of seeing Islamophobia in the media, in 2010 60% of the sample stated they had seen Islamophobia in the media. In 2014 this had risen to 90%, with 40% of those surveyed saying they saw it all the time. Significantly between the survey work of Ameli et al. in 2004 (2004a, b, 2005, 2006a and b, 2007)) and 2014, there appeared to be a collapse in faith in the political process amongst Muslims. The results of quantitative surveys used in previous studies (Ameli et al., 2004a,b, 2007 and 2011) the findings were that Muslims sought to seek redress to the many ills they faced including demonized media representation, through engagement in politics, whether as activists, members of political parties or through lobbying. In 2014, this was replaced by a feeling that politicians were also prime producers of Islamophobia and that taking part in political

processes brought no benefits and if anything brought more chagrin onto Muslims. In quantitative terms, in 2010, 56.7% disagreed with the proposition that they had seen political policies negatively affecting Muslims, in 2014 only 14.7% gave the same answer. Where before the media (Ameli et al., 2011) was blamed as the main culprit in creating an Islamophobic climate, the government and political class now seems to be much more at the forefront of Muslim attention. In 2010, 34.2% agreed or strongly agreed that they had seen such policies but in 2014 this had increased to 59.2%.

Ameli and Merali argue that the experience of Islamophobia as understood by Muslims provided within the context of the McPherson Inquiry (1999) and subsequently the Mubarek Inquiry (2006) that the perception by Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim) that they had experienced anti-Muslim racism is enough for the matter to be actionable by whichever appropriate authority. Coming as it does from the perspective of law enforcement that starts with the premise of how to tackle in practical terms the rise of hate crime and discrimination, it acknowledges the existence of the sociological phenomenon of Islamophobia without (as the law also arguably does) requiring a precise definition of what Islamophobia is. Additionally in developing the Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR), Ameli (2010) argues that minoritized groups suffer racism as a form of overlapping structural phenomenon (ideology, policy and law, media representation and political discourse) which culminate in its more extreme manifestations, a hate environment. Again, the importance of experience as the effect of narratives employed in the various discourses of culture and praxis provide here the crux of understanding what Islamophobia means to Muslims. The discussion as to what Islamophobia means has been prominent in the United Kingdom since the launch of the Runnymede Trust report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for US All* in 1997. This discussion runs parallel to the approach of Ameli and Merali (2005) and civil society activism in combating Islamophobia. The necessity for both civil society and law and law enforcement to adopt such a route lies in part in the various attempts to define Islamophobia since the launch of the Runnymede Trust report.

The Runnymede Trust report, as critiqued by Sayyid (2014), gives no history to the term ‘Islamophobia’, ‘giving the impression that it is a neologism without any historical depth and completely inspired by the contingencies of “race relations” in Britain.’ Its conceptualization of Islamophobia is to break the idea of it as a bias or prejudice based upon closed ideas of Islam (of which six are cited) and Muslims (of which two are cited). These closed views seek to assign to Muslims immutability of character, and as Sayyid argues, this implicitly recognizes the racialization of Muslims. However the report contextualizes itself upon a recognition of the idea of Muslims as ‘political subject’ post The Rushdie Affair of 1988-9, and as such both the history and impact of long running cultural tropes, colonial praxis and post-colonial domestic contingencies of the British state with regard to ‘race relations’ of such racialization, were lost to the formulation of what anti-Muslim hostility or prejudice looked and felt like. Situating itself in an essentially communitarian framework, the report left itself open to critique from all quarters but primarily from a state and institutions claiming a liberal ideological position. Thus in defining Islamophobia in terms of a hatred of the ideological aspects of Muslim life that are immutable, they raise the following problems for Muslims as political subjects and areas of attack by an establishment claiming to be basing its critique on liberal values:

“(i) it confirms the racists’ perceptions that Muslims can’t help their inferiority. They are innately stupid, immoral or even amoral;

“(ii) it posits Muslims as an ethical problem for liberal society to come to terms with (we disagree with their internal ethics therefore should we intervene or respect their boundaries?)

“(iii) it problematises Muslims at the point of their interaction with society at large i.e. Muslims come to our attention when they try to interact with wider society and this interaction is inevitably problematic as they can never adjust to the morally accepted norm;

“(iv) it requires Muslims to make concessions if they are to be recognised as participants in mainstream society (we shall discuss this in greater detail later)

“(v) it confines Muslim participation in wider society to their identity as Muslims. Therefore it is difficult to find a practising or obvious Muslim holding senior positions in the legal professions, political parties, the media etc. These people are confined to being ‘professional Muslims’ in society, and as such they cannot participate in the present structures let alone participate in changing those structures.” (Shadjareh and Merali, 2002).

As Shadjareh and Merali (2002) further argue, this definition and its focus on immutability leaves out the Islamophobia of those who challenge Muslims upon the basis of their choice to be Muslim, and leaves Muslims facing anti-Muslim racism with the charge that to better their lot they must distance themselves from Muslim belief and practice. A key example of this was the article published in The Independent newspaper the day after the launch of the Runnymede Trust report by Polly Toynbee in which she declared, “I am an Islamophobe and proud of it.” (Toynbee, 1997 cited in Meer, 2010)

Vakil (2009) argues that problem of Islamophobia required an act of naming the function of which was fulfilled by the Runnymede report. He contends that rather than discussing the history of the term, it is more productive to discuss its genealogy, as the process of naming has less to do with historical developments but more to do with the political language and landscape that caused the phenomenon to be named i.e.:

“...to ask not when the term Islamophobia was coined but what political language was required for the concept of Islamophobia to be meaningful. If Islamophobia, a la Runnymede, “(was) coined because there (was) a new reality that need(ed) naming”, and, more crucially, “so that it (could) be identified and acted against”, contra Runnymede, what is significant is not what it names, which is also not a centuries old fear and dread of Islam and Muslims (much less the “unfounded(ness)” of such hostility), but rather that it names; and in naming, the namer it bespeaks rather than the named. Quite the opposite of victimhood, then, Islamophobia is about contestation and the power to set the political vocabulary and legal ground of recognition and redress. It is about the subjectification of Muslim political subject(ivities).”

Accordingly, Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006) argue that Islamophobia as a form of racism is not exclusively a social phenomenon but also an epistemic question. Epistemic racism allows the

Westernized state not to have to listen to the critical thinking of Muslims, whether on domestic or international issues. While the authors argue this particularly in the context of the negation of Islamic thinkers, this can be extended to the idea that Muslims per se, functioning even in the mold of model 'Western' citizen, are negated as legitimate actors with legitimate concerns, let alone: 'The thinking that comes from non-Western locations [that] is not considered worthy of attention except to represent it as "uncivilised," "primitive," "barbarian," and "backward".' (Grosfoguel and Mileants, 2006)

This type of epistemic racism allows the state to unilaterally decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility of serious inter-cultural dialogue. Thus Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only manifested in the labour market, education, public sphere, global war against terrorism, or the global economy, but also in the epistemological battleground about the definition of the priorities of the state and the world today (Grosfoguel and Mileants, 2006)

Thus Islamophobia as understood as a form of racialization that not only discriminates against Muslims, but negates Muslim agency and aspiration forms the crux of an understanding of how Islamophobia functions in the UK context. Contextualizing the type of experiences Ameli et al. (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2011 and 2015) outline, with anti-Muslim narratives highlights narratives outlined below provides a context wherein, the claims of subjectification can be understood.

2. State of the art in research on Islamophobia

Taking Klug's (2013) argument that anti-Semitism curtails the ability of Jews to elaborate what their Jewishness means, Sayyid (2014) argues that Islamophobia can be understood as more than simply an expression of hatred or fear (as the Runnymede Trust report in summary does), Islamophobia needs to be understood as an undermining of the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves into the future. By using such an approach this reading of Islamophobia's focus is on the performative functions of Islamophobia that cause the curtailment of Muslims' ability to articulate themselves as Muslims / citizens and as Muslim citizens

Sayyid's focus on the performance of Islamophobia covers six practices: (i) attacks on persons perceived to be Muslim; (ii) attacks on properties considered to be Muslim in nature; (iii) acts of intimidation e.g. marches through Muslim areas, anti-Muslim advertising campaigns etc.; (iv) acts in an institutional setting be they forms of harassment, discrimination or another; (v) incidents in which there is a sustained and systematic elaboration of comments in the public domain that disparage Muslims and/or Islam e.g. publishing the Qur'an with Muhammad listed as the author or recycling medieval Christian polemics as the "truth" about Islam or reading specific crimes as being motivated by Islam or Muslim culture. These five clusters tend to be carried out by individuals or organizations (private or public). The state may facilitate them through benign neglect or refusal to provide

adequate safeguards, or to challenge such actions, but it is not actively or openly involved in the perpetuation of these incidents. However Sayyid's other set of practices is actively tied to enactment by the State. This can include surveillance, differential treatment by the police, Islamophobia in the criminal justice system, and any act or policy that can be seen as targeting in sole or large part that part of the population which is identified as Muslim.

In looking at the acts as a means to define Islamophobia by its impact on curtailing Muslim agency, expression and forms of futurity, this approach need not be bogged down in the abovementioned disagreements over the term Islamophobia and what its precise definition is. This approach understands Muslims as victims of racialization and racialized discourse and thus victims of racism in the same manner (and often through the same performative functions) as Jews are victims of racism.

Current research into the impact of Islamophobia has focused largely but not solely on Islamophobia in the media in particular news media, and on issues relating to the impact of securitization measures. Poole's various work on Islamophobia in the media has been critical in bringing together the various narrative strands of Muslim demonization, many of which are outlined below. Poole's research stretches back to pre-9/11 and provides a link between the cultural tropes identified in English culture by Progler (2008) as inhering key anti-Muslim leitmotifs that undergird an English (and latterly North American) Orientalism and Islamophobia (Ameli and Merali, 2014 and 2015). Crucially, they also highlight that 9/11 is not a key marker in the trajectory of Islamophobic narrative in a way that even the sympathetic commentariat often considers it to be.

This can be elaborated in various forms including the charge of entryism. The denial of Muslim agency, and accusations leveled of 'entryism' and privilege by organizations like the Henry Jackson Society (Griffin et al., 2014) serve to curtail Muslims' elaboration of themselves and exclude them from acceptable social practice. This is highly impactful on the way Muslim civil society operates with many major organizations from the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Cage, IHRC and MEND all targeted as somehow inimical to British values, or acceptable political and civil society norms from the commentariat, the closing down of civil society spaces wherein Muslims can function as Muslims for whichever cause is greatly narrowed in a manner that serves the interest of governmental institutions that simultaneously eschew charges of institutional bias e.g. the refusal to include critical expertise on, and the subsequent failure by government to defend its own Cross-Government Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group when it was attacked by parts of the media for promoting entryism (see below).

Thus forms of Muslim deviance such as sexual perversion and criminality, misogyny and violence as inherent Muslim traits pre-exist in reportage (Poole, 2011 and 2002). Ameli et al (2007) also look at news media but widen the discussion on Muslim representation to literature and film, in an attempt to contextualize the cultural underpinnings of Islamophobic representation. They argue that:

“What brings ‘Western’ texts from separate intellectual disciplines as well as different historical eras together in a single discourse... is the common culture and ideology intrinsic to the discursive practices through which they produce knowledge... These powerful discursive practices make it difficult for individuals to think beyond them. A demonised oriental / Muslim ‘other’ is understood as the normal(ised) oriental/ Muslim ‘other’ and the question of critically examining such representation is a non-starter in the minds of an audience which understands such representation to be given upon which to better base their understanding...”

This function of Islamophobia across different forms of representation forms part of what Ameli (2010) develops in the dominant hate model of intercultural relations as hate representation, part of an overlapping and mutually reinforcing set of state and social behaviors that constitute in extreme manifestation a hate environment against a minority group. The other overlapping functions are political discourse, law and policy, and undergirding all three, ideology.

The ideological underpinnings of state actions in particular regard to securitization lends research in this field to conform to the DHMIR model. Thus works such as Kundnani’s (2012 and 2015) are both indicative of state performances of Islamophobia as per Sayyid and the ideology behind and praxis of Islamophobia that creates an environment of hate against Muslims (as per Ameli, 2012). The outcome of the hate environment in Ameli et al’s thesis is that street level Islamophobia, and such acts as fall under the initial five sets of Islamophobia in Sayyid’s contention arise as a result of state praxis and ideology rather than independently of it. In this context even the rise of a far-right polity and activism is an outcome rather than a case of Islamophobia.

Such work has moved beyond Runnymede definitions of Islamophobia as sets of beliefs and prejudices held largely about Islam and sometimes about Muslims amongst individuals, whether lay people of those working in institutions. Nevertheless the idea of Islamophobia as functioning on the level of individual prejudice of those holding closed views about Muslims and Islam is one that has traction amongst certain advocacy groups and campaigns that seek to change e.g. media perceptions on a case by case basis.¹

Whilst such initiatives have doubtless seen resolution for individual cases of Islamophobia perpetuated by the media, they also serve to perpetuate (without a wider critique) the idea of post-

¹ Enterprises like that of Miqdaad Versi (2017) brought successful challenges to media misrepresentation using existing complaints mechanisms, they undergirded the fact that structural racism as a point of mobilization for oppressed communities has not registered as a need for social transformation. The Stop Funding Hate campaign took a more strategic view, recognizing both the role and responsibility of media as institution(s) and arguing that advocacy related to their corporate interests would be the best way to bring about change, thus acknowledging that the campaign to get large companies to remove advertising would effect change due to damage to business interests rather than a cultural shift or acknowledgement of moral culpability (Merali, 2017b). Advocacy organization MEND looks to: “tackle Islamophobia via advocacy in Westminster and media engagement coupled with empowerment of grass roots British Muslims with media and political literacy “(MEND, undated). Again, the focus is implicitly on the idea of Islamophobia as misperception or prejudice by powerful individuals which can be remedied by participation of Muslims in these institutions, rather than a call for a ‘sea-change’ in the way that institutions think about Muslims and Islam (Ameli et al.. 2007).

racial state (Sian, 2010) which in turn strengthens those opposed to tackling Islamophobia as a form of institutionalized racism.

Civil society mobilization against Prevent measures varies from attempts to have the policy moderated or reformed, to calls to scrap it in its entirety (Jones, et al., 2015).

NGO concerns with the rise in hate crimes against Muslims do not need to be informed by a particular definition of what Islamophobia is. Insofar as British law enforcement bodies, notably the various police services across the UK have acknowledged that Islamophobia exists and the law states that Islamophobic motivation can be an aggravating factor in the prosecution of a crime, the recognition of Islamophobia as a performative function operates. Whilst that understanding in both law and at a police policy level exists, a range of critiques of the implementation of the law by the police exists at the civil society level, notably that there is no consistent recording practice, and that there is either no or very poor training of officers and front line staff thus undermining attempts to record and prosecute crimes where motivation may be Islamophobic (Ameli and Merali, 2015, see also MEND, 2014 and 2016). In a comparative study of Muslim experiences in the UK, Ameli and Merali found that there was a 4% rise in the experience of violent attacks by Muslims from their previous research in 2010 and their follow-up in 2014 (Ameli and Merali, 2015). Various reports from NGOs and other civil society organisations across the period defined by the launch of the Runnymede Trust report have employed third party reporting methods to present data on anti-Muslim experiences (see e.g. Citizens Advice Bureau, 2005, IHRC, 2000, Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010 and TellMAMA, 2016, as examples). However issues such as persistent underreporting, lack of a national reporting and monitoring infrastructure, and resources issues have meant that such initiatives have been confronted with unsustainability issues as well as presenting statistics based on organizational reach rather than representative samples. This leads to the situation critiqued by Bourne (2010) where the basis of claims regarding the undoubted prevalence of anti-Muslim hatred is hard to gauge. The problems raised by third party reporting have been addressed variously through the use of representative sampling in local areas and nationally (e.g. Sheridan, 2002 and Ameli et.al, 2004b, Ameli et al. 2011 and 2015), and by discrete monitoring and analysis exercises e.g. Institute of Race Relations reports on UK Deaths with a (known or suspected) racial element (see the wider Fatalities and Racism project, IRR et al.. undated).

The experience of racial profiling under anti-terrorism stop and search powers has been critiqued by various NGOs as a given praxis, within a shared understanding between NGOs and institutions, specifically law enforcement related, as to what racial profiling means and how this concept has been and can be extended to cover the profiling of Muslims as a racialized group (see Rowlands, 2010 for Statewatch, IHRC, 2008, Ansari, 2005 and 2006 for IHRC and Kundnani, 2006 for Institute of Race Relations as examples).

Concerns raised in the work of Chakroborti and Zempi (2014) regarding the treatment of women in niqab at a street level, highlight the increasing concern at the grassroots level of the attacks on Muslim women. Whilst organizations claiming there is a preponderance of attacks on Muslim women usually operate a third-party reporting system upon which they base their claims (thus arguably it

appears Muslim women are less reluctant to report Islamophobia than Muslim men), Ameli and Merali (2015, 2011, 2004 and 2000) use survey work which indicates that since their 2004 findings this is not the case. However they do note that the type of attacks faced by Muslim women are fixated on their identity as Muslim women, rather than simply as Muslim. The nature of attacks examined in an overview of cases available for analysis showed an overwhelming fixation on either pulling off pieces of clothing (usually face veils or headscarves) and touching. Both types of attacks stem from the sexualization of the female Muslim subject and the idea that she is aberrant to British norms by not allowing herself to be viewed in the same way as other women in the UK, and not allowing herself to be touched (Ameli and Merali, 2015). There is clearly a gendered aspect to Islamophobic acts that can be traced back to the tropes around gender that will be discussed below. Various authors and NGOs have highlighted the prevalence of gender specific hate crime directed at Muslim women in various European settings including the UK. Many infer that visible Muslimness expressed in forms of dress is a marker of negative experience, with Šeta (2016 for ENAR) arguing that Muslim women experience greater frequency of hate crimes than Muslim men based on third-party reporting and monitoring projects in various countries including the UK.

Other scholars, NGOs and authors refer to the differential treatment of Muslim protestors at pro-Gaza / Palestine demonstrations by police and subsequently prosecutions of protestors as a result, highlight that there can be argued to be such a thing as one law for Muslims and one for everyone else (Majeed, 2010, Gilmore, 2013). The basis upon which police profiling took place (IHRC, 2002) and upon which sentences were based (Majeed, 2010 and Gilmore, 2013) took as their basis Muslim delinquency as a starting point.

Accusations against state institutions such as the Charity Commission promoting an Islamophobic agenda, in particular after a former Henry Jackson Society member became its chair in 2012, have been made, by inter alia the head of charity leaders group Acevo, and Cage, with other third sector figures also raising concerns from within and without the Muslim charitable sector (Burne James, 2014). In particular the focus on Muslim charities under the new regime as possible incubators or supporters of 'extremism' (Belaon, 2014 for Claystone) has added to pre-existing charges from Muslim civil society that their charities were always under more intense scrutiny than similar charities from different faith and non-faith backgrounds (Kroessin, 2007).

Nevertheless there have been changes and shifts in institutional cultures regarding Islamophobia.

Post the 7-7 attacks in the UK, IHRC noted (2006b) that both the Metropolitan Police Service and national media had made a concerted effort not to repeat mistakes made in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, including unfounded speculation on the religion and alleged religious motivations of the perpetrators. Despite the aforesaid failings, police services have recognized the need to record Islamophobic incidents. However, such shifts have been countered by the continued and in some cases new forms of Islamophobic behaviors from institutions. The perpetration of Islamophobia by police services has shifted from racialized profiling for delinquency e.g. in the prelude to the riots of the summer of 2001, to racialized policing that focuses on Muslims as potential terrorists, a form of delinquency that is set out by the raft of anti-terrorism laws and policies as an entirely different regime from existing criminal codes. The impact then of laws to record and potentially prosecute individual acts of Islamophobia pale into insignificance when the service charged with doing so is

perpetrating Islamophobia on a mass scale. The findings of Ameli et al. (2004b) that gender was no longer a variable in the experience of Islamophobia was explained in large part by the huge number of arrests under anti-terrorism laws of Muslim men. This meant that in 2004, 80% of the sample, whether male or female had experienced Islamophobia, a jump from 45% in 2000 (IHRC, 2000) where gender was an impactful variable.²

3. Background: Muslim population in the country

According to the 2011 census, the most comprehensive and recent data available, the Muslim population of England and Wales numbered 2,706,066 comprising 4.8% of the total population³. In Northern Ireland the respective figures stood at 3832 and 0.2% (Northern Ireland). Of these 52% were men and 48% women. Both the other territories of the United Kingdom contain proportionately smaller Muslim minorities. The same census recorded Scotland as having 76,737 Muslims or 1.4% of the total population (Statistics and Research Agency)⁴.

Muslims in England and Wales are ethnically diverse. Two-thirds (68 per cent) were from an 'Asian' background, including 'Pakistani' (38 per cent), 'Bangladeshi' (14.9 per cent) and 'Indian' (7.3 per cent). The proportion of Muslims reporting as 'Black/African/Caribbean/Black British' was 10 per cent while those identifying themselves as 'White' stood at 7.8 per cent. Those reporting as 'Arab' totaled 6.6 per cent, 'Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Group' 3.8 per cent and 'Any Other Ethnic Group' 4.1 per cent. Just over half of all Muslims (53 per cent) in 2011 were born outside the UK.

The Muslim population in England and Wales has a younger age profile than the rest of the population. Approximately 33% are aged 15 years or under compared to 19% of the overall population. At the other end of the age spectrum only four per cent of Muslims were aged 65 or over against 16 per cent for the overall population. The median age of the Muslim population is 25 years, compared to 40 years for the overall population⁵.

The distribution profile of Muslims in England and Wales is one of urban concentration. 76% of Muslims live in four regions: London, West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire and The Humber reflecting post-war patterns of immigration and settlement in industrial conurbations. Of the 348 local authority districts in England and Wales, 35 contain a Muslim population of 10% or more (MCB, 2015).

² The 2000 and 1999 figures showed that if you were a woman your experience of Islamophobia was much higher than if you were a man.

³ <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/fullstorywhatdoesthecensustellusaboutreligionin2011/2013-05-16>

⁴ <http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/Equality/Equalities/DataGrid/Religion/RelPopMig>

⁵ https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf

Unlike Christianity, Islam, in common with other non-Anglican religions, enjoys no official recognition in the British political system. As the established religion, the Church of England is the state church and is presided over by the reigning monarch who is at once the head of state and its Supreme Governor. The practical product of this historic relationship is that the Church of England is allocated 26 permanent seats in the Upper House of Parliament.

The first major attempt at association-forming by Muslims on the basis of faith came in 1970 with the formation of the Union of Muslim Organisations. While it presented itself as an umbrella group representing the Muslims of the UK and Eire, the UMO's affiliation with the Islamic Cultural Centre in London and by extension the representatives of foreign governments who form the Centre's trustees, prevented it from making any significant traction.

The Satanic Verses controversy in 1988 provided the impetus for Muslims to organize politically in response to domestic concerns. Characterized by fragmentation along ethnic, nationalistic, sectarian lines and even according to political affiliations in their countries of origin, attempts were made by the Muslim Parliament and the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) to form bodies geared to representing Muslims in Britain.

The Muslim Parliament pitched itself as an independent body fighting Muslims' corner against an antagonistic state. At the time British government policy on the Satanic Verses affair and the conflict in majority-Muslim Bosnia was the subject of vigorous opposition from the Muslim community. In its structure the Muslim Parliament sought to replicate the British parliament by having its members popularly elected by UK Muslims. However, from the outset it lacked popular support because it was seen as a creation of Iran owing to its inception under the aegis of the Iranian sponsored Muslim Institute and its charismatic director Dr. Kalim Siddiqui who was a vocal supporter of the Iranian revolution. It eventually fell apart after the death of its founder Dr. Kalim Siddiqui in 1996.

The British government shunned the Muslim Parliament preferring the more conciliatory UKACIA as a negotiating partner. UKACIA itself used the opening provided by the government's eschewal of the Muslim Parliament to secure access to ministers. At its inception UKACIA saw itself as an interlocutor for Muslim concerns but in 1997 morphed into the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). An umbrella group for several hundred UK Muslim organizations, the MCB saw itself as the major representative body for the Muslim community in its dealings with the state. Initially supported by the government as a potentially reliable partner the MCB found itself shunned when it began to oppose government policy most notably with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and anti-terrorism legislation that flowed from the Sept 11, 2001 attacks on the US.

The result was that more Muslim organisations emerged to fill the "acceptable partner" void, none of which incidentally, can claim any meaningful level of support within the Muslim community.

Thus hitherto, the British state's relationship with the Muslim population can be said to be one of trying to co-opt it by encouraging the formation of and/or seeking out willing groups. Since the turn of the millennium this has been done against the background of a strategy that aims to engineer a Muslim community that is both less conservative in outlook and readily compliant with government policy. The main tool for this social engineering program has been anti-terrorism and anti-extremism legislation.

4. Background: the formation of anti-Muslim hatred

The role of the British in the transatlantic slave trade brings the nascent imperial power into direct colonial contact with Muslim subjects, those perceived to Muslims subjects. The skepticism with respect to the humanity of the indigenous would be transposed and readapted to the African slave (Maldanao-Torres, 2014). This fundamental questioning of the humanity of those enslaved forms a basis for discourses of sub-alternization in the modern era (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006) that finds expression in British narratives of 'otherness'.

Whilst British involvement with the slave trade began in the reign of Elizabeth I, there was clearly interaction with and adaptation of established narratives that justify slavery. Best, for example, sought biblical justification for enslavement in a British narrative that claimed Africans to be the descendants of Ham (Noah's son) cursed to be dark skinned for his sin (Woodward, 1999). The collapse of the idea of Muslimness and Blackness, and Muslimness and barbarity (viewed through the European conceptualization of 'Saracen' in the context of the Crusades (historically) and the rise of the Ottoman caliphate (contemporaneously) provide a context for a sustained narrative of the Muslim as subaltern.

With the colonization of India by the British we see another set of interactions where political expediency demands another set of justifications for control and subjugation. Padamsee (undated) cites the term 'mussulmanophobic' (a phrase coined by one official to explain the Indian Civil Service mindset in 1857 at the time of the Mutiny), as an apt descriptive analysis of the perception amongst the service that there had been a co-ordinated Muslim conspiracy that led to the Mutiny. The facets of this conspiracy ascribed fanaticism, bloodthirstiness and the idea of wider Muslim complicity based on bonds of faith rather than evidence (which official enquiries refuted as existing). This narrative also ascribed the idea of Muslims as inherently inimical to the British and requiring mobilization of the Raj along sectarian lines to control the program. Thus a specific policy addressed to Muslims or sets of policies was born. Padamsee recalls that the persuasiveness of the narrative undergirded relations between the colonial authorities and Muslims for the rest of the century. The retaking of Delhi in 1857, notes Padamsee, was accompanied in this vein by a symbolic 'unofficial ceremony that took place in the palace of the deposed Mughal emperor in which English officers solemnly ate pork and drank wine. Cohn refers to this tableau as the 'desacralisation' of the Mughal palace, and therefore Mughal rule...'

1. The concept of despotism which provided a foil to internal European excesses, be they of the Republican or monarchical variety
2. The imposture of the Islamic Prophet, used by the likes of Voltaire to discredit all religions
3. The seraglio, which negated sexuality

These tropes can be found regurgitated in various ways. This can be seen in the idea of sexuality negated. Muslim male perversion – child groomers, predators against vulnerable white women etc. – has been the staple of much media and political representation. Likewise an idea of Muslim female perversion has developed (further) around ‘veils’, ‘burqas’ and ‘headscarves’. This also inheres in headlines and stories relating to the undermining of British values by the so-called Trojan Horse affair, whereby the idea of single-sex schooling or gender segregation again infer perverse sexuality. Issues around the normative teaching of homosexuality are also invoked repeatedly, highlighting again an idea of Muslim moral failure (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

The issue of face-veiling however is not the full extent of demonization of Muslim female identity. It is a marker of it. Social and cultural mores regarding Muslims, seen through the prism of sexuality are, as with other tropes, prone to shifting symbols and narratives. During the course of colonization in Africa and Asia, where Islam was prevalent, the idea of Muslims as having a licentious sexual culture (in comparison to a modest, chaste Christian culture) abounded, hence the seraglio and the harem. However, over the last one hundred years this has reversed as the narrative for post-colonial domination has turned to ‘freedom’ and individual liberty. The harem - previously a sign of sexual license, is now seen as an arena of sexual subjugation. The only constant is the idea that whatever Muslims and Islam are, culturally they can only be seen through a homogenized and limited narrative lens.

From the foregoing it is clear that demonization of Muslims has been both latent in Anglophonic culture but also part of a cycle of policy and narrative over the course of centuries where such tropes have served politically expedient purposes. This conforms to Vakil’s (2009) contention that the naming of ‘Islamophobia’ in the post-Rushdie context is a recognition not of a new and more apparent problem within the narrow confines of British race relations in the late 1980s through to the late 1990s, but the articulation of a term that can capture the experiences and dehumanization long felt by Muslims as a result of particular interaction with, in this case, British institutions and the British state, whether as citizen or colonial subject or slave.

5. Categorical list of most dominant narratives of Muslim hatred

It is significant that there has been a consistent feeling that political discourse has worsened with

regard to Islamophobia and racism, particularly after the 2016 murder of MP Jo Cox. It is alarming not least because the survey of Muslims in 2014 by the IHRC found that between the 2010 and 2014 results for the question, “How often have you heard Islamophobic comments by politicians?” had significantly worsened.

The ten narratives (not ranked as below) to be overviewed:

(i) Disloyalty and the Threat to Internal Democracy

The rise of the narrative of Muslims as disloyal (and therefore in need of social engineering and state intervention), and its development into a narrative of Muslims as ostracized and outliers who perfect strategies of entryism as a means to inveigle themselves into institutions and positions of power has picked up a pace in recent years. This has then been used to imply that there is a substantive threat to internal democracy from Muslim participation in civic life – even when the model of participation is based on established models of civic engagement. This then feeds further into the idea of Muslim deviance and threat, and undergirds policies that seek to curtail Muslim engagement in civil institutions as well as silence their protests regarding any number of issues.

The idea of the disloyal Muslim is not new, and the specter of the ‘cricket test’ was first raised vis a vis the perceived loyalties or lack thereof to the British state by Lord Tebbit, a former Conservative MP and minister in 1990 who claimed that British born South Asians failed to show patriotic allegiance to the country citing their perceived loyalty to the cricket teams of their ethnic heritage. This trope has resurfaced many times, with Tebbit himself claiming post the 7-7 attacks in London, that had action been taken when he first raised the idea, the attacks may have been prevented (Daily Mail, 2015). Despite much criticism the concept has not faded and resurfaces frequently with regard to Muslim disloyalty claims.

Tony Blair’s undermining of the idea of Muslim grievance regarding British foreign policy is an example of how the ideas of legitimate political protest and expressing political ideas were demonized with regard to Muslims. In a TV interview recorded just prior to his departure from Downing Street in 2007, he reinforced his criticism of ‘Islamists’ within the context of national security, claiming that the battle against ‘terrorists’ would be lost if mainstream society didn’t confront it, stating: “The reason we are finding it hard to win this battle is that we're not actually fighting it properly. We're not actually standing up to these people and saying, "It's not just your methods that are wrong, your ideas are absurd. Nobody is oppressing you. Your sense of grievance isn't justified.”⁶ Additionally in the same interview he stated that:” 'The idea that as a Muslim in this country that you don't have the freedom to express your religion or your views, I mean you've got far more freedom in this country than you do in most Muslim countries.” (Watt, 2007)

This intervention, as a continued extrapolation of Blair’s thinking that arguably undergirds much of New Labour’s policies since 1997, collapses the idea of Muslim domestic grievance vis a vis racism and Islamophobia, with political grievances regarding international affairs, with the idea of Muslim

⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/jul/01/uk.terrorism>

disloyalty and threat. Additionally, in highlighting the idea of a British ‘here’ as opposed to a Muslim ‘there’, he emphasized the foreignness of Muslims to the idea of Britain – a type of reverse engineered ‘cricket test’.

The idea then is that Muslim disloyalty is anti-democratic and inculcates the idea that they need disciplining ‘here’ and democratization ‘there’ by way of military adventures.

Repeated speeches and articles by Tony Blair and David Cameron, as well as other political figures and commentators, play on the idea of the UK as a tolerant country of equal opportunity, the only barriers to which are (a) a recalcitrant Muslim community unwilling to integrate; (b) the existence within state structures and institutions of Muslim community figures who are symbols of the failure of multicultural praxis. Thus the frequent ‘outing’ of Islamists by the media of the 2000s (e.g. the ‘exposé’ of Azad Ali⁷, a senior civil servant at the Treasury as a so-called Islamist that led to his removal from his post), has now changed in tone. Even participation by appointment by a minister (if that minister is Muslim) is seen as entryism, not legitimate political participation (Gilligan, 2015 cited in Ameli and Merali, 2015).

A number of the attacks on Ali were spearheaded by Andrew Gilligan, a neo-conservative leaning journalist who has held roles under the London Mayoral administration of Boris Johnson, as well as working on stories like the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair. His 2015 attack on Muslims sitting on the ‘cross-Government working group on anti-Muslim hatred’ and their appointment by erstwhile minister Baroness Sayeeda Warsi (also a Muslim), re-coined the term ‘entryism’. As Bodi (2015) argued Gilligan had:

“...devised [as] a new term for Muslims exercising their right to compete for and hold political positions. It's called entryism. Apparently it's the process whereby extremists consciously seek to gain positions of influence to better enable them to promote their own values. Wait a minute, doesn't that look like the right wing of the Tory Party?”

Thus political participation by Muslims in conventional ways are rebranded and demonized. Polling in the run-up to the selection of party candidates to stand as Mayor London in 2016 found that 1 in 3 Londoners (a city where 65% of the population is not white British) are uncomfortable with the idea of a Muslim mayor (Yougov / LBC cited in 5Pillars.com, 13 August 2015). This is despite the fact that the two key Muslim mayoral candidate candidates (Sadiq Khan of the Labour Party and Syed Kamall of the Conservative party) have held high ranking political positions. Khan was an erstwhile government Minister and a member of the Shadow Cabinet, as well as Chair of the human rights organization Liberty. Kamall is an MEP and also leader of the Conservatives in the European Parliament.

⁷ Azad Ali was a civil servant at the Treasury, as well as holding various civil society posts as a Muslim spokesperson and activist. A number of targeted media attacks in 2009 and 2010, labelled Ali an Islamist extremist and led to his resignation firstly from the Muslim Safety Forum (a body that at one stage was in consultation with the Metropolitan Police over anti-terror policing) and subsequently from his job at the Treasury.

The election campaign run by Conservative Mayoral candidate for London, Zac Goldsmith, was accused of using Islamophobia to target his Labour opponent and eventual winner Sadiq Khan. This included accusing Khan of supporting extremism and sharing a platform with an extremist. The accusation was then repeated in Parliament by the Prime Minister and subsequently out of Parliament by the Defense Minister Michael Fallon (Merali, 2017b).

The long-running idea that Muslims in the public space are problematic as expressed before 9-11 (Poole, 2011), has turned into arguments of entryism and takeover of public life. The practical impact and the injustice of this narrative are exemplified by the Fundamental British Values (FBV) policy and the Trojan Horse affair respectively, both discussed below.

(ii) Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’

Despite harshly criticizing the Trojan Horse investigations, the House of Commons Education Committee repeats supremacist notions of universalism. The Trojan Horse affair raised the specter of a concerted plan by ‘Islamists’ to take over several state schools. Reported thus in the media, it was picked up by government which launched the above litany of investigations at huge public expense, none of which found any wrong-doing on the part of those involved (bar one example of inappropriate language being used in a private messaging group amongst some teachers). What was obscured in the reporting and even the investigations was that those involved were being judged on the basis of their actions and aspirations set within otherwise acceptable norms with regard to education in the United Kingdom. As Sir Tim Brighouse (7 June 2014), a former chief education officer of Birmingham and schools commissioner for London, described as the practices of many white parents trying to use existing opportunities created by the arrival of free schools and academies to the British education system as:

“an open season for lay people and professionals keen to pursue their own eccentric ideas about schooling: and when trust or governor vacancies occur, some perpetuate the very English tradition of inviting friends to join them. When the community is white it doesn’t cause much comment. In mono-ethnic east Birmingham, however, it is seen as a Muslim plot to expose pupils to an undefined “extremism”.”

The British values which are now to be promoted in all schools are universal and an important part of what children should learn. Grosfoguel (2013) highlights how values e.g. human rights, gender equality, democracy, are represented as already existing European norms (norms which are used in clash of civilization theories like Huntington’s (Foreign Affairs, 1993) which are inherently European and mark our Eurocentric societies as superior to all others. This runs counter not just to decolonial theories but even minority rights regimes developed after the Second World War through international covenants and treaties. Whilst the right to educate your child in your faith is a right given to all parents, rights protecting various aspects of minority cultures form the basis of minority rights and were developed specifically as a result of the Holocaust and the lead up to it. Adams,

quoting the assistant deputy head at one of the affected schools (Lee Donaghy) identifies how that runs counter (Adams, 14 May 2014) to the idea of raising achievement through cultural values, and actually marginalizes minorities:

“Part of us getting excellent results has been about reflecting the wishes and needs of the community in the school. We would not have got those results without doing those things that mean that parents trust us and that kids are comfortable here.”

The Trojan Horse affair led to four separate inquiries: three ordered by the education secretary, Michael Gove, including the Ofsted inspections of 21 schools... There are also investigations by the Education Funding Agency and then a separate inquiry into extremism led by the former Met police anti-terrorism chief Peter Clarke.” Another Birmingham wide enquiry was also undertaken by Birmingham City Council, (Adams, 2014).

Even though all five enquiries found no conspiracy, yet teachers and parent governors found themselves banned from holding positions in the educational profession or as governors, schools involved were downgraded by the educational inspectorate (Ofsted) from outstanding to failing, and their internal hierarchies entirely changed by official intervention. At the time of writing some teachers have had their bans overturned with their treatment being heavily criticized by those adjudicating their cases as ‘serious procedural impropriety’ (Adams, 2016).

Despite a House of Commons Education Committee also investigating the matter and being deeply critical of the whole affair, there have been no repercussions for any of those in power, whether ministers or local authorities who pursued the extraordinary investigations. Instead there has been major damage perpetrated on the schools involved. Other schools in areas such as Tower Hamlets became the victims of what was dubbed Trojan Horse 2, as well as actual Muslim schools. Additionally, the idea of dual educational space (Ameli et al., 2005), religious rights and basic recognition of students’ identities, the rights already conferred on students by Department of Education guidelines, have all been undermined. Legitimate aspirations, such as those of Muslim educationalists, including teachers and governors, have been portrayed as sinister (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

(iii) Muslims and ‘extremism’

Political narratives of condemnation were almost universal with the erstwhile education secretary describing the Trojan Horse investigations as a process of ‘draining the swamp’, and his opposite number Tristram Hunt, criticizing Gove as being “soft” on extremism.

This idea of ‘extremism’ a more lay fascination with the idea of the Muslim ‘despot’ referred to above, has covered a variety of functions across the decades. At the time of the Rushdie Affair (1989), the term became synonymous with the idea of a British Muslim polity unwilling to adopt the value of ‘free speech’. This has ironically come to mean in the last decade inter alia, Muslims who abuse free

speech in promoting grievances. This doublestandard regarding free speech (Muslims simultaneously denying the importance of this (Rushdie affair) and abusing it and needing to be censored and / or excluded from political space and debate (unjust grievances and promotion of ‘extremism’) is illustrated as crossing political and media spheres in many ways. In 2002 Boris Johnson, then editor of *The Spectator*, claimed Muslim extremists feared women (Merali, 2002). As Mayor of London, his remarks claim that statements made by Muslims, including those expressing concern over Islamophobic language, are somehow promoting an ‘extremist’ violent agenda (Ameli and Merali, 2015). He berated the national umbrella organization, the Muslim Council of Britain, for its complaints regarding Islamophobia thus:

“To any non-Muslim reader of the Koran, Islamophobia - fear of Islam - seems a natural reaction, and, indeed, exactly what that text is intended to provoke...It is time that we started to insist that the Muslim Council of Great Britain, and all the preachers in all the mosques, extremist or moderate, began to acculturate themselves more closely to what we think of as British values.” (Hill, 8 September 2009).

In 2013, he called for parents who taught their children ‘extremist views’ to be treated as child abusers and their children taken into care (Johnson, 2 March 2014), claiming that the state had been woefully inadequate in intervening in minority affairs:

“We need to be less phobic of intrusion into the ways of minority groups and less nervous of passing judgment on other cultures. We can have a great, glorious, polychromatic society, but we must be firm to the point of ruthlessness in opposing behavior that undermines our values. Pedophilia, FGM, Islamic radicalization – to some extent, at some stage, we have tiptoed round them all for fear of offending this or that minority.”

‘Our values’ in this piece by Johnson, are set against Islamic ones (earlier in the piece he refers to British values again). By associating pedophilia and FGM with Islamic radicalization he further catalyses the imagery of the Muslim as sexual predator (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

Just as extremism cannot be defined so too is the list of ‘British Values’, raised by the Blair government as a type of ‘cricket test’ for acceptable behaviors for Muslims and Muslim civil society, incapable of definition.

The use of criteria to define extremism through a securitized lens mirrors the implementation of FBV in educational settings. A 2009, a leaked document described:

“government and civil servants were planning to widen the definition of exactly what beliefs constituted extremist views and sought their incorporation into the revised anti-terror strategy. The leaked document mentioned specifically the following issues as of particular concern to those attempting to define extremist views:

- “• They advocate a caliphate, a pan-Islamic state encompassing many countries.
- “• They promote Sharia law.
- “• They believe in jihad, or armed resistance, anywhere in the world. This would include armed resistance by Palestinians against the Israeli military.
- “• They argue that Islam bans homosexuality and that it is a sin against Allah.
- “• They fail to condemn the killing of British soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan.” (IHRC, 2009).

The teaching of British Values, named in policy documentation as FBV was a measure introduced in the wake of the Trojan Horse affair claiming to teach inter alia ‘gender equality, democracy and rule of law’ (Wintour, 2014). This list presumes itself to be a counter to the list of ‘extremist’ behaviors the Trojan Horse schools were investigated for and leaves a legacy in educational circles that posits Muslim behavior as deviant, despite such behavior being no different to that of other citizens, students or citizens’ groups. In a court judgment in 2016, one of the tropes of the Trojan Horse Affair i.e. gender segregation at school, gender discrimination against women was held not to be the case⁸. Yet, one of FBV’s premises was and continues to be based on the trope of Muslim misogyny.

- (iv) Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)

The Preventing Violent Extremism policy (PREVENT) has been in operation since 2005 across the UK, and was made a statutory obligation on all public workers through the Counterterrorism and Security Act (2015). In essence the Act made it a duty for public sector workers (e.g. doctors, teachers, social workers) to report anyone they feared was an extremist or at risk of radicalization. Whilst referrals were already under criticism before the duty was imposed, the subsequent spike in referrals has shown that the operation of anti-Muslim narratives has had a huge impact on the type of cases referred. School children in particular have found themselves to be vulnerable to referral to de-radicalization programs and / or the involvement of the police on the most spurious of reasons. This includes the referral of a child aged four, for drawing pictures of a cucumber clock (misheard to be a cooker bomb by a teacher) (PreventWatch 2016).

The Channel program is the process by which the government tries to ‘de-radicalize’ people at risk of being drawn into extremism. It is part of PREVENT, and was introduced by the government in 2006. The panel is made up of local police, social services, PREVENT officers, and their job is to create a de-radicalization plan for those identified at risk of being drawn into extremism or terrorism. Little is known of how the program operates as most of those who have been put through the program have refused to speak (Mohamed., 2015).

⁸ *The Interim Executive Board of X School v HM Chief Inspector of Education, Children's Services and Skills [2016] EWHC 2813* the Court decided that any detriment was suffered by both genders equally and therefore could not amount to sex discrimination against girls; there was no discernible detriment toward one gender over the other as both genders were denied the opportunity to interact with one another (Wilkins, 2016).

While the Channel program conjures up images of Orwell's thought police, the PREVENT program goes further in seeking to control people's ideas and beliefs. As one commentator put it: PREVENT has created a category of 'thoughtcrime' for Muslims by which certain ideas and beliefs such as the right to armed resistance, wear religious attire or conscientiously oppose homosexuality is referable to the PREVENT police (Bodi, 2015). Recently David Cameron spoke about how some in the Muslim community were quietly condoning extremist ideology and that it was not sufficient to be law abiding citizens: "For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens 'as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone'." Cameron's speech was reported perversely as "UK Muslims Helping Jihadis" by the Daily Mail. (Groves, 19 June 2015)

Sian (2013) critiques the existing Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) measures being implemented in schools:

"The rehashing of such accounts including the 'culture clash,' religious hatred, alienation and so on (Alexander 2000, xiii), are never deployed to explain white activity, as such they remain locked into assumptions replete with elements from the immigrant imaginary (Sian 2011, 118), that is a series of discursive representations based around the ontological and temporal distinction between host and immigrant (Hesse and Sayyid 2006)... As David Tyrer (2003) points out the specific marking of Muslims reinforces and '...fixes the representation of Muslims as criminalised, and thus valorises the logics of racist pathology' (184)." (Sian, 2013:6)

This 'logic' extends into the narratives of Muslim entryism and ostracism and threat in the Trojan Horse scandal as Professor Gus John sums up:

"Michael Gove, under the pretext of responding to anonymous claims in an unsigned letter, appears to be seeking to establish grounds for extending the 'Prevent Terrorism' agenda to schools with a certain percentage of Muslim students. British-born school students, teachers and governors belonging to this particular faith group are therefore likely to be subject to surveillance in much the same way as they are in further and higher education. Mr Gove presumably makes no connection between this saga, the xenophobic support for UKIP that we witnessed in the latest elections and the British Social Attitudes survey results regarding the percentage of people in the population who describe themselves as 'racist'." (2014)

Sian (2013) identifies how managing of the term Islamophobia (pre-dating the current security focus on Muslims) fuels the ability of state organs to enact policies with a deeply ideological purpose. Following Sayyid's conceptualization of Islamophobia (2010) as 'the disciplining of Muslims by reference to an antagonistic western horizon' (Sayyid 2010a, 15 as argued by Sian, 2013) Sian believes this governing or 'disciplining' of Muslim bodies can clearly be seen at work in the PVE initiative."

This meta-narrative of discipline links the foregoing to the current praxis of PVE. As the prevailing

discourse seeks to deter Muslims from speaking out against injustices either at home or abroad, any attempt not to conform to this containment or to have any sort of agency is seen as evidence of deviance (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

At the time of writing a mooted Extremism Bill appears to have been dropped from the government's legislative programme having featured in its proposed legislation for two years (Daily Record, 2017). Instead a Counter Extremism Commission has been proposed that would carry the same statutory weight as the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. The previously argued for Extremism Bill would most notably have allowed the banning of organizations deemed to be extremist. Despite leading lawyers arguing that the term 'extremism' would be difficult to define in law. It is unclear whether the Commission is a way of circumventing the problems of enactment, using the precedent of the foregoing narratives that have informed policy in a mutually constitutive way.

(v) Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman

Various tropes are subsumed in this narrative that harks back to the idea of the seraglio (Proglor, 2008 referred to above) and the women of the *harem*. Whilst the idea of the sexuality of the Muslim woman has transformed from the harlot of the harem (Ameli and Merali, 2014) to that of sexually oppressed/submissive (with veil as a symbol of this), there continues to be a concurrent dissonant narrative of Muslim women as dangerous and criminal, as well as the cultural and physical vanguard of the supposed 'Islamisation' of society.

The 'Muslim woman' as pre-eminent symbol of Muslimness has a long pedigree. Part of this stems from a cultural obsession and the fetishization of the 'veil', construed broadly and practically as types of clothing that mark Muslim women out as Muslim. These range from head coverings, face coverings, long pieces of clothing, and at different times 'ethnically' marked clothing like *shalwar kameez* and even *saris*. Of these the head-covering or potential for head covering in dress has taken on a highly politicized significance dominating discussions about Islam and Muslim in the UK at various times. The tropes can be classified as the Muslim woman/ veil: oppressed / tool of oppression; danger or criminal or terrorist / instrument of disguise or security threat; sexually oppressed / tool of sexual oppression; submissive / tool of submission and symbol of silencing; and cultural and physical vanguard of looming Islamisation by virtue of forced conversions and high birth rates.

The 'veil' as a cypher for the oppression of Muslim women has a history in recent colonial discourses, substituting the idea of the harlot of the harem, whose sexuality was constructed in the Eurocentric/colonial psyche as outrageous and in need of containment and moral redemption. It was reconstructed in time as the "submissive" and "sexually repressed" that needs liberating (Merali, 2016a). Both themes are reflected in the production of pornographic imagery of Muslim women from the Victorian era to the current era, highlighting in extremis the sexualization of the discourse around Muslim women, which is impactful when reading attacks on Muslim women at the street and social level. In this reading attacks against Muslim women which can be characterized as motivated by gender, usually involve either an attack on the veil (throwing alcohol on it, trying to pull it off etc.) and/or an attempt to touch the victim by doing so. The acting of touching in this scenario may in

other cases be also construed as sexual harassment as it invokes the idea that Muslim women in order to be regulated by that act require to be socialized to a 'British' norm of femininity that includes the ability of men to touch without censure, and the idea that 'British' women are uninhibited and allow this. Had such an act been committed within the context of a gender motivation, it would be considered at best misogynistic and at worst a sex crime and would undermine the 'logic' of the attack itself.

In January 2016, erstwhile Prime Minister David Cameron announced measures to tackle extremism and promote integration based on a focus on Muslim women whom he deemed to be 'traditionally submissive' and unable to speak English in large numbers (Hughes, 2016). This initiative collapses the idea of Muslim women as both submissive, sexually oppressed and repressed and a danger (including a terrorist threat) into one trope with the addition of 'ill-educated' and 'unintegrated' into the mix, claiming inter alia the fact that some women may not speak English adequately could be a precursor to their sons joining terrorist groups, as well as the reason why 60% of Bangladeshi and Pakistani women are economically inactive (ignoring reliable data on the levels and operation of anti-Muslim prejudice in employment). The idea of Muslim illiteracy in political discourse is not recent, and harks back several decades and will be discussed below (Muslims as subhuman).

Cameron's comments come out of an increased focus on Muslim women that finds a long history in the trope of the seraglio and the negation of sexuality that Progler (2008) argues is one of three key formulations of 'Islamic' identity in Western European culture, in particular English (speaking) cultures.

In its current incarnation Muslim male perversion – child groomers, predators against vulnerable white women etc. – has been the staple of much media and political representation, and will be discussed below. Likewise an idea of Muslim female perversion has developed around 'veils', 'burqas' and 'headscarves'. This also inheres in headlines and stories relating to the undermining of British values by the so-called Trojan Horse affair, whereby the idea of single-sex schooling or gender segregation again infer perverse sexuality.

The stigmatization of the face-veil is not new in the last five years but has gathered pace and found more succor from legislation in France and Belgium, thus providing space for the commentariat to make repeated accusations of the veil being a sign of separation (first propounded by a politician, the then Home Secretary Jack Straw in 2006) or a sign of misogynistic value and male control, or both. Bans on face veils in the UK (e.g. at some schools), however have often been made on the grounds of security (i.e. not being able to identify the wearer). Stories relating to a bombing suspect fleeing in a burqa have stoked this, but Williamson and Khiabany (2010) provide other examples where wearing a veil at school has been discussed as an extreme security threat collapsing⁹: "the issue of security into that of 'threats to our way of life'. This reported the comments of a judge to the effect that allowing veil wearing in schools could allow a recurrence of the primary school massacre which took place in Scotland in March 1996."

⁹ 'School veils allow new Dunblane' Daily Mail, 8 February 2007

Whilst this idea has fueled a securitization idea around face-veiling, the past year has seen this idea of threat extended to the idea that face-veiling is a form of or engine to radicalization. Janice Turner (5 July 2014) states in *The Times*:

“The veil is so much more than a garment or even a symbol of faith like the cross, yarmulke, turban or headscarf, whose British wearers live largely free from abuse. It is a Trojan horse for an extreme form of Wahhabi Islam that provokes western Muslims to rage against their non-Muslim compatriots rather than to co-exist in peace. The veil is both a means to banish women from public life and a tool for provoking social unrest.”

The face-veil and the act of face-veiling are in fact seen as violent threats to British society. This piece comes in response to Dr. Irene Zempi’s research into the experience of being face-veiled in the UK (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). Not only did Zempi and Chakraborti interview women who wore the niqab, Zempi dressed in a burqa for four weeks and presented her findings, which included being victimized and oppressed by non-Muslims. Zempi and Chakraborti outline in some detail the horrors of victimization, highlighting that part of this is the exclusion of the Muslim women who wear it from social spaces, thus fulfilling a concomitant function to the expulsion created by law that Razack discusses (2008) as allowing the Muslim subject, once expelled to be tortured and denied in ways that citizenship does not allow.

As Sayyid (2011) elaborates:

“The demand to erase the burqa is not an attempt to liberate oppressed women, but more likely an attempt to erase Muslim presence from public life. This erasure is perhaps couched in the language of public safety, combating cultural oppression of women and guaranteeing cultural integrity and civic peace, but what it is saying unambiguously is that Muslims should not be seen let alone heard. The irony of repressing something in the name of combating cultural oppression is too obvious.”

In this regard, there are distinct emotional harms associated with this victimization. Throughout interviews and focus group discussions conducted by Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) participants highlighted that they had low confidence and low self-esteem because of experiencing Islamophobia in public. They also pointed out that they were made to feel ‘worthless’, ‘unwanted’ and that they ‘didn’t belong’. For converts in particular, experiences of Islamophobic victimization often left them feeling confused and hurt, compounding their sense of isolation. Seen in this light, Islamophobic victimization disrupts notions of belonging whilst maintaining the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This highlights the immediate effect of Islamophobic victimization which is to undermine victims’ sense of security and belonging whilst the longer-term or cumulative impact is to create fear about living in a particular locality and to inspire a wish to move away (Bowling, 2009). In this way geographical spaces are created in which ‘others’ are made to feel unwelcome and vulnerable to attack, and from which they may eventually be excluded (Bowling, 2009 in Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014) Part of that exclusion comes from the exclusion of Muslim voices from the spaces of discourse.

Ameli et al (2004b) highlight how conversations around the face veil are considered to be part of a ‘common sense’ discussion that finds expression in newspaper columns whereby everyone can be an expert (even TV sports presenters) except Muslims. In the last few years, this narrative space has been extended to include Muslims who accept the extremes of the narrative.

Ameli and Merali (2006a) highlight how women who cover their hair are also made intensely vulnerable by the increasingly negative rhetoric. In the almost 10 years between this study and that of Chakraborty and Zempi (2014), it can be argued that the sense of vulnerability has turned into outright fearfulness, with major impacts on mental health and well-being, health and social mobility which need to be properly addressed.

Running parallel to this discourse is the idea of Muslim men as sexual predators and pedophiles and Muslim male perversion – child groomers, predators against vulnerable white women etc. – has been the staple of much media and political representation (Ameli and Merali, 2015). There have been repeated stories about Pakistani and Muslim men grooming children after a series of cases involving all or mainly Muslim and / or Pakistani men. It has been observed that no similar stories highlighting the ethnicity or religion of other perpetrators have been noted. Harker (22 July 2012) reflecting on the conviction of white male perpetrators of child abuse said:

“There was no commentary anywhere on how these crimes shine a light on British culture, or how middle aged white men have to confront the deep flaws in their religious and ethnic identity. Yet that's exactly what played out following the conviction in May of the "Asian sex gang" in Rochdale, which made the front page of every national newspaper. Though analysis of the case focused on how big a factor was race, religion and culture, the unreported story is of how politicians and the media have created a new racial scapegoat. In fact, if anyone wants to study how racism begins, and creeps into the consciousness of an entire nation, they need look no further.”

Harker further laments:

“While our media continue to exclude minority voices in general, such lazy racial generalizations are likely to continue. Even the story of a single Asian man acting alone in a sex case made the headlines. As in Derby this month, countless similar cases involving white men go unreported.”

“We have been here before, of course: in the 1950s, West Indian men were labelled pimps, luring innocent young white girls into prostitution. By the 1970s and 80s they were vilified as muggers and looters. And two years ago, Channel 4 ran stories, again based on a tiny set of data, claiming there was an endemic culture of gang rape in black communities. The victims weren't white, though, so media interest soon faded. It seems that these stories need to strike terror in the heart of white people for them to really take off.”

Whether by striking terror into the hearts of white people or not, there is now some critical reflection on the British establishment after the revelations of widespread child abuse in the wake of the inquiry into the late Jimmy Savile, and at the time of writing, allegations into widespread child abuse by senior political figures including former Prime Minister Edward Heath and ministers and peers including the late Leon Brittan and Lord Greville Janner.

As Neale and Lindisfarne (March 2015) argue about the Oxford gang abuse case the “[G]reat majority of the men recently prosecuted for organised abuse of children and young people are nonwhite. These are a tiny minority of non-white men in the country.

Yet media headlines including those overtly connecting Muslim practitioners (Imams) with the promotion of grooming (inferred through religious praxis of sermons and instruction) like ‘Imams Promote Grooming Rings, Muslim leader claims’ (Dixon, 2013) have arguably been instrumental in the experiences of Asian taxi drivers in Rotherham who claim they are facing racist abuse from passengers on a daily basis. Cabbies in the town say they have been the target of bigots since the Jay Report into child sexual abuse by largely Pakistani men was published (Pitt, 22 October 2014), as well as a plethora of other experiences of Islamophobia, organized and intimidatory and spontaneous. This includes far-right mobilization e.g. hundreds of the far-right group ‘Britain First’ supporters marched through the center of Rotherham on two occasions after the publication of the Jay report. (Parry, 5 October, 2014 and Pitt, 5 October, 2014).

(vi) Muslims as subhuman and unable to socialize to ‘human’ norms

The markers of sub-humanity of Muslims are not particular to Muslims, and have been instrumentalized by negative policy discourse against various communities at different times. These include the ideas of Muslims as intrinsically violent, as lazy, as illiterate (either willfully or intrinsically), un-Enlightened (inherently so) and sexually deviant.

David Cameron’s comments that Muslim women are traditionally submissive, that some cannot even speak English and that both these factors are tied to potential violence amongst their children is the culmination of a particular focus on Muslims as illiterate.

The idea of Muslim illiteracy as a self-inflicted cause of Muslim problems (that finds realization in the Casey Report) was raised by erstwhile Home Secretary Jack Straw at the time of the launch of the Runnymede Trust report on Islamophobia in 1997. Straw not only did not recognize the problem, saying that he was unconvinced by the report, but he stated that he had good news for the Muslim community that day. This news had been widely anticipated by many present as the long overdue announcement that Muslim schools would be receiving state funding. The Home Secretary announced that he would be helping Muslims by maintaining the level of s.11 funding i.e. funding for teaching English as a second language. Again this posits Muslims as illiterate and therefore unable to participate in society as opposed to victims of Muslim specific discrimination and exclusion from society (Shadjareh and Merali, 2000).

Running alongside this policy narrative was the rise of the far-right in the political field, namely the revival of the British National Party (BNP) under the leadership of Nick Griffith. The party contested various elections and was able to secure some council seats in the late 1990s, an entirely new phenomenon in British politics whereby an avowedly far-right group, perceived to be racist, gained any type of electoral victory. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the BNP brought this idea to the fore in its campaigning material. It repeatedly announced that Muslims are a threat to British society. On the articles page of its website, it pasted an article called ‘Understanding Islam is our birthright,’ allegedly sent by an unnamed Sikh source.

It states:

“Most demonstrators, who set fire to the book at a public demonstration in Bradford a few years ago, shouting abuse at the author, were illiterate. They could not understand a word of English nor had seen a copy of the book before...”

“Compulsory Koran classes for Muslim children are a waste of time for most pupils at school who are forced to learn Arabic at the cost of learning Physics, English, Maths or Geography...”

It concludes:

“Islam, therefore, holds a world record in the number of VOLUNTARY killers and assassins on earth. Salman Rushdie is not the only one seeking safety from Islamic killers. The others have been killed promptly. None is living even to be protected!”

This section of articles on the BNP website reiterated its claim that it was “the only political party with the guts to tackle the Islamic question honestly and openly.” Dated September 29, 2001, this is mirrored on May 12, 2002 by The Sunday Times, which lauds Peter Hain MP, then Minister for Europe, sounding an ‘honest warning,’ and “sound[ing] the alarm about Islamic asylum seekers who...refuse to adapt to Britain’s way of life, sometimes even refusing to learn English.”

Peter Hain’s ‘honest warning’ references the problems of ‘isolationist Muslims’ who can be exploited by Bin-Laden’ or other extremists. Once more the specter and stereotype of Muslims as illiterate is raised and associated with violence of an extreme nature. New citizenship tests in the early 2000s, added the obligation on new immigrants to learn English imposed by David Blunkett MP, the present Home Secretary, and we see an increasing association between Muslims and illiteracy, with a running sub-text of violence (Shadjareh and Merali, 2002).

The idea of Muslim ‘illiteracy’ as a long running cultural trope and the demonization of Muslim grievance at the time of the Rushdie Affair in 1988 – 89, continued to find reflection in these narratives. Thus Muslim illiteracy was not simply a matter of ingratitude or laziness or separatism on the part of Muslims with no desire to integrate but stems from a basic un-Enlightened nature. In this

discourse both Islam as an unreformed religion, and Muslims as essentially un-European (un-Enlightened) and un-European (ethnically) overlap. There is some tension between the idea that the Enlightenment values supposedly undergirding modern man are universal and the idea that Muslims are incapable of having them. In essence rather than undermining the idea of universality, in a discourse laden with this tension at the political and cultural level, it is the humanity of Muslims that is denied. The rise of the clash of civilizations theory espoused by Huntington (1996) only served to make this more explicit by locating Enlightenment values within Europe to be adopted by non-Europeans rather than being natural to them (Huntington, 1996 cited in Merali, 2000).

Whilst the BNP's imagery was crude in its violent depiction of the 'Islamic question' ultimately post-Rushdie it took the underlying narrative of Muslim illiteracy as a self-inflicted / inherent trait.

Its latest incarnation in the narrative of Cameron or the educational policies of Gove reinforces the idea that Muslims (even in the case of the Birmingham schools seek to advance educational attainment) are incapable of raising (an acceptable) literacy. Khan, as described elsewhere identifies this as the projection of the idea of the rebellious slave and the heretical outsider (the witch), who can never be fully constituted as human in a Eurocentric framework (2014).

(vii) Muslims as segregationists

Muslims are posited as both gender segregationists internally, but crucially segregationist vis a vis issues of integration. This runs through ideas of Muslim no-go areas promulgated and platformed by both far-right groups but also figures such as Bishop Nazir Ali (Wynne-Jones, 2008 and Brown, 2009) and the Henry Jackson Society (Treptow and Stuart, 2015), despite regular debunking of the ideas that such areas exist.

The issue of dress, in particular but not solely the niqab has been a recurrent narrative that claims inter alia the idea of emotional separateness of Muslims. Raised in the mainstream by Jack Straw MP in 2006, the idea has recurred endlessly and been reinvented in many ways to indicate a desire for separateness. It has been reinvigorated in the snap General Election 2017 debate by the inclusion of a plan to ban it by the UK Independence Party. The party's leader was given mainstream airtime to explain that in order to integrate, Muslim women must show their faces.

Likewise the desire for Muslim faith schools has been historically pathologized, despite the existence of faith schools across religious spectra.

The above mirrors Ameli et al's findings in 2005 and the idea amongst parents seeking faith education that a Muslim school environment helps create confident citizens. Yet the idea of Muslim educational space, both in terms of faith schools and as space within mainstream schooling has not only continued to be pilloried, it has also become a trope reproduced by law and policy makers as well as

in political and hostile media discourse. Repeated discussions around the idea of (self) segregation are usually unfounded, (see Billings and Holden, 2008 outlined below). Merali (2013), writing before Trojan Hoax, observes the continued obsession with the Muslim educational space nearly a decade after the research by Ameli et al (2005) was undertaken:

“... we find ourselves subsumed by a pernicious debate about Muslim schools (again), where government and opposition politicians jump over each other in attempts to placate an Islamophobic mob mentality over red herrings such as gender equality and discrimination, and the demonizing of the wearing of hijab as inimical to this. Whilst paying the same taxes as everyone else, it appears Muslims have no right to demand the type of schooling they want, and thus having to put up with whatever is on offer, often low on academic standards and institutionalised against diversity, or pay for private Muslim schools.”

Just as Progler (2008) identified recurring post-Enlightenment tropes in the depiction of Muslims in Anglophonic culture, Khan (2014) sees specific tropes come to the fore in the Trojan Hoax affair, which the authors here see reflected in the general narrative used in the run up to the enactment and implementation of the CTS Act, i.e. the slave and the witch.

“... The slave or the subordinate - the dangerous street mugger who threatens the law and order of society, a figure reflecting fear of rebellion and insurrection. This is the fear of the ghetto and the street. A fear of a Muslim physicality expressed through the language of self-segregation or segregated communities, espoused by Ted Cattle and Herman Ouseley a decade ago in a language now embedded in public policy. A body of people depicted as a congealed unmovable mass, unable to integrate or penetrate into wider society; allegedly a space whose counter values have been fostered by a multicultural egalitarianism that has compromised the cohesiveness and safety of Britain.”

“This is the Muslim imaginary space referred to by former New Labour Minister, Hazel Blears, as non-governed spaces, where notions of jihad are born, take shape and take action. It is a fear that creates ‘no go’ areas in people’s minds, a fear of Muslim ghettos that challenge the aspirational ‘Middle England’ and you can hear it echoed in both the rhetoric of the EDL and that of mainstream UK politicians. It is the fear expressed in the charge of ‘Muslimification’ of state schools as self-segregated institutions producing self-segregating young people and communities. A charge that interprets acts of demography as acts of ideology.

“... the Witch: a fear of the disguised, the hidden, and the stranger seeking vengeance or retribution. This fear exists in the breakdown of trust within a community or nation leading to it becoming divided against itself, neighbour suspecting neighbour, colleague suspecting colleague. One can see this here in state measures that place a duty on teachers, employers, colleagues, neighbours and families to look for signs of radicalisation in their colleagues, students or children. This form of Islamophobia conveys the fear of a hidden agenda, of an intelligence planning and designing,..”

A persistent trope expressed even in the thinking of former race relations pundits is ‘sleepwalking into segregation’ (Phillips cited in the Guardian, 19 September 2005). However research is counter-intuitive and rather shows the locus of extremist White ideologies in enclaves of the ‘host’, as in the Burnley report (Billings and Holden, 2008). The report studied inter alia three schools (one mainly white, one mixed, one mainly Muslim) in the Burnley area with a view to looking at the negative impacts of enclavisation and how this may have contributed to the riots in Burnley in 2001. The authors however found that:

“The all-White school is unable by itself to overcome the entrenched White extremism that is mediated through the family, the peer group and the enclave. This strongly suggests that in towns with sizeable ethnic minorities, unless White young people are exposed during their school careers to fellow pupils of different ethnic and religious backgrounds, attitudes of White superiority and hostility towards those of other cultures are unlikely to be ameliorated and smouldering resentments will continue into adult life. Enclavisation, however, assists the development of liberal and integrative attitudes among young Asian/Muslim people by providing an oasis of liberality in a strong and cohesive sub-community.” (Billings and Holden, 2008: 4).

Later in the year a judge found that the Schools Inspectorate Ofsted’s claim that the schools targeted by its actions were discriminating against women by imposing gender segregation in school was incorrect and that no legal breach had taken place. The judge stated that there was no evidence that gender segregation disadvantages women, and that further as both sexes were denied interaction there was no disadvantage to one over the other. This did not however translate into a major revision of the narrative against either the Trojan Horse teachers and schools, or the trope in general that Muslims push gender segregation as a way to disadvantage Muslim women. Indeed the stigma of being a student from a Trojan Horse school surfaced in 2016 in an employment discrimination case. A Muslim teaching assistant sacked after objecting to children being shown a graphic video of the 9/11 horrors found that that staff had raised concerns about her background, mentioning her position of Head Girl at Saltley School - one of the schools implicated in the ‘Trojan Horse’ scandal.

(viii) Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)

Nevertheless, the trope of a segregationist anti-integration Muslim society within British society continued to find expression in media and political discourse, leading to policy interventions that fuel the cycle of negative discourse.

The launch of the Casey Review into Integration and Opportunity in December 2016 supposedly looked at the challenges faced by communities. It was widely lauded by UKIP, some government ministers and politicians, and various parts of the commentariat. However it was also deeply criticized for methodological failings, and an obsession with Islam and Muslims, with the word Muslim used 249 times in a 200 page report (with the Polish community mentioned only 12 times), and Islam mentioned over 100 times. Many critics said it was likely to worsen community relations.

The report summarized a shift in political discourse regarding social mores generally, which has instrumentalized Islamophobic rhetoric and tropes to legitimize a move away from the idea of government responsibility vis-à-vis social issues like poverty, disadvantage and racism. Thus the rhetoric of the Casey Review echoed tropes about Muslims and minorities who suffer disadvantage in employment as bearing the responsibility for this by not integrating (enough). The impact of racism on such disadvantage or social and economic factors relating to class or regional disadvantages is entirely overlooked, and even portrayed as fictitious.

Although many similar cases can be cited, there is enough from senior governmental figures to keep us occupied. David Cameron's speech in Munich in 2011, attacking 'Islamist extremism', proposed among other things a litmus test for engaging with Muslim organizations:

"So let's properly judge these organisations: Do they believe in universal human rights– Do they believe in equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encourage integration or separatism? These are the sorts of questions we need to ask. Fail these tests and the presumption should be not to engage with organisations. No public money. No sharing of platforms with Ministers at home. At the same time, we must stop these groups from reaching people in publicly funded institutions – like universities and prisons."

The internal conflict between the idea of organizing participating in civil society, be it at university or providing chaplaincy services, with the idea that they are still not integrated furthers the promulgation of the idea of differential citizenship for Muslims. They cannot take part in political and social processes for fear of being charged with 'entryism' and even 'extremism', but at the same time they are deemed to be separatist and that this failure to 'integrate' is in fact the cause of the disadvantage they face, rather than external factors such as racism, state or social discrimination, class or economic factors.

Part of that narrative also charges Muslims as the vanguards of multiculturalism, and therefore minority privilege and the undermining of equality and social cohesion and attacking British identity and privilege.

This attack on the idea of failed integration runs concurrent to the public disavowal by various governments since the mid-2000s to the idea and praxis of multiculturalism. Whilst Cameron is credited with a full break from the term, calling instead for 'muscular liberalism' and 'social cohesion', it is Blair's speech known as the 'Rules of the Game' speech that set the scene for the retreat from this praxis. Whilst multiculturalism was a contested idea, even amongst minority communities its detractors stated it favored, the concept understood the operation of structural and institutionalized forms of racism. This understanding led in the 1960s and 1970s to the creation of new bodies to help foster integration, and to laws that outlawed discrimination such as the Race Relations Act (1966, amended 1976). The idea and its outcomes were a de facto acknowledgement that institutions (schools, workplaces and by extension all institutions of the state) are obliged to protect ethnic

minorities from discrimination. The operation of racism within structures is acknowledged at the very least, and the idea of institutional racism (as concretized later by the Macpherson Report 1999) exists therein. The drive for integration, whilst focusing on the need to socialize immigrant cultures to the state, acknowledged that the state's relations with its ethnic communities was problematic and in need of change.

With the demonization and oftentimes pathologization of Muslims has come a call for the end of multicultural ideas and practice from voices within the political establishment and the commentariat. Using the idea that these practices have somehow favored Muslims, the roll-back from the idea of multiculturalism has a twofold effect (i) to mark out Muslims as receiving undeserved privileges from the state; (ii) to remove the responsibility of the state for dealing with issues like racism, and to retreat from the idea that government and institutions are racist.

This idea of privileging Muslims cuts across social landscapes, and can be found e.g. in discussions about culture and cultural institutions. In January 2010, the acclaimed and popular screenwriter Lynda La Plante was quoted bemoaning the BBC's commissioning practices. La Plante, whose many TV dramas like *Prime Suspect* have had primetime slots over many decades on mainstream British channels stated that the BBC would rather read a script by a "little Muslim boy," than one she had written implying that there was in fact preferential treatment for Muslims. She continued, "If my name were Usafi Iqbadal and I was 19, then they'd probably bring me in and talk,.." (Midgeley, 2 January 2010). In using the name Usafi Iqbadal (neither of which have an actual provenance in Muslim heritage languages) she reverts to an age old racist practice. Whilst the story was covered, there was little revulsion.

Further the expression of mother tongues or community languages in the public sphere is associated with the critique of not speaking English. This critique comes not simply from far-right campaigns or commentary but has been expressed by the former head of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Trevor Phillips (2016) with regard to the prominence of Polish shops and signage on British High Streets. Thus the legitimization of angst against language, by way of the idea of Muslim separatism has resulted in a blanket demonization of 'immigrants'. It is notable that after the Brexit vote, the spike in hate crimes against various 'minoritized' groups saw attacks, including a murder, undertaken because someone was heard speaking another language (Krupa, 2016).

The Telegraph (Midgeley, 2 January 2010) reported the story in terms of a discussion about the values of the BBC and a more general critique of its commissioning practices. The implication was that new commissioning editors have exceeded the corporation's remit (as highlighted by the critique of another author, P.D. James) with regard to the quality of its programs (she spoke of dog themed entertainment shows and made no reference to ethnicity or religion) and programs which are by implication mindful of trends rather than focusing on British classics and classical programming e.g. shows like *Pride and Prejudice* (a critique cited from Andrew Davies, another well-known scriptwriter). La Plante's criticisms are then attached to unrelated critiques and legitimized. By doing

so, in this article, they also attach a sense of cheapness to the idea of Muslim creativity (akin to shows on dog training) and undermining of British classics (like the very famous adaptations of Andrew Davies), as well as mooted the idea of misplaced favoritism for Muslims which discriminates against a beloved elderly screenwriter i.e. La Plante.

This article and incident speaks to an idea of failure of multiculturalism resting not in the failure of Muslims to integrate, but that Muslims are undeserving of integration into (in this case) the cultural fabric of the nation.

Even before 9-11, the reportage of Muslims had been identified ‘as exoticism, fanaticism, and delinquency’ (Brown, 2007). Poole (2011) analyzed hundreds of articles from British newspapers over three years before 9-11 and identified the following themes: Muslims’ involvement in deviant activities that threaten national security; Muslims as a threat to British values provoking integrative concerns; the idea of inherent cultural difference between Muslims and the majority; and Muslims increasingly making their presence felt in the public sphere. These themes are illustrated further by examining the dominant topics of coverage: politics; criminality; relationships; education and fundamentalism.

Poole (2011) further highlights (citing Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008)), that such coverage has come to the forefront again as the threat of terrorist attacks declined after 7/7. It can be argued that this cycle repeats as and when attacks happen. However, Poole further argues that despite the shifts in the type of stories, the core message remains the same since before 9-11 with the idea that ‘we’ the British have been too tolerant of them, the Muslims, who have sought to impose their way of life on us. She highlights the link between this type of coverage, the legacy of New Labour’s integrationist / assimilationist project and David Cameron’s Munich speech blaming multiculturalism for Islamic extremism (due to minority separatism). Cameron’s speech, as Poole notes, is seen as more symbolic in that it set out a test for “extremism” on the day the English Defence League staged an anti-Islamic march in Luton, UK (Ameli and Merali, 2010).

(ix) Immigration and the demographic threat

Immigration as demonized discourse in the UK can be traced back several decades. Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in the 1960s and Margaret Thatcher’s concerns about immigrants ‘swamping’ the UK are well known and documented. Immigration has remained a contentious political issue, and successive governments of whatever hue and most parts of the public intellectual and media punditry have taken umbrage with the idea of the UK as the destination for large numbers of ‘foreigners’. In the 1950s - 1970s the marking out of immigrant communities as problematic was largely based on biological racism and the marking out of ‘national’ cultures. Anti-Muslim / Islamophobic specificity in various discourses arose in two distinct scenarios: the idea of second and third generations of British citizens who were also Muslim and could not be targeted as the first generation as ‘immigrants; and those who arrived as asylum seekers and refugees in the 1990s and onwards. Thus, having hitherto been known as a locus for political dissidents fleeing persecution

elsewhere in the world, London found itself targeted in much discourse as a home for ‘extremist’ Muslims accused of taking benefits from the state and by implication taking benefits to the detriment of ‘host’ communities.

The ‘Islamisation’ of immigration is a factor that has had significant impact, and is arguably one of the factors that led to the ‘Leave’ win in the EU referendum of 2016.

The campaign for the Leave group in the EU Referendum held on 23 June was also accused of instrumentalizing Islamophobia both as a trope against Muslims already in the UK, as well as raising the specter of increased Muslim immigration by remaining within the EU. Two pieces of advertising for the Leave campaign came in for particular criticism. A poster unveiled by UKIP leader Nigel Farage two weeks before the referendum featured a line of what appeared to be Syrian migrants in Europe. The picture, an actual piece of reportage from the so-called migrant crisis, was captioned: “Breaking point: the EU has failed us all.”

This came less than four weeks after the poster for the Leave campaign entitled “Turkey (a country of 76 million) is joining the EU: Vote Leave.” (Figure 2) The poster was accompanied by comments from the campaign stating:

“Since the birthrate in Turkey is so high, we can expect to see an additional million people added to the UK population from Turkey alone within eight years. This will not only increase the strain on Britain’s public services, but it will also create a number of threats to UK security. Crime is far higher in Turkey than the UK. Gun ownership is also more widespread. Because of the EU’s free movement laws, the government will not be able to exclude Turkish criminals from entering the UK.”

Arabella Arkwright, a businesswoman who sat on the board and finance committee of Vote Leave, was forced to resign after details of her Twitter activities were exposed in the media. They included an image of a white girl in the middle of a group of people wearing burqas saying: “Britain 2050: why didn’t you stop them Granddad?” and a link from Tommy Robinson, the founder of the far right English Defence League, suggesting UK Muslims were trying to build an Islamic state in Britain. The fact that such a high-ranking member of the Leave campaign had chosen to engage publicly in such repugnantly Islamophobic chatter is illustrative of what Ameli and Merali described as the environment of hate that governs the perception and treatment of minorities.

(x) Muslim spaces as incubators

Mosques, Islamic centers, Islamic schools or Muslim majority schools, madrasas, shariah councils, cemeteries and potential Islamic spaces have been frequent targets of hate crimes. Conceptually however they have also been targeted by government, media and legislative oversight as spaces that incubate all of the foregoing tropes.

The violation of Muslim spaces, in particular mosques and schools, speaks to the idea of being able to ‘touch’ in this case Muslim space, in the name of desegregation. In actuality it serves to reinforce expulsion because it also denies the legitimacy of identity and violates the psychological sanctity of the community targeted.

The thematics of the symbolic attacks and incidents again show the breaking of bonds of empathy and shared citizenship. The continued attacks on the idea of multiculturalism from political discourse in particular, makes multiple non-majority spaces vulnerable. The replacement discourse of social cohesion, which places responsibilities on minorities to integrate and desist from separation, only serves to emphasize that community- specific places like mosques are a mark of separation.

As Khan describes:

“discourses surrounding community cohesion set the stage for the acceptance of Islamophobic measures in public and political spheres promoted by PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism] and associated counter terrorism initiatives. As a consequence negative, reductive and stereotypical constructs have been played out to represent Muslims as ‘something of a congealed mass, both impenetrable and inassimilable’ “(Khan 2010, 86).

Such depictions both reinforce and escalate fears about the Muslim ‘other’ whereby all Muslims come to embody a ‘danger,’ even young Muslim children in primary schools” (Sian, 2013: 7-8).

The idea of separateness is also tied in to the material and thinking of groups such as Britain First who have staged a number of mosque invasions in the last year. These typically involve entering mosques wearing shoes, distributing bibles, calling on worshippers to integrate into society and condemning women only spaces as ‘sexist’.

The visibility of Muslim symbols like mosques, is also often interpreted as a sign of takeover. The long-running idea that Muslims in the public space are problematic as expressed before 9-11 (Poole, 2011), has turned into arguments of entryism and takeover of public life (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

Muslim charities, have also been systematically singled out for scrutiny by the Charity Commission (the oversight body for UK charities). According to Bodi (2016) the failure of Kids Company, a charity that had high level political patronage, but failed without it seemed even the slightest basic oversight by the Commission, was further evidence of the partiality of the Commission, which had evidenced an obsessive focus on Muslim charities. Bodi highlights the treatment of Interpal and Muslim Aid both investigated, spuriously as it turned out, and repeatedly in the case of Interpal for allegedly having links with terrorist organizations. On all counts both charities were cleared and the claims, oftentimes made in the press, proven to be wholly unsubstantiated. Since the appointment of William Shawcross as the Chair of the Commission, according to Bodi, the focus on Muslim charities accelerated.

The appointment of Shawcross, vetted by relevant parliamentary committees, signified a serious shift in discourse. Avowedly anti-Islam, Shawcross resigned his position at the neo-conservative think tank the Henry Jackson Society to take up the role. Whilst at HJS, Shawcross was quoted as saying: "Europe and Islam is one of the greatest, most terrifying problems of our future...." It was revealed that after Shawcross was post, the Commission implemented a new code called 'extremism and radicalisation'. Claystone revealed that the Commission had marked 55 charities with the issue code 'extremism and radicalisation' without their knowledge in the period 5 December 2012 to 8 May 2014. These charities were being monitored as a potential concern for matters relating to extremism and radicalization. According to Claystone, there are no written criteria for applying or removing this label and thus it lends itself to non-evidence based targeting of particular groups (Bodi, 2016).

IHRC (2014) had previously argued that Commission's new powers would green light further harassment of Muslim organizations.

Given the government's definition of extremism incorporates an ever latitudinous range of beliefs and behavior, it will allow the Commission to target a larger number of charities, simply on account of the religious and/or political beliefs they or their partner organizations appear to hold. According to IHRC:

"The government has turned the Charity Commission into a principal enforcement agent of its much-berated PREVENT programme, designed to combat religious and political extremism in the UK. The recent appointment by the Cabinet Office of Peter Clarke to the board of the Charity Commission underlines this transformation of the Charity Commission from an oversight agency into an instrument of repression against British Muslims."

6. Conclusion

The nature and illogic of anti-Muslim narratives is as such that many overlap despite (or indeed because of) their internal contradictions. It becomes difficult then to classify narratives in a discrete order of severity. Nevertheless it is clear that some of these discourses have eclipsed others in their pervasiveness and impact.

The following narratives coalesce to create the justification for the creation and perpetuation of laws and policies that extend almost entirely Muslim specific policing and legal regimes, including mass surveillance, profiling, laws that in effect target mainly the Muslim communities in the UK, and a wider discourse of aberrant and deviant Muslim subjectivity:

- Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)
- Disloyalty and the threat to internal democracy

- Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’
- Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)

These four narratives hold up the basis for all anti-terrorism laws, regardless of efficacy (Merali, 2017a). The ten narratives are subsumed (with some cross over) between these four overarching themes, listed in order of prominence and impact.

- **Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)**

Whilst the idea of **Muslims as ‘extremist’** is of relevance to these narratives, it is inferred in all the above. Its importance as a stand-alone narrative currently rests on whether or not the proposed Extremism Bill becomes law, thus giving a legal meaning to ‘extremism’ as opposed to its current status as a derogatory term and basis in media and political discourse for exclusion of the Muslim subject from equality before the law (Razack, 2008 and Merali, 2013).

Of similar significance is the trope of **Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman**. This carries with it now the subtext of violence, having been attached to the idea of male radicalization both by dint of raising radicalized sons as a result of their inability to communicate with them (Cameron, 2016), and by being themselves beacons of radicalization and cause of social unrest (Turner, 2014).

Whilst the narrative of Muslims as **segregationists** is connected to Muslims failing or not wanting to integrate, **the failure to integrate narrative** has moved beyond the idea of Muslims as living separate lives. The narrative that has gained more currency is that of **entryism** and the idea that Muslims trying to integrate or to have positions in society or mobilize on social issues is a form of threat.

Suspicion and denigration of **Muslims spaces** is framed (regardless of the space, be it a mosque, school or the practice of veiling) as inherently threatening and **in need of regulatory law, praxis and discourse**. The focus on mosques prevailed in large part in the mid-2000s with policy focused on surveilling mosques, as well as many opinion pieces and political speeches about the idea of the radical Imam and his radicalized congregations. Whilst the impact of the discourse continues, not least by the policies of the Charity Commission under William Shawcross, it is no longer the main focus. Likewise, an obsession with Muslim schools in the political imaginary that characterized many Muslim related discussions in the early 2000s (Ameli, et al., 2005) has been subsumed by the idea of Muslims in public institutions including students and teachers and governors in mainstream schools.

The idea of **segregationism**, based on the idea of Muslims spaces crosses over here with the overarching narrative of the ‘need for Muslims to integrate’.

- **Disloyalty and the threat to internal democracy**

This and the other narratives also feed into the narrative of Muslims as the **vanguards of multiculturalism**, and are used as evidence of the failure of and indeed the lack of credibility of the multicultural settlement. This narrative had precedence over many other in the mid-2000s to the start of the ConDem coalition, when David Cameron finally ended all claims of the state to foster such an ethos, declaring instead that it was time for a ‘muscular liberalism’ (2011). Arguably, the collapse of the idea of Muslims as citizens and the idea of the Britishness of the majority versus the culture(s) of immigrants (be they Muslim, Eastern European or other) has resulted in an unattainable Britishness, despite claims that the adoption of liberal mores is all that is needed for victimized ethnic and / or religious groups to end their victimization.

The rise of the obsession regarding **entryism** highlights the extent to which the Muslim ability to project themselves into the future has taken hold, whereby Muslim aspirations based on pre-existing praxis amongst the majority is seen, not as (deferential) emulation and evidence of integration but as something other, by virtue of its Muslimness.

The Brexit campaign exhibited a complete capitulation to far-right narratives of yesteryear, and right-wing commentariat claims (Murray, 2013 2014) about the Muslim **demographic time bomb**, with the possible accession of Turkey to the EU highlighted as a threat to the UK (Merali, 2017b).

- **Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’**

The idea that Muslims are **subhuman** and unable to **socialize to ‘human’ norms** has gained currency within civil society and caused a schism in programs to combat Islamophobia by accepting the premise that (if) some Muslim practices are beyond the pale, there must be a form of rejection of such practices and beliefs on the part of Muslims before a recognition of and redress for Islamophobia can come about. Thus the expectations of Muslims from the government is beset with a **conditionality** in a way no other citizen, be they from a minoritized community or the majority community is required to hold. The locus of this problem at the level of civil society is arguably the result of a trickle down of the narrative in particular from the time of the Rushdie Affair until the early 2000s when opposition to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars was often characterized as not just disloyalty but particularly a sign of Muslim recalcitrance for their more reprehensible beliefs. Thus opposition to the wars, if expressed by Muslims was deemed to be support for the Taliban and Bin Laden.

- **Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)**

Whilst the **separatist / segregationist narrative** still exists (an crosses over with the overarching narrative of security), it has more significance as a trope in far-right mobilization where the idea of physical segregation in terms of veiling, Muslim spaces (i.e. mosques, schools etc.) is deemed

aberrant and in need of redress if necessary as a result of mobilization of the majority to attack those expressions of separateness. Whilst the majority of hate crimes are usually perpetrated by individuals with no group affiliations (Ameli et al., 2011), there has clearly been a rise in far-right mobilizations against such spaces. This includes marches through supposedly Muslim majority areas e.g. various EDL marches in Luton; mosque invasions by Britain First particularly in 2014; continued attacks on Muslim women who wear clothing identified as Muslim, including but not solely face veils and headscarves (Ameli and Merali, 2015, Zempi and Chakroborti, 2014).

It can be argued that those narratives that fuel securitization policy and discourse and those that critique the potentiality and possibility of the Muslim subject in the public space as entryists etc., currently hold the most sway as anti-Muslim narratives. The impact of this is seen and felt by Muslims whose faith in the political process appears to have collapsed between the period of 2011 and 2014 (Ameli and Merali, 2015). The latter narrative has highlighted to many Muslims surveyed by the authors that they feel targeted by media and political institutions, which in their understanding contribute heavily towards a deteriorating climate of fear, a rise in support for far-right groups and a rise of anti-Muslim racism per se. As a result they feel pressured to modify their behavior and in some instances feel that this is the deliberate goal of government and the political classes. This latter feeling is something more evident in 2014 than it was in 2010, when the operation of institutional (and what was understood to be often ignorant) reproduction of stereotypes by the media was seen to be the primary cause of an anti-Muslim culture (Ameli and Merali, 2015). In response to the qualitative question about whether negative experiences had caused behavior modification, most Muslims answered affirmatively. Various examples of the types of change were given and included acts that effectively reduced or erased Muslim visibility, as individuals, but also as a community of confession, or as individual actors or groupings in political and civil society arenas. The political pressures are seen as a way to socially engineer the acceptance of a depoliticized and secular 'Islam' amongst Muslims in the UK. The expectations for Muslims to hide their beliefs and views is a form of violence and bodes ill for the future (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

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the 1990s, the number of people with diabetes in the Netherlands has increased from 1.5 million to 2.5 million (10.5% of the population).

Diabetes is a chronic disease, and the consequences of diabetes are often severe. The most common complications of diabetes are cardiovascular disease, kidney disease, eye disease, and nerve damage. Diabetes is also a leading cause of blindness and amputation.

The burden of diabetes is increasing worldwide, and this is due to a combination of factors, including changes in diet and lifestyle, and an increase in the number of people who are overweight and obese. In the Netherlands, the prevalence of diabetes is expected to continue to rise in the coming years.

Diabetes is a complex disease, and the management of diabetes is often challenging. The goal of diabetes management is to keep blood glucose levels as close to normal as possible, while avoiding hypoglycemia. This is often achieved through a combination of diet, exercise, and medication.

The management of diabetes is often a long-term process, and it is important for people with diabetes to work closely with their healthcare provider to develop a management plan that is tailored to their individual needs. This may include regular monitoring of blood glucose levels, as well as adjustments to diet, exercise, and medication.

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APPENDIX C

Counter-Islamophobia Kit

**Workstream 2: Dominant Counter-Narratives to Islamophobia –
United Kingdom
Arzu Merali
March 2018
Working Paper 14**

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Counter-Islamophobia Kit



About the CIK Project

The *Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States* (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the second workstream of the project which was concerned to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. This output comprises eight papers on conditions in individual member states and a comparative overview paper containing Key Messages. In addition this phase also includes assessment of various legal and policy interventions through which the European human rights law apparatus has attempted to conceptually analyse and legally address the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamophobia. The second workstream examines the operation of identified counter-narratives in a selected range of discursive environments and their impact and influence on public opinion and specific audiences including media and local decision-makers. The third workstream will be producing a transferable EU toolkit of best practice in the use of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, the key messages, findings and toolkits will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

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1. Background

The report of Workstream 1 (Merali, 2017a) outlined the ten key narratives of Islamophobia currently operating across British social, political, legal and media discourse. The purpose of this second report is to outline key counter-narratives to Islamophobia both already in effect and which have been identified as needing more emphasis from state, its institutions, the media and civil society.

The search for effective counter-narratives is located in a relational methodology (to be expounded further below) which sees racism as the “interactive relation between repressive racial ideas and exclusionary or humiliating racist practices across place and time, unbounded by the presumptive divides of state boundaries” (Goldberg, 2009). The Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (Ameli, 2012) collapses the distinctions between legal, political, educational and other institutional praxis by focusing on discursive patterns within institutions and social and political commentary. This approach also allows for an analysis of the impact of racism along a continuous scale rather than being confined to discrete areas based on their status as actionable under criminal law (e.g. hate crimes), civil law (e.g. discrimination) or other complaints mechanism (e.g. media representation) or as a matter for conceptual study, analysis and transformation. This allows for a discussion of counter-narratives by themes rather than by the necessary mechanisms proposed to effect change.

Interviews with key actors with relevance to the topic at hand, as well as investigation of existing literature from the academy, local, regional and international civil society and a variety of social media have been used in order to establish a broad ranging conceptualisation of what counter-narratives do and can look like. Where possible, overlap regarding mechanisms has been reduced.

The ten key narratives of Islamophobia identified in Workstream 1 (Merali, 2017a) were:

Muslims as disloyal and a threat to internal democracy
Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’
Muslims and ‘extremism’
Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)
Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman
Muslims as subhuman and unable to socialize to ‘human’ norms
Muslims as segregationists
Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)
Immigration and the demographic threat
Muslim spaces as incubators

These were then categorised as falling within four categories, arranged in order of impact. The narratives can be subsumed under the four most powerful and fall as follows:

1. Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)

Whilst the idea of **Muslims as ‘extremists’** is of relevance to these narratives, it is inferred in all the above. Of similar significance is the trope of **Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman**. This carries with it now the subtext of violence, having been attached to the idea of male radicalisation both by dint of raising radicalised sons as a result of their inability to

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communicate with them (e.g. Cameron, 2016 in Payton, 2016, Groves, 2016, Hughes, 2016), and by being themselves beacons of radicalisation and cause of social unrest (e.g. Turner, 2013).

Whilst the narrative of Muslims as **segregationists** is connected to Muslims failing or not wanting to integrate, **the failure to integrate narrative** has moved beyond the idea of Muslims as living separate lives. The narrative that has gained more currency is that of **'entryism'** and the idea that Muslims trying to integrate or to have positions in society or mobilize on social issues is a form of threat.

Suspicion and denigration of **Muslims spaces** is framed (regardless of the space, be it a mosque, school or the practice of veiling) as inherently threatening and **in need of regulatory law, praxis and discourse**. The idea of **segregationism**, based on the idea of Muslim spaces crosses over here with the overarching narrative of the 'need for Muslims to integrate'.

Disloyalty and the threat to internal democracy

This, and the other narratives also feed into the narrative of Muslims as the **vanguards of multiculturalism**, are used as evidence of the failure of and indeed the lack of credibility of the multicultural settlement (as ultimately evidenced when erstwhile Prime Minister, David Cameron finally ended all claims of the state to foster such an ethos, declaring instead that it was time for a 'muscular liberalism' in 2011. Arguably, the collapse of the idea of Muslims as citizens and the idea of the Britishness of the majority versus the culture(s) of immigrants (be they Muslim, Eastern European or other) has resulted in an unattainable 'Britishness', despite claims that the adoption of liberal mores is all that is needed for victimised ethnic and / or religious groups to end their victimisation.

The rise of the obsession regarding **entryism** highlights the extent to which the Muslim ability to project themselves into the future has taken hold (Sayyid, 2014), whereby Muslim aspirations based on pre-existing praxis amongst the majority is seen, not as (deferential) emulation and evidence of integration but as something other, by virtue of its 'Muslimness'.

Right-wing commentariat claims during the Brexit campaign echoed those of Murray, for example, in 2003 and 2014 regarding the Muslim **demographic time bomb**, with the possible accession of Turkey to the EU highlighted (Boffey & Helm, 2016) as a threat to the UK.

Islam as a counter to 'Britishness' / 'Fundamental British Values'

The idea that Muslims are **subhuman** and unable to **socialise to 'human' norms** has gained currency within civil society and caused a schism in programs to combat Islamophobia by accepting the premise that (if) some Muslim practices are beyond the pale, there must be a form of rejection of such practices and beliefs on the part of Muslims before a recognition of and redress for Islamophobia can come about. Thus, the expectations of Muslims from the government is beset with a **conditionality** in a way no other citizen, be they from a minoritized community or the majority community is required to hold.

Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)

Whilst the **separatist / segregationist narrative** still exists (and crosses over with the overarching narrative of security), it has more significance as a trope in far-right mobilisation where the idea of physical segregation in terms of veiling, Muslim spaces (i.e. mosques, schools etc.) is deemed aberrant and in need of redress if necessary as a result of mobilisation of the majority to attack those expressions of separateness. This can be evidenced in the rise of hate crimes. Ameli and Merali, 2015 recorded a rise to nearly 18% of all respondents reporting physical attacks against them, with the experience of verbal abuse 'often' and 'always' in 2010 was much higher than in 2014 (20.8% compared to 6.4%), this masks the overall rise in experience with those stating 'rarely'

and ‘sometimes’ rising from 11% to 49.6% (nearly half of everyone surveyed). In 2010 the overall experience ran at 38.9%, in 2014 it ran at 66%.

Whilst the majority of hate crimes are usually perpetrated by individuals with no group affiliations, there has clearly been a rise in far-right mobilizations against such spaces. This includes marches through supposedly Muslim majority areas e.g. various English Defence League marches in Luton; mosque invasions by Britain First (Dearden, 2014) particularly in 2014; continued attacks on Muslim women who wear clothing identified as Muslim, including but not solely face veils and headscarves.

These four narratives hold up the basis for all anti-terrorism laws, regardless of efficacy. The above narratives not only herald expulsion of the Muslim as citizen and equal subject before the law, but are foundational to the rise in the notion of what it means to be ‘British’. This idea of Britishness whilst finding violent outlet in far-right mobilizations at street levels is established as part of mainstream policy-speak which leaves those constructed as Muslim as intrinsically on the wrong side of this identity with no ability to cross over.

2. Introduction

The determination of national identities as identified above, constructed by virtue of exclusion are in many ways a contradiction of democratic values based on equality and difference. There is an urgent need for policy makers and institutions to acknowledge this contradiction and seek both measures that immediately mitigate the negative impacts of these narratives, and work on long term policy and strategy that both project and lead on counternarratives to Islamophobia. The impact of measures that otherise Muslims is not simply a rights issue for Muslims individually or a ‘minority rights’ issue for Muslims as (a) community/ies. This level of subalternisation strikes at the heart of what it means to be a democracy. The deficit caused by structural racisms, whether Islamophobia or any other form, undermines the very egalitarian claims that form the basis of democratic identity and praxis, and call into question the self-perception of the state as liberal (Johnson, 2017).

An overview of Counter-narratives to Islamophobia

Based on interviews of practitioners including lawyers, academics, policymakers, civil society representatives, journalists, artists as well as existing literature and other media resources, the following issues were identified as overarching concerns that need to be addressed and provide four metanarratives that inform the ten key counter-narratives to Islamophobia that will be outlined in this report:

1. The Normalisation of Islamophobia and the challenge facing society to make Islamophobia and all forms of racism unacceptable (Ahmed, 2017).
2. The need for a Muslim space wherein Muslims can reclaim control of their narrative(s). This speaks to the situation that the majority of interviewees have expressed, that Sayyid (2014,

referencing Klug 2013) describes as an understanding of Islamophobia as an undermining of the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves into the future. In this scenario, Muslims are not only denied the ability to define Muslimness in any of its diversity but also are defined by state and institutional discourse and praxis that is a form of violence against them. It disempowers them from having any role in the development of wider society.

As Kundnani (2017) interviewed for this project states:

“Islamophobia is ultimately a symptom of bigger, wider, deeper issues in British society. Islamophobia is not just ever about Muslims, it’s about a deep social crisis. But the experience of Islamophobia is also particular to Muslims and has its own particular feel and texture and history and experience and so forth, and so, the challenge in taking it on is to both enable a space where Muslims can articulate and define their own experience and their own response to Islamophobia in Britain while at the same time being able to link that particular story to the wider crisis that Islamophobia needs to be linked to. And that wider crisis will be to do with the whole structure of British society in the end and therefore implicates everyone in Britain.”

3. Countering the obsession of law and policy with marks of Muslimness (Ameli et.al, 2012) leading to the expulsion of the Muslim subject (from equality before and the protection of) the law (Razack, 2008, Ameli and Merali, 2015). This was summarised by Ahmed (2017) “as the obsession of the courts and policy makers with what Muslim women wear rather than operation of Home Office rules that fundamentally violate human rights.”
4. Accountability for state and institutional racism in the context where the state feels it can withhold the rights and therefore its obligations to citizens / humans because of their perceived behaviour / abnormality / lack of humanity.

The responses from interviewees in particular can be categorised into two types: those that directly address one or more of the key narratives highlighted in the first report of this project (Merali, 2017a) and; those that refuse to directly respond to demonization, but to negotiate political and social issues through differently imagined praxis and discourse.

Importantly, interviewees averred to many ongoing forms of counter-narrative that provide examples of work that needs to be ‘rolled out’ on a large scale to tackle directly the narratives of Islamophobia identified. However, key to the critiques raised of existing counter-narratives and / or their praxis fall into two groups:

- (i) Reproducing a cycle of demonization by trying to respond to Islamophobic tropes by ‘proving’ otherwise. This approach was seen to be a set-up to fail both conceptually and practically. Many respondents averred to the endless cycle of Muslim condemnation after any incident of political violence. Narkowicz (2017) states: “‘I condemn, I condemn’, I just don’t think that’s a good counter-narrative. A good counter-narrative is to challenge the narrative on which the questions are based and this is happening but in activists’ space...”

Further, attempts to prove loyalty e.g. raising awareness of Muslim participation in the world wars, and thus being worthy of remembrance (and thus inclusion in to the collective memory) or indeed aggressively promoting remembrance events (Merali, 2014, Glenton, 2015, Ahmed, S. 2015, Afzal, 2017, Baig, 2014, Leslie-Smith, 2014) in order to prove Muslim ‘loyalty’ were critiqued. These attempts have not resolved over twenty years or more the issue of demonization of Muslims as any of the above identified tropes. If anything the strengthening of such narratives, indicates that this is failed praxis.

Conceptually, as Malik (2014) argues, this is not to criticize Muslims for condemning acts of political violence etc. but to understand that the discourse of condemnation is an exclusionary one, and that by fulfilling the demand of condemnation, Muslims will still not be included but will be simply reinforcing their connection to something which they claim not to be connected with. Shadjareh (2004) explains the situation post the Madrid Station bombings of 2004:

“While younger organisations... called on mosques to pray for peace for all in the wake of the horror of Madrid, the Muslim Council of Britain called on mosques to report any suspicions they had about anything. It’s the difference between being a part of society, however marginalised, and perpetuating the idea that you are an unruly guest, your stay determined by different conditions than for everyone else.

You don’t have to be disaffected youth to see the anomalies and feel the isolation.”

- (ii) Where ‘successful’ or ‘innovative’ or where needed but not fulfilled, these counter-narratives were being provided by civil society. Whilst many interviewees and indeed many civil society projects and practitioners see the role of civil society as key, almost all interviewees saw the key lack in the current situation was the failure of the state to intervene. Whilst some saw the state as the root of or at least complicit with many if not all the narratives of Islamophobia, all identified a lack from the state and its institutions in its responsibilities. In summary, counter-narratives to Islamophobia were

located in the space vacated by the state and were being provided by civil society (Bouattia, 2017).

The need for the state and its institutions to take action was the overwhelming demand of interviewees as expounded further below.

3. Methodology

35 semi-structured interviews were undertaken for this part of the project. Interviewees were chosen because of their existing work on counter-narratives to Islamophobia and other forms of racialization. They included several broadcast and print journalists and editors, a former Archbishop of Canterbury and current master of a Cambridge University college, academics researching on different aspects of Islamophobia, (including (but not solely) on education, media representation, hate crimes, securitization, discrimination, sociology of religion, social cohesion), lawyers, artists, authors, charity trustees, curators and advocates. Five wished some or all of their comments to remain anonymous.

Goldberg's (2009) relational model of analysis provides the reference for analysis, centring on the "constitutively relational aspects" of racial conceptions. While granting that the exact arrangement of these aspects are "no doubt deeply local in the exact meanings and resonances they exhibit," he argues that they are "nevertheless almost always tied to extra- and transterritorial conceptions and expressions, those that circulate in wider meaning and practice" (Goldberg 2009). Embracing this relational view of racialism explains local variations in discourse, because racial ideas are adapted and modified to local needs and power structures. At the same time, however, "racial ideas, meanings, exclusionary and repressive practices in one place are influenced, shaped by and fuel those elsewhere. Racial ideas and arrangements circulate, cross borders, shore up existing or prompt new ones as they move between established political institutions" (Goldberg 2009) (Jackson, 2016).

The cross-fertilization of racial ideas between institutional settings, and the mutual reinforcement of structural Islamophobia by institutions (Ameli, 2012) informs the following analysis and interviewees were sought on the basis that by their research interests and experiences, respondents could speak to the questions raised by this thesis, even if to counter it. Interviews were not sought from solely political actors, though some of those interviewed are also political activists. Many of those interviewed were sought out for their multiple experiences in different fields (e.g. one was a political activist and journalist, another an academic and broadcaster, another a charity trustee and advocate and so on). Some interviews were sought and conducted on the recommendation of other interviewees.

4. *Counter-Narratives to Islamophobia*

1. *Decentring conversations on Islam and Muslims from current institutionalised narratives.*

Upon being elected President of the University of Salford's Student Union and a National Executive Councillor of the NUS, Zamzam Ibrahim found her tweets made five years previously when she had just turned sixteen being published in the mainstream media with claims made as a result that she was an anti-white racist and an extremist (Ibrahim, 2017). Finding herself forced to explain herself (repeatedly) Ibrahim was also subjected to 48 hours of threats, including rape threats and abuse via social media. She wrote after the event of the right-wing media that:

"They often paint us as caricatures undeserving of empathy or understanding. They want to deny our humanity because they want you to be afraid of us.

"We cannot allow this situation and allow this cycle to continue in Britain today. Because **the first step of solving any problem is admitting there is one.**"

This cycle of repetition is picked up by other interviewees. Samayya Afzal (2017), a former National Union of Students NEC officer, and formerly Diversity Development Officer at the Peace Museum of Bradford concurs with Ibrahim: 'it's very frustrating from my perspective or from people within the community that are constantly having to say the same things over and over again... to get people to understand that we don't deserve to be discriminated against.'

Poole (2017) laments the lack of interest shown by media and government in the plethora of research discussed in this project, which proves in great detail the existence and nature of the problems and narratives of Islamophobia. Ibrahim's demand that the problem of constant dehumanization must be acknowledged is still, sadly, the natural starting point.

The **humanisation of the Muslim subject** was repeatedly raised by interviewees not simply as an intuitive response to the idea of demonisation, dehumanisation and subalternisation (Johnson, 2017) in political and media discourses regarding Islam and Muslims, but as a basis for policy and even law. The dehumanisation of the Muslim subject is not necessarily an overtly racist act. In their submission to the Scottish Government (EHRIC) for its Inquiry into Bullying and Harassment of Children and Young People in Schools, Scotland Against Criminalising Communities (SACC) explain how this operates within an institutional setting where teachers are with all good intentions trying to help victims of racist and or Islamophobic bullying:

"In conversations with members of the majority community we often encounter the view

that highlighting a racist/Islamophobic incident as such could risk further stigmatising the individual affected and could “make matters worse.” We virtually never encounter that view from the people supposedly at risk of being stigmatised.

“Recognising a racist/Islamophobic comment or incident for what it is as an essential step towards tackling the problem. We believe that systematic failure to recognise racist/Islamophobic incidents, whatever the reason for it, is a form of institutional racism/Islamophobia.”

Thus even putatively benign interventions can reproduce racism, in this case, by obviating the very outcomes that victims of racism feel are needed. Crucially, in this instance but possibly more generally the erasure of Muslim voices in countering Islamophobia (or more generally the voices of those who experience racism(s) from addressing racism) is causal. The well-intentioned actions implemented in order to suppress further problems in fact simply suppresses those who are the victims.

The need for this process of humanization was also indicated by interviewees to be crucial in academic and policy framing of Muslims, which even when sympathetic, had the effect of making invisible or marginalising Muslims in a way that again removed their agency (Johnson, 2017, Rajina, 2017). In so doing this:

“changes the very foundation of how you do this research because it means you’re not going to be just taking, “oh, look at the poor Muslims there, look at the violated Muslim...” It’s actually about these systems of oppression are killing many Muslims across the globe, but also, we deserve to be defined by more than these systems of oppression.” (Johnson, 2017)

By having this ‘basic understanding of the Muslim ummah’s humanity’ (Johnson, 2017) and an ‘understanding of the way race is invoked’ (Kapoor, 2017) in institutional discourses per se, made invisible ontic assumptions about Muslims as subjects (of law, the state or discourse) can begin to be challenged effectively.

Examples of how this has already been carried out include research undertaken by interviewees in the course of their doctorate or post-doctorate work as well as discrete research projects funded by the ESRC and UK universities on e.g. the **framing of and the outcomes of the framing of securitisation discourse** like the Deport, Deprive, Extradite project. The project aims to ask key questions about the praxis of government by investigating:

“the shifting dynamics of racism and the security state, exploring the interconnections between counterterrorism policing and border control as they play out in the context of the War on Terror.” (Deport, Deprive, Extradite, 2017)

In addition to garnering statistics and analyses of events and their impact on the securitisation discourse, they have produced films with renowned director Ken Fero highlighting individual cases of injustice where the narrator and subject of the films' lives have been devastated by unproven allegations and or refusing to co-operate with the intelligence agencies (Fero, 2017).

At the level of the individual, some academics referred to their own doctoral work and how they **challenged the norms of framing** the Muslim or otherwise racialized subject. Rajina (2017) found that she:

“...decided to focus on the British Bangladeshi community in East London because... a lot of the research... was all very much about the socio-economic status of being the poor migrants, the poor people... It was never about the people themselves... it was very much about just framing it within the good migrant-bad migrant discussion. And I was keen to just look at the people, and look at the landscape and see how East London has changed over the years. East London has a very, very long relationship with Bengal – not just modern-day Bangladesh but the whole of Bengal, with the East India Company being set up in the Bengal in 1600 and the British leaving India in 1947. So, we're talking about a 300-year relationship there. That intrigued me ...”

“...I feel, any research around Muslims always revolves around something as nebulous as just identity or just their economic contributions, it's very rarely about the people, the development of the community, internally, how the shifts are happening between generations - this is why I compare two generations and their perceptions of dress and language. How, what is it? What are the factors that are influencing and changing those things?”

Rajina (2017) signals that the arrival within the academy of people of colour who 'disrupt' established anthropological narratives is one positive counter to existing narratives that have failed hitherto to deal with positionality, the need for reflexivity and the white male colonial gaze (2017).

However, the **natural evolution of change** whether in academia or other institutions or society per se without institutional intervention is challenged by interviewees from various backgrounds who noted that **diversity in and of itself was not enough to effect change** with institutions often socializing those who entered those institutions to its norms and prejudices. Ahmed (2017) notes that in the lower ranks of the legal profession there are many Muslims represented but that this did

not necessarily entail a critical approach to the profession or the law. Whilst Ahmed (2017) and others concede that better representation at the top of the profession is needed and welcome in ensuring that the **optics of equalities** (see counter-narrative 7 below) are fulfilled, the same caveat applies.

An **understanding of the way race is invoked** (Kapoor, 2017) is helpful across all fields discussed. Kapoor's comments apply regarding the need to understand the shifting boundaries of what is understood as race/racism apply equally to the framing of research in academia (Rajina, 2017, Johnson, 2017), the positionality of lawyers (Ahmed, 2017, Choudhury, 2017), the ontology of the law and the epistemology evoked by lawmakers (Qureshi, 2017) (whether in parliament or on the bench) or common-sense understandings of marginalised groups within society and projected by parts of the commentariat (particularly but not solely characterised within a securitisation discourse) (Ameli et.al., 2004b) Kapoor, 2017 states:

"I think specifically the big challenge is convincing people, in certain sections of mainstream population that [Islamophobia] constitutes racism in the sense that there's an argument by the similar liberal sections, political commentators but also the general public because the signifiers are centred around religion. [They say] it's not race, it's different, the Polly Toynbees¹ and so on, of the world... it transgresses, although it might be that it's deeply linked to seeing physical differences; colour is used in conjunction, as part of the ways in which Muslims are portrayed I think the stark racial signifiers are there but it's not necessarily the case and so one of the challenges is the way in which race is invoked ... the other thing is... the way the narrative around the problem is conceptualised in terms of national security, global security, it's moved the criminalised threat, which is one way in which race is always invoked, beyond national boundaries, so it presents a greater or a more difficult challenge, one that more starkly connects racism with imperialism. It's not just a criminal figure that within the bounds of a nation state can be dealt with within the confines of a criminal justice system, it's something that links domestic racism with imperial and colonial interventions and I think the separation between racism and imperialism is part of the consequence of the separation of thinking about the two together, has enabled this distinction or separation so that the terrorist suspect is not necessarily a figure that we think

¹ Polly Toynbee wrote for The Independent after the launch of the Runnymede Trust Report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, "I am an Islamophobe, and proud of it." cited in Toynbee, P. (1997). "In Defence of Islamophobia". The Independent (23 October 1997), quoted in Naser Meer, *Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 182.

about as being a racialized trope in the same way that the mugger has been in the past, the kind of criminalised black and brown figures.”

Part of the Deport, Deprive and Extradite project led by Kapoor is the production of short films that convey in the words of people who have been harassed by the security services, the traumas that they have faced and the injustices laid bare e.g. the removal of their children by social services despite there being no criminal finding against them (Fero, 2017).

The challenge **variously identified of the normalization of Islamophobia and the desensitisation of society at large and institutions to its operation**, effects and its inherent injustices are interconnected issues that such projects have tried to challenge. Kapoor identifies a mix of anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, securitised discourses that pervade the university setting, where institutions have gone above and beyond what is required by the law rather than interrogate the ideas underpinning such laws and policies. **Getting the institution to understand it’s complicity in injustice is part of the challenge of unpacking the various performances and theatres of Islamophobia** (Sayyid, 2014). Kapoor’s (2017) example highlights that in:

“...some senses there’s an indifference, there’s some sense when you try and raise the injustice, for example, of having to treat Tier 4 students differently from other students, police being on campus during freshers’ week to ensure that they know they have to register if they change address or if they fail to attend supervisory meetings then they potentially face deportation.”

Williams (2017) highlights the dangers, but also an example of push back against the loose use of terms, in particular ‘radicalisation’:

“One of the basic mistakes that government sometimes makes (I have spoken to successive ministers about this over the years) is that there is something called ‘radical Islam’ and something called ‘moderate Islam’... that is a painfully inept grid to interpret Muslim identity... I am always wary of the way the word radicalisation is thrown around...”

“We continue to have arguments (at the university) about how radicalisation is understood and our own university [Cambridge] made a nuanced response to the government on that, noting that the word radicalisation must be used with care... unfortunately in a very short term and reactive political culture where you have to be seen to be doing something yesterday this is hard work, so I think the sheer normalisation of Muslim presence is needed.”

Kasia Narkowicz (2017) who also works on the Deport, Deprive and Extradite project with Kapoor describes the **dilemma to humanising Muslims and the impact of celebrity ‘Muslimness’** thus:

“the problem is what is effective is not effective... celebrities like Nadiya Hussain, I can see that probably does something for people, just like visual representation, when they see people who they normally dehumanise, they see them humanised... bringing Muslims to the mainstream probably does something. I personally think it is a really sad benchmark to have.”

Kassam (2017) describes his project’s work in this regard:

“... a [counter]narrative for Islamophobia is being able to highlight studies of Muslims that contribute to society... For example, we have recently got a *hijabi* Muslim referee who was qualified, and we have a video on that. It just offers a different perspective obviously the way in which Muslim women are portrayed. When I say mainstream I do not mean the entire mainstream elements of the mainstream, but The Daily Mail, or The Sun². The way in which Muslim women are portrayed is often... they do not have a voice etc. and when you see this, when you see a Muslim woman in a *hijab* giving yellow cards to a bunch of guys playing football it’s quite liberating, empowering. In a sense it offers a different perspective and we try to focus on those stories, whenever there is a positive story, positive contribution.”

However, the cycle of humanisation and dehumanisation, is critiqued by poet Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan in her piece, ‘This is not a humanising poem’ (2017). She decodes the conditionality placed on Muslim presence and acceptance:

Love is when you are not an athlete
or bake cakes
Love is not when we offer our homes
or free taxi rides after the event.

In other words **the national conversation and the national story needs to include Muslims regardless and without conditions**. She concludes her piece with a brutal but precise critique:

² The Sun and The Daily Mail are politically and socially right leaning tabloid newspapers that have earned reputations as purveyors of scurrilous stories (particularly in the case of the former) and anti-migrant (particularly in the case latter). The anti-migrant sentiment broadly covers any number of anti-Muslim tropes discussed in this and the Workstream 1 report.

‘If you need me to prove my humanity

I’m not the one who’s not human.’

Hooper (2017) highlights both civil society and media trends that emphasise ‘positive’ Muslim responses to incidents of political violence as serving to ultimately undermine the supposed aim of doing so:

“there’s been a counter-narrative to the narrative that, there’s some sort of incident or attack, the Islamic state is blamed, and there’s an outpouring of public emotion and among those reactions are: Muslim communities raise funds or they do something which then the media seizes on as an example of “Oh look, Muslims are doing something in recognizing the horror of the Manchester bombing” or something like this. And I actually feel that the framing of these media stories is quite damaging because although it is well-meaning it actually frames Muslims... [and] it makes the point that they have a normal reaction to something horrific, something that’s newsworthy and noteworthy. We have to be really careful now about how we present these stories about Muslim communities as if we somehow should be congratulating people that they have a normal human reaction to horrific events happening in the society where they live. That’s a trend that I’ve noticed, the ‘good Muslim’, as it were, promoted as opposed to the ‘bad Muslim’... I think that we shouldn’t go [this way] because it entrenches the idea of Muslims as the ‘other’. In terms of the media, this also feeds into the idea of stuff that goes viral, even the sort of emotional framing of headlines. The Independent does very cheap stories about how these Muslims reacted to the Manchester bombing... it’s quite manipulative and unhelpful.”

Simply reproducing cultural forms in order to provide counter-narratives to the problems caused by that form perpetuate the problem. Looking for different cultural practice, to analogise Kappeler (1986) arises from a ‘changed consciousness of what culture and its practices are... It would be a practice in the interest of communication, not representation’.

Manzoor-Khan’s performance of “This is not a humanising poem” has been seen on various social media platforms several million times, clearly speaking to the experience and feelings of many. **The use of art by Muslims to express their story/ies was recommended by many interviewees albeit with an understanding that the space within which those stories could be created was under severe pressure** (see El-Khairy and Latif, 2016 below), and that freedom of expression for Muslims was severely curtailed by the state, that mainstream artistic spaces are not easily accessible to Muslims or conducive to this type of work. At the time of writing Manzoor-Khan’s poem and work have been profiled on mainstream arts media channels. Manzoor-Khan’s work is one of the more vociferous and critical in a developing canon of ‘resistance’ and decolonial performance art which

broadly includes young Muslim artists like Mark Gonzales and Warsan Shire whose poem ‘Home’ on the experience of being a refugee, was adopted by INGO Save the Children during the so-called Refugee Crisis³. This type of cross-over into the mainstream is an important step by the **culture and arts sector that narratives of Islamophobia that deny the place of Muslims within the cultural fabric of the nation can be confronted** despite societal and institutional discursive practices that work counter to that.

The type of pressures on Muslims in arts spaces are compounded by the operation of security praxes include Prevent as highlighted by El-Khairi and Latif (2016). Their play *Homegrown* was pulled by The National Youth Theatre halfway through rehearsals. The pair highlight not just the hypocrisy of this denial of free speech, but elaborate in detail how this incident highlights the exclusion or worse, expulsion of Muslim voices from telling their own or indeed any stories by the mutually reinforcing actions of the law, media and government (Ameli & Merali, 2015).

El-Khairi and Latif report and argue the impact of the following as:

- (i) Before being cancelled, the production had already been subject to local government intervention. That intervention led to them being thrown out of their original venue; after which police had suggested security measures that included reading drafts, attending rehearsals, planting plainclothes officers in the audience, and carrying out daily sweeps of the venue by a bomb squad. This all garnered much media attention, but little dialogue. Subsequent to the cancellation there was no consistent or elucidatory explanation from any of the agencies of why any of the foregoing or the cancellation took place.
- (ii) The playwrights argue that had they, and the majority of the 113 young people involved not been Muslim this situation would not have arisen and indeed their work may have been lauded in much the same manner that Gillian Slovo and Nicholas Kent’s work ‘Losing our Children to Islamic State’ which was not only allowed to go ahead by the same National Theatre (NT) but framed by the artistic director as ‘provocative’ and ‘urgent’ speaking of: ‘the “flak” the theatre anticipates, but [he] said it was right to take part in a “national debate”.’

³ It has been noted that the term Refugee Crisis is in itself problematic insofar as those suffering the crisis are largely imagined to the European societies faced with an influx of refugees rather than the refugees themselves who are often fleeing war and / or extreme poverty / social deprivation. It arguably another example of dehumanising discourse.

As El-Khairy and Latif note: 'This framing... in relation to Islam not only boosts ticket sales, but also sets up a battle between brave artists and feared Muslims.'

- (iii) They summarise the duplicity of the 'national conversation' in reference to a previous attempt by the NT 'to promote a show tackling "the Muslim question" as both timely and fearless"', including in 2012 when a work that 'addressed freedom of speech, censorship and Islam – from the Salman Rushdie fatwa to the Dutch cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.'" The playwrights note that: "Despite contemporary British Muslim life rarely puncturing the walls of the National, they presented Islam not only as a topic for dramatic exploration, but as an urgent problem: one that society has been too scared to confront.'" This leads them to raise the core issue to this section: "Why can't Muslims tell their own stories?", but also, why did the NT not open its space to young Muslims to speak of the experiences of over-policing and Prevent, the key issues facing them and the story of their nation as told through their experience?
- (iv) They also refer to the double bind of the interpretation of Muslim absence from these 'conversations', using the example of DW8 again: 'they tend to be left out of the conversation, yet their position is always presumed to be one of irrational rage. Their absence is never interpreted as an act of ambivalence. Instead it is cultural ignorance or crude protest.'

Understanding that ambivalence and opening up conversations that interrogate the hidden operation of Islamophobic narratives – even as in the case of NT's production 'Another World' they seek to humanise the dehumanised - is desperately needed to have a 'national conversation' that decentres current institutionalised narratives on Islam and Muslims, whether overtly or covertly Islamophobic, or indeed whether they operate in existing attempts to 'humanize' the Muslim subject whilst denying that 'subject' their own voice. The importance of Muslim agency in this process crosscut with counter-narratives 9 and 10 below, and fall under the broad meta-narratives of the normalisation of Islamophobia (1) and the need for Muslim space (4).

This idea of changing the narrative has impact on the utility of legal challenges. Choudhury (2017) highlights the role his department (advocacy at IHRC) has in trying to challenge the government narrative through strategic litigation but, as will be expounded on below, has severe limitations:

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“we are constantly challenging government policies, whether it is when they put out a consultation for legislation, ... pushing back and constantly challenging these narrative and providing that alternative narrative or that alternative face on that story.”

However, this has been fraught with difficulties in regard to the anti-terror legislation in particular, leading IHRC to absent itself from consultations on this issue because they felt that the government simply used such consultations as rubber-stamping exercises rather than engaging with the concerns raised (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2015). This theme of whether to engage or not was recurring through the interviews for this research, with several advocating either strategic boycotts of institutions (Salih on the media, 2017, see counter-narrative 8 below) or no direct engagement with government.

Even where humanising narratives exist, e.g. the memorial work for Srebrenica that has taken hold over the last few years, Ahsan (2017) expressed concerns about what could be the agenda of the government which has funded such a project organisation with over £1million pounds. This frustration with established institutions and the state can be summed up by Choudhury's (2017) expectation of the political and media discourse produced around immigration:

“[it] smacks of racism, and it is a case of ‘these immigrants are problem’, they don't necessarily want to discuss how social problems are solved, so it just becomes all about ‘immigration’ ... and it is what they end up doing is demonising minority communities as a result, and they need to stop doing that and that it is.”

Williams (2017) feels that Muslims being seen to interact with other issues not just Muslim ones is a way that the media and political realms can send messages to wider society about the place of Muslims in the UK, where:

“... Muslim commentators in the media are seen to be addressing other intelligent and resourceful issues not just religious ones ... that is surely one of the things that would make a difference. This [Muslims] is a set of resources, identities, convictions that can contribute to a general civil discourse, not just one about religion, but about justice, poverty, the environment etc.”

This visualising of Muslims as part of the story of society carries forward to the next counter-narrative of diversifying the understanding of who and what constitutes the nation.

2. *Diversifying the understanding of what, who and how is a Muslim, and the acceptance of this plurality within a plural understanding of the nation.*

The rise of the idea of ‘Britishness’ (Merali, 2017a, and Ameli and Merali, 2015) and the narrative of Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ and ‘Fundamental British Values’ (FBV) has narrowed the conversation around what is the nation. Both ‘identities’ are homogenized in a false manner, creating a fictitious dichotomy between British and Muslim, both imaginings of which are projected AT Muslims. Muslim ‘identity’ in this instance is created in the absence of Muslim participation but is a projection of ‘Muslimness’ created through the discursive practice of policy, media and law (Ameli and Merali, 2015). Former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams (2017) sees that the national conversation is one very much geared towards marginalizing faith per se, with Muslims bearing the brunt of both this increasing anti-religious culture as well as experiencing the effects of racialisation as Muslims.

The emphasis regardless on ‘Britishness’ and British values in opposition to Islam and Muslim practice even permeates civil-society where the idea that Muslims are subhuman and unable to socialise to ‘human’ norms has gained currency within civil society and caused a schism in programs to combat Islamophobia by accepting the premise that (if) some Muslim practices are beyond the pale, there must be a form of rejection of such practices and beliefs on the part of Muslims before a recognition of and redress for Islamophobia can come about. Thus, the expectations of Muslims from the government is beset with a conditionality in a way no other citizen, be they from a minoritised community or the majority community, is required to hold (Rajina, 2017, Shadjareh, 2004).

Sociologist of religion Sariya Contractor (2017) finds the **direction of travel of the national conversation** problematic:

“...there is too much of an emphasis on Muslims, it **has to be both ways**, Muslims may have questions about Prevent, or questions about other things so I wouldn’t say that the emphasis has to be on Islam or Muslims. Perhaps again, that’s difficult, why should it be the Muslims always answering the questions... the emphasis on asking questions should be about diversity, we live in plural Britain. Paul Weller, me and my colleagues argue in our

book that Britain is no longer what it was, the religion belief... [is] increasingly less Christian, increasingly more plural... so the questions that have to be asked need to incorporate all the different stakeholders in society not just Muslims.”

Myriam François (2017) describes the need for this process as a discussion about the story of the country and who is part of that story. Contractor identifies three examples of good practice in this from local authorities and the Church of England. Contractor (2017) refers to far-right marches by the English Defence League (EDL) in Blackburn and Leicester. The **strong network of community organisations** in Blackburn and the umbrella body of the Lancashire Council of Mosques **worked with the council and the police, resulting in extra vigilance and care being taken of Muslim sites**. The day passed without incident. This contrasts with reports to civil society organisations where, despite direct threats of violence, Muslim sites including mosques and schools have not received a risk assessment or support from the police or acknowledgement of the precarity of their situation from local authorities (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2017 unpublished). At the time of writing it has been reported that Muslim sites have seen an upsurge of hate motivated attacks including arson in the period (Roberts, 2017). This would suggest a **community security focused approach** (notwithstanding the problems caused by austerity and funding cuts) to those in legitimate fear of street violence is required as a starting point for community relations.

Contractor further identifies Leicester City Council’s response to an EDL march as exemplary:

“The very next day Leicester decided it was going to celebrate its One Leicester identity, they had a big celebration in the square, different faith leaders, young people came together, they had singing and music, they also had a mic for people passing by who would come and say why they were One Leicester and they were very careful or sensitive to the fact that Muslims have different sensibilities but also includes Muslims. They were very aware of the fact that this EDL narrative is often anti-Muslim rather than anti-immigrant and they conflate these identities... it really seemed to work. Over and over again when I interviewed people they spoke about ‘our’ celebration to counter the EDL’s message of hate. Now what was key about this was it did not focus on Muslims, what it did was focus on Leicester as a diverse community that was inclusive, included Hindus, Muslims, Christians, people that were not religious and who were Muslim. I think the focus on inclusivity is key.”

Choudhury (2017) emphasizes the need for grassroots organisations that can legitimately claim to be representatives of the people in that area be consulted by and be in communication with local

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authorities. Rajina (2017), El-Shayyaal (2017), Hamid (2017) are among several who refer to the need to understand the broader Muslim experience in particular regional and class differences, which make Muslims invisible as they do others who are non-London/south of England based and/or are working class. This ties in with concerns about equalities outside of a purely 'Muslim' focus on national problems to be discussed further in section seven below. As well as regional difference there is also the importance of analysing how Islamophobic narratives in one context bleed through when unchallenged not just regions but generations. Afzal (2017), herself a young woman recently graduated from university found in reviewing oral histories of Bradford recurring mentions of the Honeyford Affair and the devastating impact it had on the lives of those identified as Muslim in the city. This finding and reminder is counter-intuitive to the idea that politicised Muslim subject was created in discourse and praxis in the post-9/11 moment or in the UK after the Salman Rushdie affair of the 1990s. It is a reminder that the long-running tropes of racialisation need to be factored into any policy relevant work. Whilst a full analysis of the Honeyford affair is beyond the remit of this paper it is worth highlighting that the incident revolved around comments by a headteacher in the city that there was in effect a conspiracy by Asians to 'produce Asian ghettos' and their 'value system' (as opposed to a perceived British system) and that there was a "an influential group of black intellectuals of aggressive disposition, who know little of the British traditions of understatement, civilised discourse and respect for reason" (Parkinson, 2017). The ghosts of Honeyford can be found in the Trojan Horse Affair which arose in relation to a hoax alleging a conspiracy to export an already existing Islamist takeover of schools in Birmingham to Bradford in 2014 (Ameli and Merali, 2015). Whilst contemporary politics eventually saw Honeyford discredited, his death in 2012 provided an opportunity for a public reappraisal of his views in what is now a culture that has discarded much of its equalities and human rights discourse on the basis that this simply fosters a now much demonized multiculturalism. Parkinson's (2012) article for the BBC was entitled "Ray Honeyford: Racist or Right?". This framing as a question, signified a shift in British culture from an understanding of racist discourse to one where such discourse could be celebrated, and the stigma associated with the term racism devalued as a political tactic by 'extremists' old and new. This polarisation of ideas reflects a resurgent notion of monoculture which is normative and under threat by extremists. It erases even the plurality of the 'white' nation, made up of regions, regional and national languages (themselves replete with histories of suppression of Celtic languages and cultures), and masks the exclusionary cycles of the state when unchecked. In the French context, Milicent (2006) sees a similar cycle enacted against Muslims as was enacted against different nations that ended up being comprised in the France of today. James (1963) references

this as a French colonial practice in the Caribbean which crushes the quest for national identity and differs from the British system, who seek instead to stifle such a quest.

In this scenario, the state and its and other major institutions' discursive praxis (Merali, 2017a and Ameli and Merali, 2014 and 2015) at best stifles and now more often crushes the idea of a plural national identity or one in which marginalised groups, particularly Muslims can have a say in developing. Repeated surveys have shown, that Muslims show deep loyalty to the state (Ameli and Merali, 2004a) (even above the rate of members of the majority community) (Comres, 2015, put the figure at 93%) yet their expectations as citizens of reciprocity is dashed at almost every turn (Ameli et. al. 2004a, 2004b and 2006) by a denial of their agency as citizens, their delegitimisation as agents for change whether for Muslims or society as a whole and their expulsion from the normal practice and equality before the law. The cultural shift around this situation is characterised by a state that does not deny this situation but justifies it based on a 'need' for securitisation of that community that has been thoroughly debunked over almost two decades. Many interviewees whether of Muslim and/or various backgrounds often felt that the ability to change this lay outside of direct interaction with state organs that had not only failed to address these issues but promoted policies that created and/or exacerbated the situation. Thus, movement building (Ameli and Merali, 2015) that is built on alliances between social activists, causes and marginalised groups including Muslims in their diversity was needed (including Kundnani, 2017, Rajina, 2017, Aked, 2017, Bouattia, 2017, Kapoor, 2017, Narkowicz, 2017) remains a preferred option for many whose critical voices and work on counter-narratives has been key. This begs the question as to what the state's response will be, but also demands that there the state's response can no longer be one of a mythical monoculturalism.

François (2015) highlights that even where there is an attempt to 'include' Muslims into the narrative of the 'one nation' mantra adopted by former Prime Minister David Cameron, it is focused only when addressing Muslims (see Cameron's Ramadan 2015 speech in François, 2015) followed swiftly by a denunciation of problematic 'Muslimness' that has an immediate and otherizing effect (see Cameron's speech two days later echoing his 2011 call for a "muscular liberalism", François, 2015). As François (2015) (whose work at SOAS includes a project on social cohesion) notes in response to Cameron's targeting of Muslims as individuals prone to radicalization and violence:

"...the reality is that individuals are enmeshed in structures. They are not floating atoms, they are part of a broader fabric that contributes to their sense of self and belonging – or lack thereof. That is partly the fabric of their local communities, but also, the fabric of

broader society. To focus purely on individual motivations – or ideology – is to try and disculpate broader society from its responsibility to its citizens. It essentializes Muslims as somehow the pure product of their religion and conveniently glosses over government failings...”

Afzal (2017) highlights how narratives of segregation in Bradford focus on Muslims’ isolation but do not look at the numerous reasons for the situation. This has been picked up by the Scottish Government in their report on Muslims (2011):

“There appears to be an underlying assumption that lack of cohesion⁴ amongst communities is a problem in Britain that needs to be addressed... A key theme in the literature is that these policies often fail to recognise the impact of economic and social deprivation, along with discrimination on community relations. As Jayaweera and Choudhury report, there has been a growing critique of aspects of the community cohesion policy. In particular: “a key line of criticism challenges the extent to which the focus on social capital in the community cohesion policy turns attention away from the importance of social and economic deprivation and inequality” (Jayaweera and Choudhury 2008).

As a strategy or indeed expectation for civil society, the **importance of citizenship as a narrative is crucial. Kundnani (2017):**

“I don’t think we can just give up on citizenship because we’re dealing with nation states and the only thing that we have in trying to tame them is the rights that come with being a citizen of them. I don’t think it makes sense to completely give up on the language of citizenship but as soon as you start using the language of citizenship you’re in some sense also binding yourself to the nation state. There’s always a dilemma there... Because of the history of the British empire, there is a way in which we can play the game of citizenship but also play other games because we also have in our history experiences of British colonialism and experiences of struggle against that. We can operate inside the citizenship frame but then also draw on things that are outside it and counter to it. I think that we should allow

⁴ Footnote from citation: According to this report such diversity amongst Muslim communities includes the context for migration, different settlement histories, geographies and employment trends. See link www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1203896.pdf. 32 Home Office (2001), Community Cohesion: A report of the Independent Review Team – Chaired by Ted Cantele, London Home Office.

ourselves to be in that double space and allow it to be productive for us. It's not surprising to me that the thing that seems to terrify the Islamophobic propagandists is precisely that relationship of being inside and outside. So, the ideal Muslim for the Islamophobe is the one who completely cuts themselves off from their relationships to the rest of the world and completely disowns Muslims in other parts of the world, and signs up in the most patriotic way to some idea of a nation. But, precisely being able to say "I'm inside the nation but also not of the nation" is the radical space to be and the one that gives the most purchase in taking on the Islamophobes. What that means in practice is that we become advocates both for our own communities in Britain but also for those parts of the world that are being victimized by Britain."

With some 'risk taking' in how 'autonomous narratives' are deployed, Kundnani (2017) suggests:

"out of [this]... a stronger politics that can defend the community can emerge. And doing that in a way that is actually rooted in the needs and the lives of the communities rather than something that's abstract. It has to be something that can have that magical effect that you sometimes get in movements where you find the language that suddenly a lot of people are empowered by it and start participating in a project together and it spreads with its own energy - that kind of moment."

This failure to **include Muslims whether as individuals or groups within the story of the (one) nation** needs to be directly addressed. This extends not just to understanding the diversity of Muslims, but also in naming the problems Muslims face but also the problems of society in general. François (2017) argues both that the experiences of Islamophobia are distinct and are clumsily lumped under the one banner of Islamophobia when the impact on working class Muslims in Blackburn is considerably different than that on Muslim city workers in London. Further the problems faced by Muslims as a result of being differently categorised in the past:

"... at a different point in history, might have been looked at as working-class communities or second-generation immigrant communities or even communities that might have been identified according to their ethnicities. Today they are all just bundled under the label Muslim and I don't think that's a particularly helpful development because (Muslims know this) it's such a broad church for want of a better word..."

The issue of how inequality is conceptualised and dealt with is discussed in further detail in counter-narrative seven below. **The idea again of who or what is a Muslim and what are the problems**

society face are not so easily collapsible as the current narratives of Islamophobia claim, and recognising this in the production of public discourse is a first step.

Kundnani (2017) talks about the return to a baseline of the ‘very simple equality and multiculturalism story that is in a way the official, liberal, tolerance argument that’s been there in British society for some time as the official way of thinking about race.’ He continues that more is needed in terms of diversifying the conversations, highlighting the narrowness of the foregoing in and of itself:

“...what’s important [is] to have alongside that some more radical counter-narratives that in the end... will be necessary to really get to the root of this issue. Those ultimately take us to questions of empire and the economic system that we live under... that’s one of the roots by which the discussion about Islamophobia connects over to issues of both class and issues of foreign policy and makes it part of the conversation that is ultimately a deeper crisis in British society. That part of the conversation is often neglected because it feels like it’s starting to sound conspiratorial or it feels like it’s starting to sound like the usual accusation of being apologist or terrorist. But I think it’s a necessary part of the conversation.”

The acknowledgement of the ‘crisis of British society’ in itself and as a conversation Muslims must be part of will be explored further in counter-narrative 5 below but dovetails with the metanarrative of Muslim space (4) to create their own narratives. Kundnani sounds some warnings from previous experiences of conversation and dialogue between marginalised groups, in this case Muslims and wider civil society, institutions and the state:

“the responsibility on the rest of us in British society is in a way the flip side of that which is to **respect the autonomy of Muslims, and to hear the voices that are coming out of Muslim communities on their own terms** not of course then to be translated into the languages that we might feel more comfortable with (which was the issue of the nineties).”

Whilst there were some **examples cited of Muslim figures within the commentariat** that might add some texture to this counter-narrative, the overall view was that their **participation was still conditional**:

“[Mehdi Hasan] is a mainstream figure but he is a practising and believing Muslim... I see him as a mainstream figure and he only goes so far and therefore he’s not really dangerous to the system. Whereas maybe someone like Assed [Baig], if he was allowed to do the journalism that he wants to do, maybe he’d be more dangerous. But the system needs more opposition to justify its existence, it needs to give the impression that it’s open and can tolerate dissent but it can only go so far. So many people like Mehdi and others like Owen Jones and Miqdaad

Versi who is getting more of a prominent presence in the mainstream, they'll put aside... the harsher aspects of domestic and foreign policy... they won't talk about fundamental systemic issues that actually threaten the system and might force the system to challenge the system and might force them to fundamentally change their outlook." (Salih, 2017)

Williams (2017) sees the 'collusion with the Saudi regime' by successive governments as a factor in perpetuating demonised representation:

"...there is an emerging group of articulate young Muslim leaders but they are not getting heard. There is another kind of problem which is the political and economic dominance of certain influences in the Muslim world coming from Saudi that feed the myth that Islam is one thing and that is not getting any less either and that is to do with the political collusion with the Saudi regime which western powers seems to be stuck with."

Baig (2017) also argues that the parameters of Muslim participation in the cultural fabric of the nation is severely curtailed. He highlights how his report on Muslim women who do not speak English (which has been viewed in millions on social media⁵) received much support from Muslims but also from people who had hitherto not considered the issue in terms different from mainstream narratives⁶. The Prime Minister had criticised Muslim women who did not speak English, and also announced plans to test the English skills of spouses allowed to come to settle in the UK, with the possibility that they may be deported if their skills were not to an acceptable level. In particular the argument raised by Parveen Sadiq (in Urdu) in Baig's piece that: 'The English invaded more than half the world. Of the countries that they ruled, how many languages do the English speak?... People from third world countries contributed to making Britain, Great Britain, which up to this day they are in denial about...' was widely commended. It gave voice to the people deemed outside the pale by the narrative that Muslims are segregationist; it also gave space to the autonomous voices of grassroots Muslims, whose more incisive critique has hitherto found little expression in the national conversational space.

⁵ Facebook views of the official Channel 4 News post number at the time of writing 2.1million, with over 25,000 shares

<https://www.facebook.com/Channel4News/videos/vb.6622931938/10153567236491939/?type=3&permPage=1>.

The video also has been posted on various social media platforms and its reach is undoubtedly much higher.

⁶ In January 2016, David Cameron made series of much criticised comments about Muslim women as "traditionally submissive" and targeted the small minority of women in the UK who did not speak English (Merali, 2016a)

Workstream 2: Dominant Counter-Narratives to Islamophobia – United Kingdom

Arzu Merali

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Williams (2017) stated that the highlighting of e.g. Muslim women teachers working in many urban areas would form the basis of a good counter-narrative in the media, both highlighting Muslim contribution and subverting Islamophobic narratives of Muslim women as oppressed, segregated etc. In previous research (Ameli et. al. 2004a, Ameli and Merali, 2006a and Ameli et. al, 2007) highlighted from Muslim respondents this type of thinking – that is the truth telling on a mass scale will normalize Muslims. There are however now, some caveats to this. Ameli and Merali (2015) identify the pervasive environment of hatred against Muslims as forming a barrier that mediates all representation of Islam and Muslims. Whilst images of Muslims – even positive ones – are ubiquitous, the ambivalence of film and photography in particular (Sontag, 1982) and representation in general (Ameli, et. al., 2007) mean that representation is both familiar and alienating. No matter what a non-Muslim ‘viewer’ is shown about Muslims, the operation of Islamophobic discourses frames that view and the general Islamophobic ‘gaze’ pertains.

Poole (2017) describes grassroots initiatives that tackle this in the school setting as a short-term fix, which needs to be developed into longer term projects like:

“Educating in schools and through other organisations and more diversifying of the content that’s out there, as well as diversifying contact. The issue of contact seems to be a really big one. It’s a good mechanism in combatting some of the Islamophobia on a personal level but it’s about trying to go beyond a kind of tokenistic contact e.g. schools take children out to mosques to try and educate them about Islam but it’s not enough, it’s too infrequent and too fleeting. There needs to be more mixing on a more regular basis.”

Anonymous 4 (2017) also raises the issue of Muslim presence in Europe as something that needs to be funded and promoted through media and education:

“there is a rich hidden history of Islam in Europe from which to draw on - many Muslims already know about this - but it needs institutional funding (councils, central government, EU) to bring the history into common knowledge, e.g. through teaching it in schools, trips to historic sites, museums, media.”

He likewise highlights existing materials on the Muslim presence, specifically the English Muslim presence in the UK

3. *Contextualising the nature and level of ‘threat’ posed by political violence per se by reviewing the epistemology of current security policies.*

Brittain (2013) outlines the crisis caused by ongoing securitisation praxes: ‘what have been the costs in the UK and the US, to society and to the legal system which is supposed to represent the best values of society...?’ Securitisation haunts every discourse regarding Muslims. Denied acceptance and thus the rights and assumed dignity of citizenship, Muslims are not considered to be British (Merali, 2017a). This perverse logic followed through sees them projected as living or existing not in Britain but in ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamism whatever that may be’ (François, 2015) in a public discourse that allows them to be eschewed from equal citizenship in the wider public psyche. This situation is part of and indeed significantly undergirds the narratives and the experience of Islamophobia in the UK, and was highlighted by the majority of interviewees as the most significant issue that needed dealing with in order to build a counter-Islamophobia culture in the UK.

The differential impact of institutions on citizens marked by their ‘Muslimness’ or other forms of racialisation and wider society are not as clinically distinct as the operation of a security narrative and set of praxes targeting certain outgroups suggest. Kapoor argues that part of the issue at stake here is the **need to understand that the authoritarian aspects of the nation state have always been there but have simply been exposed by the recent anti-terrorism cases** (2017). Berger and Mohr (2010) argue that the difference between the experience of the racialised and non-racialised wo/man is that the former lives the content of European institutions in a shorter period of time, whereas the later has been socialised into them over generations. For the former the transformation is violent, for the later there is no transformation because they live within these institutions. This critique is necessary if conversations about the damage done to British society as a whole rather than simply as damage done to Muslims in particular. This sectioning off of the issue of Islamophobia furthers the idea that Muslims are something else that need to be dealt with separately – in this case by an exceptional legal regime that falls well below the guarantees and standards of the rest of the law in the country. This also normalises the law as neutral and decreases the space for critique and development of that law.⁷

The tropes of the narratives that undergird the securitization of Muslims, and the exceptional praxis of law and state against them are detailed extensively in Merali (2017a) and opposition to this has been framed largely by civil society calling for at the very least a review of the Prevent policy and its introduction into law since early 2016, to an all-out call for the repealing of ALL anti-terrorism laws

⁷ As Ahmed (2017) points out in section 7 below, whilst EU directives on equalities are often powerful on paper, case law developed and policies implemented in the UK often circumvent the demands made by such directives.

(Jones et. al. 2015). Bouattia (2017) explains how the former of these has found echoes within the political establishment from all political parties to differing degrees, and that this is a testament to the persistence of civil society actors and NGOs, academics, dissenting politicians and lawyers and students' groups to critique the operation of the Prevent policy. Examples of this include the Students Not Suspects campaign (NUS, 2015 onwards), the wider operation of anti-racist campaigns by the National Union of Students Black Students Campaign (NUS, 2017), which includes shared work on Prevent related matters (see e.g. the Preventing Prevent Handbook, NUS Black Students, 2017) particularly during the academic years 2015 – 2017, the operation of organisations like PreventWatch, IHRC, CAMPACC, SACC, Cage and MEND (Merali, 2016b, 2017a, b) who all adopted critical positions with varying nuances across varying durations of time, some starting as far as twenty years ago in response to the introduction of the first new anti-terrorism laws in 1997 (Ansari, 2006) since the repeal of laws targeting political violence in relation to Northern Ireland.

As Bouattia (2017) and others have highlighted this activism has come at extreme personal cost for many involved whether as individuals or organisations, facing demonisation in the press and by politicians, as well as facing the prospects of being marginalised in political spaces. This is widely seen as one of the reasons that many Muslim civil society organisations were slow to criticise the processes of securitization until they too found themselves demonised⁸.

The call for a review of Prevent being taken up in some political circles is an achievement however what is more significant is that the new independent reviewer of the anti-terrorism laws, Max Hill QC, has spoken of the ideal scenario where there would be no anti-terrorism laws, and crimes of political violence would be prosecuted using the existing gamut of criminal law (Hill, 2017a). Hill was considered by many observers to be a potentially authoritarian and illiberal choice for the post, given his work for the Crown Prosecution Service in prosecuting several high-profile 'terrorism' cases⁹. In post he has called for higher sentencing tariffs for families of perpetrators of acts of political violence. The adoption of the critique by Hill that many of the laws enacted are simply a knee-jerk response to the idea that 'something needs to be done' (Merali, 2017b) and now marks a point where government must listen to the demands of even its hitherto strongly aligned supporters. It also re-emphasises the need for there to be space of critique for Muslims, free of fear

⁸ See e.g. the targeting of the MCB by Boris Johnson on the pages of The Spectator (Ameli and Merali, 2015)

⁹ The so-called Rycin case which has been highlighted as an extreme failure by the state, its agencies, law enforcement and prosecution in particular and the media, regarding the unchecked operation of anti-Muslim prejudice that resulted not only in injustice for those directly targeted but had long term (Ameli and Merali, 2015). It was also argued that the events were hijacked for purely political purposes both domestically and abroad as a justification for the invasion of Iraq (Archer and Bawden, 2010)

and where their autonomy and their narratives are considered as part of the conversation. Hill's views confirm that in this instance a counter-narrative to (Islamophobic) securitisation that was much maligned when expressed by Muslims and civil society alliances (Jones, et. al. 2015, United to Protect our Rights, 2005¹⁰) has found mainstream acceptance. Surely a twenty-year cycle to get to this position is one that the state needs to avoid as the basis of reviewing policy?

Qureshi (2017) claims that the conversations that are being had have no 'epistemological basis' and that securitisation and the framing of Muslims as a threat to the UK needs to be challenged epistemologically. In short:

"That's why I respect the work of people like Marc Sageman quite a lot, who himself has come a long way in his own work. His book "Misunderstanding Terrorism", which came out last year, was a phenomenal piece of work because what he does is that he uses Bayesian probability analysis to make an assessment about what the actual threat is that is posed to non-Muslims by Muslims in the Western world. He categorizes the West as being Australia, New Zealand, Europe and North America. According to him, it ultimately boils down to one Muslim per million per year. That is the threat that is posed to the Western World, that he actually says, that's the way to talk about it. That's what we should be saying. All of this exceptional policy, this securitisation, exists despite the fact that 999,999 Muslims out of one million pose no threat at all to the West. And so, this is how we really need to re-conceive of what the actual data is, what statistics tell us. And then how **policy should be informed by that.**"

Hill QC's **meeting with advocacy group** Cage (Hill, 2017b) **to discuss their concerns regarding the current security regime**, is another repudiation of Islamophobic narratives of Muslims as a security threat and a threat to internal democracy if engaged with. In response to his critics Hill (2017b) explains:

"I have come under some criticism for agreeing to meet with Cage, an organisation considered to be beyond the pale in many circles."

"Successive Governments have taken the view that there are some organisations with which any engagement is inappropriate, and Cage certainly falls within that category. That is of course a matter for government and it is neither my place nor would it be appropriate for me to pass judgment on their stance."

¹⁰ The signatories to this statement came from a wide civil society spectrum.

“For my part, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, it is my duty and within my remit to engage with anyone who is affected in any way by the legislation. This not only helps inform my annual review of the legislation but also informs my wider contextual understanding of how our laws apply generally to society.”

As Hill QC, says and does, **reiterating the necessity of conversation between Muslim civil society, including those that have been demonised by established voices, is an imperative in breaking the cycle of literal, legal and conceptual expulsion of Muslims from the nation.**

Hill QC’s own disavowal of the need for anti-terrorism laws is another example of how relevant political voices, in this case an appointed reviewer of law, must **look beyond current narratives of crime and security.**

4. Acknowledging structural issues and racism(s)

The metanarrative of allowing Muslim space intersects heavily with this section. As Kundnani (2017) identifies:

“Islamophobia is ultimately a symptom of bigger, wider, deeper issues in British society. Islamophobia is not just ever about Muslims, it’s about a deep social crisis. But the experience of Islamophobia is also particular to Muslims and has its own particular feel and texture and history and experience and so forth. The challenge in taking it on is to both enable a space where Muslims can articulate and define their own experience and their own response to Islamophobia in Britain while at the same time being able to link that particular story to the wider crisis that Islamophobia needs to be linked to.”

Part of that wider crisis is a wider issue of racism(s) in the United Kingdom. Whilst the UK has been celebrated (or demonized) for its equalities culture in the past, notably the Race Relations Acts of the 1960s and 1970s that brought some palpable change in the way minorities are treated, there is a case to make that that culture stagnated and if anything has found itself under attack as a result of unbridled Islamophobic narratives normalising racism in society once more. This is particularly evident in the post-Brexit rise in street violence against racialised minorities, whether those minorities were from European countries or BAME communities and / or Muslims. Zempi (2017) lays this at the door of the:

“that toxic language that was used during Brexit, the arguments used by different camps in terms of favouring Brexit but also the actions of Trump for example banning Muslims from certain countries and rhetoric and language used against Muslims in the political context in the UK and US. I think it has legitimised hostility and discrimination from ordinary people, not just the far-right.”

This space is important if the journey started in the report of the Scarman inquiry report (1981) which took the idea of racism within institutions as more than simply the accumulation of the prejudices of individuals, the ‘bad apples’ but as structural, as the McPherson inquiry report (1999) phrased it ‘institutional racism’. This manifests in a variety of ways, but notably with regard to taking action for redress against injustice or simply accessing the structures and rules of the state, the following issues are hugely restricted for Muslims:

- (i) Accessing justice
- (ii) Immigration rules
- (iii) Accumulation of debt around (i) and (ii)
- (iv) The roll out of functions of the state to the private sector
- (v) How hate crimes are recorded, investigated and prosecuted

There are a number of equalities measures and protections in law, yet accessing these for many Muslims and other marginalized groups is hampered by the operation of structural barriers.

Discrimination in the workplace runs at high levels, and accessing employment is fraught with similar difficulties (see Merali, 2017a for a summary of relevant research). Provisions to tackle discrimination at work based on religion came into force at the end of 2003 in response to requirements to comply with the EC Equal Treatment Framework Directive. However, a number of problems arose immediately that made the provisions inaccessible, and where accessed still problematic. Notably legal aid was not initially available for these cases meaning that those bringing cases had to find thousands of pounds to fund cases themselves. This period was also one where lawyers taking on pro bono cases found themselves also targeted and measures brought in to make pro bono lawyers liable for costs should their case fail. As legal aid has been rolled back across the UK in recent years, even when there was a minimal amount of legal aid assigned to such cases in more recent years, as with all such cases the amount was nominal (a few hundred pounds) which is supposed to cover dozens of hours of work across a period of years. This impacted not just these

cases, but immigration cases and indeed civil and criminal cases¹¹ across the board. The introduction of fees for employment tribunals is another barrier for accessing justice. Lawyers working in the field noticed a significant drop in cases after the introduction of fees (the fees were recently removed after a legal challenge). The impact of such measures is to ensure that despite the potentiality of redress, there are sufficient barriers to ensure that that redress is almost unachievable. **There need to be any number of reversals of such barriers** (Ahmed, 2017, Anonymous 1, 2017, Choudhury, 2017).

Set within the wider context of case law developed around equalities provisions over a twenty-year period, there is an argument that case law has developed to hamper applicants rather than support their claims. The case of London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm (2008), where an appeal to the House of Lords had the impact of making: “more difficult for a disabled person to prove disability-related discrimination. The judgment means that for some types of disability discrimination cases the correct comparator for a disability-related discrimination claim is now the same as for a direct discrimination claim.” (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2016). This reflects anxieties around the religious discrimination rules which placed the burden of proof for discrimination on the applicant rather than the employer (as opposed to evidentiary burden as established by the Race Relations Act, 1976). As such **issues around the burden of proof**, are also pressing if there is to be any prospect of making existing legal provisions for equality a reality (Ahmed, 2017).

Additionally, a lack of **properly funded legal aid defence** is crucial not just for Muslim defendants but has been highlighted as one of the determiners for the disproportionate sentencing and thus disproportionate prison populations of Muslims and other racialized communities.

Aligned to this is the issue of the duty solicitor system, whereby those questioned in criminal or anti-terrorism investigations may call a solicitor who is ‘on duty’ to represent them. For those who do not have access to the names of solicitors conversant in the details of the cases they are being questioned for, this representation, particularly in anti-terrorism related investigations and interviews e.g. Schedule 7 questioning, means they do not get appropriate or adequate advice. In such cases the advice given may result in defendants’ not fully being able to exercise their rights, or exercise an effective defence.

¹¹ Curtailment of legal aid in criminal cases has also disadvantaged many Muslims who do not qualify for full legal aid in criminal matters making it even harder to have an effective defence for whatever crime petty or otherwise.

Family proceedings have long been accused of institutional racism, including judgments and referrals based upon stereotypes and racist tropes rather than actual problems and issues (see, e.g. Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2000).

With regard to restrictive immigration rules, it was noted by interviewees (Ahmed, 2017, Ansari, 2017) that the financial threshold regarding bringing spouses or family members to the UK meant that Muslims, who hail from a largely working-class background, were disproportionately affected in being unable to meet the threshold, whilst also being disproportionately likely to want to bring family or spouses to the settle in the UK. As such, **a full review of these rules and the clear discriminatory impact they have on certain communities** must be a first port of call. Within that review, attention needs to be paid to the anecdotal evidence and impression amongst relevant professionals that rejections also have a bias against these communities. These **accusations of bias need further investigation, which must be done by independent researchers** but at the same time have relevant support including possibly financial, from the relevant state authority (in this case the Home Office). There also needs to be **political will from government to publicise the findings and implement the recommendations**. The cases of the Burnley Report (Holden & Billings, 2008) and the Trojan Horse inquiries (e.g. Kershaw, 2014 and Clark, 2014) highlight the trend that where government wish to make a point regarding the deficiency of Muslim communities or actors they can commission research, but when the findings – however rigorous – do not meet with that agenda, these reports are given so little support in their dissemination they are effectively suppressed (Burnley Report) or only those parts which meet the agenda are used without regard to findings and recommendations that go against the government’s views (Brighouse, 2104 and Education Committee, 2015)¹².

¹² In the case of the Burnley Report, research was commissioned on the effect of segregated schooling. This came in the wake of a number of media and political proclamations about the existence of state schools where a very high percentage of the intake were Muslim children. Using the term enclavisation, the authors found contrary to popular tropes that:

“The all-White school is unable by itself to overcome the entrenched White extremism that is mediated through the family, the peer group and the enclave. This strongly suggests that in towns with sizeable ethnic minorities, unless White young people are exposed during their school careers to fellow pupils of different ethnic and religious backgrounds, attitudes of White superiority and hostility towards those of other cultures are unlikely to be ameliorated and smouldering resentments will continue into adult life. Enclavisation, however, assists the development of liberal and integrative attitudes among young Asian/Muslim people by providing an oasis of liberality in a strong and cohesive sub- community.” (Billings and Holden, 2008: 4)

In the case of the Trojan Horse inquiries, after 5 such inquiries, media and political attention was directed to an exchange of WhatsApp messages between teachers where one or more homophobic and one sectarian messages were exchanged. This was highlighted as a justification for the accusation of extremism when the

The operation of the legal profession and its oversight bodies needs review. The failure to accept an understanding of institutional racism is summarised by Ahmed (2017):

“The SRA (Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the disciplinary body for lawyers for solicitors) ... have been the subject of serious allegations of racial biases in disciplinary action. Statistically it’s borne out that BME solicitors are the subject of far more disciplinary actions compared to non BME lawyers. There was also a report and the conclusion funnily enough was that there is a disproportionate amount of actions taken against BME solicitors compared to non BME solicitors but that there wasn’t evidence of racism so that’s the whole point, the whole thing I was speaking about presumptions. When it’s proven statistically that certain things are happening, you have to do better than just say it’s nothing to do with race. They can’t just get away with it by saying it’s nothing to do with race. Well what is the reason for it? And is there a plausible reason for it? And if they can show that there’s a plausible reason for it then fine. So, there is a lack of progress on this issue from a number of organizations and number of institutions.”

The **recording, investigation and prosecution of hate crimes need serious review** (MEND, 2014, Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2013, Ameli et. al, 2004b). Whilst the Director of Public Prosecutions Alison Saunders stated in August 2017 that:

“the CPS, police and others in the criminal justice system are ready to listen and, where we have the evidence, to hold those committing hate crimes to account. Victims should not suffer in silence and, as our new guidance makes clear, **victims can be supported at all stages of the criminal justice process.**”

There remain serious criticisms that the caveat “where there is evidence” means that the majority of reports cannot be taken forward because they boil down to a he said / she said situation. This coupled with patchy or non-existent training for frontline police officers and investigating officers in recording hate motivation means that many cases that do go into the prosecution system are often not flagged as hate crimes (Choudhury, 2017). Particular attention to language used in crime or speech has been flagged up by ENAR (2017), and they recommend the **setting up of specialised units to initiate prompt and effective investigations.**

reports themselves found that there was no such charge to made against any of the schools, teachers, governors or pupils involved.

Despite this critique, there was a note from Afzal (2017) that in her own cases of two Islamophobic attacks a few years apart, that she saw a shift in the reporting and logging culture that was positive with marked improvements.

There needs to be serious revision of the epistemologies of anti-racism and equalities within institutions. The roll out of state functions to the private sector and public-sector employees was a recurring critique, notably:

- (i) The requirements imposed by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 for public sector employees to refer anyone they suspect of extremism to the police;
- (ii) The imposition of duties and penalties on private landlords, schools and other public services to report data or indeed individuals whose immigration status is in doubt. This includes reporting people who have overstayed their visa, and denying accommodation and medical and educational services to over-stayers and those whose immigration status is deemed dubious¹³.

The impact of these measures includes, but is not restricted to:

- A surveillance state in general being in operation where the functions of its policing are outsourced to service providers and private citizens. This situation impacts Muslims and other racialized communities disproportionately (Kapoor, 2017 cf above).
- The enforced homelessness and destitution of people caught up in the cycle of failed immigration applications and appeals.
- The denial of basic services to those deemed outside the pale, essentially normalising inequality as a normative function of the state.

There must be **a change in this culture at the highest levels that acknowledges that institutional racism, of which institutional Islamophobia is a part, exists and must be challenged through:**

- (i) **Revision of Legal Aid provisions.** Legal Aid must be provided in order to allow access to justice, but also to prevent the vast accumulation of debt (Ahmed, 2017) that litigants, defendants or immigration applicants and sponsors fall under the current system. Those affected are disproportionately from Muslim and other racialized communities. A

¹³ At the time of writing cases involving people who have reported crimes to the police, have then been detained for immigration violations. This includes a woman who reported being kidnapped and raped, and a Polish man whose immigration was perfectly legal.

caveat to this is that the level of Legal Aid offered must not be tokenistic. Recent changes to Legal Aid rules have made legal professionals either bear the brunt of financial cuts, or decline cases because they remain, even with minimal Legal Aid, financially prohibitive for their firms' existence.

- (ii) **Properly funded legal clinics** as a way to obviate the Legal Aid drought created by restrictions on Legal Aid funds is one solution suggested (Ahmed, 2017) that would require targeted interventions by the state to ensure that there is access to legal redress on issues such as immigration and employment.
- (iii) **Properly funded legal aid defence**, and systems of duty solicitors who are adequately experienced for criminal defendants and those questioned or charged under anti-terrorism laws.
- (iv) **A change in the evidentiary burden in employment discrimination cases** where the burden of proof falls on an employer that they did not discriminate rather than on an (potential) employee that they were discriminated against (Ahmed, 2017). There is precedent for this in the Race Relations Act (1976) superseded by the Equality Act 2010 and making the approach consistent should be uncontroversial.
- (v) **Research into the impact of immigration rules** on Muslims and other racialized and marginalized communities e.g. financial thresholds, levels of rejection, need to submit evidence of return (Ahmed, 2017).
- (vi) **Forward movement on implementing policies that understand how institutional racism** (McPherson, 1999) operates and how to tackle structural discrimination that results. The call for this in regard to the issue of institutional Islamophobia was made as far back as 2004 in the Mubarek Inquiry report.
- (vii) There needs to be a **political push to ensure that the anomalies and injustices of the current equalities culture are erased**. This requires a recommitment to the McPherson principles (1999).
- (viii) **End of the policing of communities through unaccountable private individuals (e.g. landlords), charities, the NHS, and schools and universities.**

The foregoing is in some ways backward looking towards certain 'high' points of equalities culture in the past. This is not a case of unwarranted and misleading nostalgia, though there are dangers in creating a mythical past devoid of critique of its failing (Kapoor, 2017). It is more a case of setting a baseline (Kundnani, 2017 above) from which a movement forward can be established.

Further problems and possible solutions based in civil society highlighted in interviews revolved around strategic litigation (Ahmed, 2017, Choudhury, 2017) and support for individual cases.

The possibilities and timing for strategic litigation appear to be narrowing, and the lack of public funds to bring such challenges also makes this a restricted route for civil society. Where cases have a prospect of succeeding and there is as a result an out of court settlement, or some form of resolution, this then does not get media uptake (either because of confidentiality clauses in settlements or the fact that a settlement is not as sensationalist as a win). Litigation that is settled out of court generates no written decision, and thus has no precedential effect.

Thus, between these impediments the possibility or utility of such litigation is a serious issue. Where there are significant outcomes e.g. the giving of substantial damages in a settled employment case, confidentiality clauses mean that the impact and possible normalisation through media coverage of the outcome of the case is negated (Ahmed, 2017, Choudhury, 2017). Where a case such as that brought against the government on the imposition of full naked body scanners at ports in the UK (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2013), was resolved by the government removing said scanners in favour of those which did not violate citizens' rights, the coverage of such a case was minimal and again any normative impact of the acceptance that this measure, which had been brought in on the back of a narrative of securitisation, was lost by little or no media coverage or discussion (Choudhury, 2017).

The role of the media in this regard is crucial and thus some recommendations must fall onto their shoulders and cross over with counter-narrative eight below. With regard to a counter-narrative based on acknowledging structural racism, the **media need to move beyond the double-bind of lackadaisical and sensationalist reporting and focus instead on providing balanced and normative coverage of legal developments and the need for changes in the law**. The press has shown when it has taken on causes it can have an impact, with the Daily Mail being credited (and taking credit Dacre, 2012) in many ways for changing opinion and even putting political pressure on the police and legal system over the Stephen Lawrence case (though careful analysis of the Daily Mails' claims suggests these claims were exaggerated and that where there have been positive consequences these were unintended, Cathcart, 2017). Likewise, they stand accused of shifting the focus towards a demonised representation of Muslims and help push the law towards increasing disproportionality towards Muslims (Poole, 2016, Ameli and Merali, 2015).

The **setting up of more community initiatives and the community and independent funding of civil society organisations providing advocacy services and legal support for individuals needing support** is an increasingly needed support strategy. Whilst one organisation has an in-house solicitor for employment and immigration issues (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2015) there is a dearth of legal support structures within civil society that mirrors in part the general decline of such support across BME civil society, but is also an indictment to the lack of organisation within civil society on issues which have existed for a long time.

Regardless of any lack in this regard, the critique of governmental failure to tackle or even complicity in creating an environment of hatred and hostility for Muslims is a recurring one. Haley (2017) highlights this complexity:

“That’s been of particular concern to our campaign [Scotland Against Criminalising Communities] i.e. state and institutional Islamophobia. Concerns about Islamophobia are deflected into concerns about what you might call street Islamophobia and the actual views held by the general public and all the time the debate takes the purpose of should the government being doing more about that. From my perspective [the] government and government policies... are doing a great deal to stimulate and feed Islamophobic attitudes more generally so I think there’s a lack of correct balance in dealing with these things. There’s an excessive emphasis on dealing with Islamophobic views in the general public and that failure to get to grips with Islamophobia institutionalised in both government and party politics and other authorities or institutions.”

The situation where civil society is in effect providing advice and services (support for victims of hate crimes and advocacy support services) (Bouattia, 2017), legislating and making policy that suppresses democratic values, equality and racism like Prevent (Aked, 2017), imposing discriminatory and restrictive immigration and detention regimes (Ahmed, 2017 and Anonymous 4, 2017), closing down discussion and denying the ability of Muslims to enter dialogue with the state and the institutions of the state regarding their experiences and expectations (François, 2016 and 2017, Ameli et. al, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007, Kundnani, 2017, Williams, 2017) marks a situation where civil society regardless of its successes or failures cannot make a sustained change when there is no partner in the process of transformation from the government.

The **daily impact of structural racism requires serious investigation**, but it appears even before this process begins there is a **need to establish once more the structural nature of racism and other societal problems**.

5. *Acknowledging Islamophobia as a form of violence that is relational to both recent and colonial history and current events in various Westernised settings that refer to each other in order to perpetuate each other.*

As Sadiq (in Baig, 2016 above) highlights the problematization of Islam and Muslims in the UK context though deeply entwined in the long durée of colonial history, largely represents itself as ahistorical and transnational. There is no overt conversation about the presence of Muslims or other racialized communities in the UK.

François (2017) ties the need for the reinventing of the story of the nation with an understanding of this history:

“nations need what you might call national myths as part of social cohesion, that the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves are inclusive and help to feel that we are united by a common thread. In the absence of that, a dark form of exclusivist nationalism which we’ve seen take over in Brexit can take over. We need alternative national conversations, alternative national myths which look back at the history of the UK, not in an exclusivist, I would say in many cases racist way, but in one which acknowledges the history of the multiple peoples who now inhabit this island and acknowledges the multiple ways in which the UK historically was intertwined with other cultures and civilisations and how our history is now an emerged one...”

The award-winning website, *Our Migration Story: The Making of Britain* (2017), is one of the ways this has been conceptualized as a learning tool, looking at migration to the UK over almost 2000 years of history:

“Drawing on the words and research of over 60 historians based in universities and historical institutions – including the National Archives, the Imperial War Museum, the Victoria and Albert Museum, and the Royal Historical Society – this website presents the often-untold stories of the generations of migrants who came to and shaped the British Isles.”

Haley (2017) contextualises the impact further:

“What we’re seeing everywhere is that Islamophobia is the driver for the growth of the far right... it’s Islamophobia that propelled Trump to the US presidency. If you look a bit around the EU it’s the same. We’ve seen systematically for a decade or more, UKIP have tried to pick up on Islamophobia and racism and channel that and transfer those attitudes into something that’s Islamophobia directed at EU migrants. There remains a really close relationship between the way that Islamophobia is exploited and the targeting of EU citizens.”

“Everywhere you look Islamophobia is driving some of the biggest and most alarming political movements we’ve seen anywhere, but we’re not seeing a response to that that’s anywhere near to commensurate with the importance of the issue.”

Goldberg’s (2009) conceptualisation of the globalization of the racial pertains here:

“The support racial thinking and racism ‘here’ gets from ‘there’, both as a symbolic matter and materially, sustains and extends the impacts...”

“The globalisation of the racial is predicated on the understanding that racial thinking and its resonances circulated by boat in the European voyages of discovery, imported into the impact zones of colonisation and imperial expansion. Racial ordering, racist institutional arrangement and racial control were key instruments of colonial governmentality and control.”

Sivanandan (2008) reflects on the dichotomy between ‘colonialism and immigration’ and racist narratives of the place of the other and of ‘here’ and ‘there’ in the UK:

“Myths and stereotypes reinforce each other. The myth sets out the story, the stereotype fits in the characters. It was said, for instance, that the post-war “influx” of West Indian and Asian immigrants to this country was due to “push-and-pull” factors. Poverty pushed us out of our countries, and prosperity pulled us into Britain. Hence the stereotype that we were lazy, feckless people who were on the make. But what wasn’t said was that it was colonialism that both impoverished us and enriched Britain. So that when, after the war, Britain needed all the labour it could lay its hands on for the reconstruction of a war-damaged economy, it turned to the reserves of labour that it had piled up in the colonies. That’s why it passed the Nationality Act of 1948 making us colonials British nationals. (Equally, when, after 1962, it did not need that labour, it brought in a series of restrictive

and racist immigration acts.) Quite simply we came to Britain (and not to Germany for instance) because we were occupied by Britain. Colonialism and immigration are part of the same continuum – we are here because you were there.”

“The same syndrome obtains today. Europe wants immigrant labour but not the immigrant, the profit from the one, not the cost of the other – except that the immigrants now are mostly from eastern Europe and what used to be the numbers theory – the fewer the immigrants, the more easily can they be “digested” – the phrase belongs to the original director of the Institute of Race Relations – is today the managed migration thesis of the government. Except, too, that the refugees and asylum seekers, thrown up on Europe’s shores, stem from the uprooting and displacement of whole populations caused by globalisation, and the imperial wars and regime change that follow in its wake. Globalisation and immigration are part of the same continuum. We are here because you *are* there.”

In this scenario there is even precarity of what legally defines a ‘British national’ as being essentially at the whim of a state governed in its own continuing colonial interests. This bucks the expectation of many that the British state is essentially the ‘just state’ (Hamid, 2017) that Muslim civil society leadership in particular aspire to and seek to persuade of Muslim humanity and thus deserving of inclusion within the story of the nation (Narkowicz, 2017).

Whilst Contractor (2017 above) has highlighted how the types of conversation between Muslims and the institutions of state need to be reset, others look to establishing a clear and honest narrative within political, academic and media discourse about the causality of the ‘problems’ ascribed to issues of Islam and ‘Muslimness’ that is fair, unbiased and reflects a wider understanding of structural and geopolitical factors rather than relying on

Islamophobic narratives to support contentious but ultimately devastating ideas and policies. Others seek to expound a clearer understanding of how racism, in particular anti-Muslim racism is a form of organisation that underpins various hierarchies of inequality in the current national and world order (Grosfoguel, 2013).

All three approaches rely on the need for ‘acknowledgement’ of certain realities. Existing and potential counter-narratives to Islamophobia in terms of conversation setting particularly in the media will be dealt with in counter-narrative eight, and the need to acknowledge hierarchies and

how to move beyond them in counter-narrative six. This section will deal with the need for academia and government and its institutions to acknowledge ongoing histories and reframe not just current ‘problems’ but question the framing of the problems themselves if Islamophobia as a form of racialised governmentality (Sayyid, 2014) is to be unravelled in pursuit of a truly post-racial state.

Experiencing Islamophobia through the medium of the state, media, academy and other institutions

Afzal (2017) highlights a shift in narrative whereby Islamophobia is acknowledged in some circles, yet the operation of this discourse lacks direction and efficacy:

“I feel like people are more open to talking about it now because everyone is talking about it or seeing it in Trump or this caricature. People are probably more comfortable now but it’s still deeply uncomfortable in challenging it in everyday life. So, social media and I guess challenging Trump is fine and talking in a very abstract way about how islamophobia is really bad, that seems to be okay, but on the other side I still find it very difficult to have conversations with people who think that they know everything, who think that they understand the way that Islamophobia operates in society but still get it through to them that actually it’s multi-layered and it’s still very prevalent even though people are so aware of it.”

Gendered forms of Islamophobia have highlighted street level experience and harassment of women (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2000, Zempi & Chakroborti (2014), Ameli and Merali, 2005b, Ameli and Merali, 2015, Seta, 2016) but also the rise of Islamophobia as it impacts men through primarily the counter-terrorism laws (Rajina, 2017, Ameli et. al, 2004b). Whilst these gendered differences are now not as wide¹⁴ as in previous years, they provide a way of understanding how policies and laws like the counter-terrorist regime extend in their impact not simply as an unintended consequence of otherwise robust laws responding to imminent threats or concerns, but as a form of governance based on maintaining separation and difference between groups of citizens / (non) citizens much as past forms of colonial governance operated. The street level experience of Islamophobia cannot be untied from the responsibility of the state and its legal extend over society both as perpetrator of violence and failed protector of its violated citizens.

¹⁴ See Ameli and Merali, 2015 on the parity in experiences of violence, and Deport, Deprive and Extradite (2017) on the increased targeting of women by the anti-terrorism laws and its adjuncts e.g. family proceedings etc.

Acknowledging the following have been highlighted as prerequisites to the reformulation of policy and the developing of good practice in countering Islamophobia:

- (i) the epistemologies of current security praxis and studies are at best poorly constructed and at worst deliberately disingenuous (Qureshi, 2017, Begg, 2017, Ansari, 2006, Jackson et. al., 2007, Breen-Smyth, undated)
- (ii) the UK is only nominally Christian¹⁵ and that in terms of values it has an aversion to all religion thus marginalizing believers of all faiths calling into question its pretensions to liberalism (Williams, 2017, Farron, 2017, François, 2016)
- (iii) the operation of institutional racism throughout the praxis of government, its institutions and within academia resulting in flawed knowledge production;
- (iv) that the long durée of colonial history must be considered in understanding current praxes of government and the ‘problems’ and ‘frames of reference’ that result (Kundnani, 2016);
- (v) Discussing political violence but not in a vacuum. Aked (2017): ‘...if you are going to talk about that you need to talk about foreign policy, state violence as well you need to talk about policy, state violence you need to also talk about political violence in the far right as well.’

Existing counter-narratives that have been deployed in this regard have included the following which are now themselves under critique as reproducing cycles of powerlessness:

- (i) responding to government consultations on laws and policies (IHRC, 2015);
- (ii) increasing Muslim participation in the academy, and other institutions, services and professions;
- (iii) individual and community projects that try to show Muslims in their ‘true’ light;
- (iv) inter-faith and outreach work;
- (v) awareness raising events, third party reporting projects and projects around street level Islamophobia and discrimination.

The limits to these can be summarised as them being all short-term strategies, which when operating without more long term strategic vision, can serve to simply reinforce the cycle of

¹⁵ The 2011 England Wales census found that 59.3% of the population identified themselves as Christian (ONS, 2012). However when it comes to practice, in 2016, a Church of England report found that the number of people regularly attending church stood at 18 people per 1,000 regularly attending church and were predicted to fall to 10 per 1,000 over the next three decades (Sherwood, 2016).

exclusion. All the above respond directly to narratives of Islamophobia and thus risk what Malik (2014) identified as reinforcing their connection with and thus validating narratives of Islamophobia.

Counter-narrative work cited as examples of good practice and work which address the long-term aims of countering Islamophobia begin with the need for they type of **barrier breaking interventions** in the public space evidenced in counter-narrative 3 above by Max Hill QC, as well as civil society groups led by those working with and giving voice to those directly affected.

There was some criticism (reflecting long standing concerns) of the ‘saris and samosas’ approach to education about diversity (see Ameli et. al. 2015). Participants at the IHRC & SACC workshop on Education (2017) felt that such education needed to embed things in the curriculum rather than one off lessons on multiculturalism, and that what was required was critical literacy.

Williams (2017) cites the need for both government and the state education system to be the primary recipients of counter-narratives:

“I think the two target audiences are government and I am repeatedly taken aback about how little information is in the minds of ministers and staff. How do we address this through the state education system? It seems to me to be an **overwhelming case for a really balanced religious and cultural studies syllabus to look at how religious ‘others’ are constituted and set up and essentialized.**”

The adoption by parts of the academy of the **need for decolonised curricula** has been highlighted as major step forward, with projects such as Dismantling the Master’s House at University College London initiating causes such as the Why is My Curriculum White? - and Why isn’t my Professor Black? movement - which in themselves and in concert with other movements like #RhodesMustFall and the NUS Black Students Campaign led to the establishing of degrees focussing on Black Studies and critical re-evaluations of existing curricula. At the time of writing a letter from student activists at the University of Cambridge to the English Faculty is credited as having started a process of ‘decolonization’ of the English syllabus (Morgan, 2017). The need to acknowledge begins in the realm of learning and various interviewees and general critique point to the direction of travel going in the opposite way at the level of schools with the introduction of ideas around the benign nature of British colonialism and the benefits brought to those colonised. The **latter was seen as undergirding structural racism and in need of radical transformation.**

Revisiting history textbooks at school to reflect: “rethink[ing] the stories we tell our children about who we ‘are’ and we need to acknowledge the historical wrongs that have been done in order to recognise the historical inequalities that have fed into some of the current inequalities...” (François, 2017)

The **usefulness of terms such as ‘institutional racism’** (McPherson, 1999) and **‘institutional Islamophobia’** (Mubarek Inquiry, 2004) (Ahmed, 2017, Elahi, 2017) have been oft cited, and the backlash against the terms from certain think tanks (see Mirza et. al., 2007 cited in Ameli and Merali, 2015) has only served to highlight to those concerned with tackling Islamophobia the importance of the terms. The revolving door between certain think tanks

and government and the continuous exchange of personnel between political, media and think tank positions is part of the meta-narrative of accountability and lack thereof that has run throughout this part of the research. There appears to be no accountability for the stranglehold on power but also narratives of power and the terms of governmentality exercised by increasingly smaller groups of people holding increasingly narrower views in particular with regard to Islam, Muslims and other racialized groups. **Exposing these connections** has been part of counter-narrative work of Spinwatch and others, but **accountability for this situation or ways to loosen this stranglehold** are yet to manifest in particularly consistent ways.

Existing and possible counter-narratives revolve largely but not solely outside the realm of **direct consultations** with national government as currently a futile and counter-productive exercise (Kundnani, 2017, Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2015), but does not exclude **working with local authorities**. A case in point is the work undertaken in Burnley to counter an EDL demonstration in particular and the rise of the far-right in general between the council, the Lancashire Council of Mosques, and Blackburn Cathedral (Contractor, 2017). This incident highlights how a shared sense of community against a nativist discourse was built over successive years in a manner unrelated to platitudes about ‘one nation’ (Cameron cited in François, 2016), the need for social cohesion (Cameron, 2007) and muscular liberalism (Cameron, 2011) as opposed to multiculturalism (Cameron, 2011 *ibid*). Other counter-narrative work includes **working with the established church and other faith groups outside existing narratives of extremism and British values**. Contractor highlights the appointment of a dialog officer at Blackburn Cathedral:

“When the Blackburn Cathedral realized that, the demographics of Blackburn have changed forever... They decided to appoint a dialog officer... and her job was very much about trying to make the cathedral an open space because Blackburn is a small town and the cathedral is the towering landmark of that particular town and her job was to make Blackburn as a city more cohesive and the cathedral more inclusive.”

Although there is a huge emphasis on inter-faith work pushed by the Prevent agenda, there were many examples of inter-faith work cited that challenged the stereotypes that are perpetuated by Prevent related work e.g. Muslims in need of socialisation to the ideas of tolerance. Such alliances include those between various Jewish groups and activists (from orthodox, liberal and secular backgrounds) and Muslim groups and activists on Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaigns, as well as protesting for Palestinian rights, and also on social issues e.g. rights of students to express their religious beliefs.

The need for this work to be from the grassroots, and maybe supported by larger bodies who take a hands-off approach is one that Contractor (2017) recommends based on her research:

“...we asked people what they thought needed to be done to reduce discrimination on the basis of peoples’ beliefs and they said we don’t need any more laws, we’ve enough laws and policy in place. What we also discovered in that particular project where discrimination occurs, it’s not because of policy, policy is robust, it’s because of attitudes of individuals. What people suggest we do and that became a recommendation, they said we needed more dialog and faith intercultural dialog and we needed more education but in both cases the feeling was we need to move away from institutional stuff, where top down doesn’t

always work... you need some sort of middle path where you have organisations leading on things but where local groups, Islamic societies, universities, community groups, mothers' groups in our inner cities, where they are empowered and given resources through some sort of centred body to roll these things out, make them happen, make them relevant to their local needs as well because there's no point talking about national agendas when communities are worried about roads and garbage pickups or roads that are not properly surfaced so it has to be pertinent to local needs as well."

Acknowledging the structural nature of racism is a repeated refrain from interviewees and an emerging and urgent critique in the literature. Whilst all respondents welcomed awareness raising around the issue of Islamophobia, a frequent concern raised was the failure to conceptualise it as 'more than' 'street hostility' and discrimination. Further concerns were raised that the issue of discrimination was treated differently and almost as a form of 'Islamophobia lite' whether in awareness raising or (insofar as any institutional conversations exist) at a policy level. **Recognizing discrimination as a form of structural violence** (Johnson, 2017) was key recommendation that supports the idea of understanding and tackling Islamophobia as a series of overlapping and interlocking discourses.

There is also a need to **tackle the immediate threat to Muslim women at the street level and in public spaces**. The need for Muslim women to feel safe when in public, and not have to modify their behaviour is one shared by all women, however the threat of Islamophobic hatred being levelled at them gives an added dimension and urgency to the issues they face. There have been repeated calls from civil society for better training of police services on such issues, and also in recording and understanding the dimensions of religious hatred in attacks. A failure to understand the latter has resulted in many cases not being properly recorded and thus any prosecution that comes about does not have the religious element factored into this, once more suppressing a reality faced by Muslims from the public and legal imagination.

This 'safety' needs to extend to their interaction in everyday life at school, at work or going about their everyday business, where many report feeling they have to modify their behaviour and simultaneously not attract adverse attention by lowering their profile (Ameli and Merali, 2017). Bearing the burden of conviviality (Rajina, 2017) requires Muslim women to be always on alert to represent all Muslims because of the pervasive political, media and legal gaze on Muslims. Not having to answer questions or proactively portray 'Muslimness' as non-threatening, pleasant etc. is a form of safety (and equality with other women) currently lacking for Muslim women. Rajina (2017) compares this situation ironically with one of the much-criticised facet of the counter-terrorism regime i.e. Schedule 7, where a person held for questioning 'does not have the right to remain silent.' **The right to be silent whether before the law or as a day to day participant on the life of the nation is a key facet of citizenship** currently denied Muslims.

This need for safety and retreat from hostile environments has in part been addressed by the **creation of physical and conceptual safe spaces** (Bouattia, 2017). Whilst there has been backlash against this concept, interviewees highlighted that this space is a crosscutting issue between counter-narratives of Islamophobia.

Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, was caught up in a media storm in 2008 when he gave a public lecture in which he claimed that at some point Muslim civil law (shariah) would be part of the legal landscape in the UK (much as Beth Din courts are for the Jewish community). Williams (2017) states that the status of the word 'shariah' at that time (and even currently) is a dogwhistle term evoking media backlash and a variety of tropes and stereotypes, and that his aim by raising it was to say: "'shariah' needed to be understood in its diversity... don't assume that you from the outside can pick out the essential core meanings, we have to listen to the practitioners". Further whilst the: "media reaction was overwhelmingly negative in a sort of know nothing way i.e. never mind what they say we know what it means and that has gone on keeps coming up on women's rights, and issues in Islamic world. I had hoped that by addressing an audience of lawyers... that something of debate might start up, and in spite the media reports the lawyers who were there on the whole took this seriously and argued about it and of course the Lord Chief Justice a few months later took this forward."

Recognising the perversity and refocusing the gaze of the state is a key demand of many interviewees. The obsession with what Muslim women wear rather than e.g. Home Office circumventing human rights rules to deport people (Ahmed, 2017) epitomises a situation that is frequently being exposed outside of government and institutional circles but which has not had much purchase within institutions and government structures yet. Whilst civil society now feels forced to externalise its complaints regarding human rights issues, it is clear the state simply regroupes and recalibrates when external criticisms or directions are received. If the UK is serious in tackling social issues it needs to take on board critique like that of the United Nations which has denounced the securitized culture that prevails (Human Rights Council, 2017).

This has further purchase when discussing the anti-terrorism regime which spread across sectors and is found to work within and through family proceedings (Fero, 2017, Deport, Deprive, Extradite, 2017, Anonymous 5). Anonymous 5 stated: "cases get referred by the anti-terrorism branch to social services, and are driven not by social workers but anti-terrorism officers, with the possibility of care proceedings levelled against parents... siblings have even been split up. There are cases where bizarre stuff is happening when you go before a social worker...it's a system that has been developed now, that is difficult to deal with... all of these cases are driven behind the scenes by police officers."

This problem is compounded by the fact that (as with other barriers to accessing justice), family lawyers in the UK are not always or often specialised in criminal (including anti-terrorism) law and are thus not able to represent clients adequately.

Previous critique from the UN Rapporteur on Religious Freedom, Asma Jahangir raises the question, (mirrored in questions about the divining of 'true Islam' by government and media):

"The Special Rapporteur would like to emphasize that **it is not the Government's role to look for the "true voices of Islam" or of any other religion or belief**. Since religions or communities of belief are not homogenous entities it seems advisable to acknowledge and take into account the diversity of voices. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that **the contents of a religion or belief should be defined by the worshippers themselves**."

Whether this relates to Prevent and other government sanctioned inter-faith work, or the operation of policies working to socially engineer the Muslim community (Ansari, 2006, IHRC et. al. 2005) Jahangir's comment pertains in exposing how hierarchies of racism are not only undergirded by government policy but exploited by them too.

Removing hierarchies of racism and acknowledging Islamophobia as a form of racism.

A repeated counter-narrative over several decades has been the invoking of the 'Jewish' community as a model, whether by Muslims themselves (Rajina, 2017, Runnymede, 1997 and 2017) or by political figures (Cameron, 2007). Ameli et. al., discuss the wider implications of this with regard to faith communities (2006b). Their findings from qualitative and quantitative work, highlight Muslim expectations within the existing parameters of minority rights in the UK. The call for **parity between minoritised and/or religious communities** i.e. the acceptance of minority identity and the 'benefits' that go with it should be on a par across major religious minorities, or indeed across major religions (Beth Din courts, the Synod, Muslim arbitration). This can provide (i) examples of good (state) practice; (ii) a marker by which to measure the treatment of Muslims by the state; but counterintuitively (iii) can inhibit the improvement of the situation of Muslims but also (in this case) Jews, by using certain aspects of recognition of 'Jewish' identity as the final point of good practice regarding religious and or racialized communities in the UK.

Ahsan (2017) sounds a warning regarding monopolisation of narratives of suffering from whichever community, and emphasizes the need for there to be more than piecemeal or nominal shows of solidarity. In particular, he calls for **a more interwoven understanding and solidarity between campaigns, causes and oppressed groups**. He highlights his work with the Hillsborough Committee campaign, as well as referencing what he calls the 'repeating pattern through other suspect communities' including the Irish through the 1960s until the Good Friday agreement, the American-Japanese and their experience of internment, as well as the targeting of the white working class in the Orgreave Affair (demonised as striking miners) and the survivors and victims' families after the Hillsborough Disaster (demonised as 'scousers'):

"...there is a repeating pattern through other suspect communities, obviously Irish people in the 70's and the Japanese-Americans and their internment and so I view this as part of that wider branch of history and I am working closely with other communities... I went to the Orgreave (Miners' Strike) and memorial on 33rd anniversary and I looked some of the language used by the Tory minister and there were things said by the minister, certain things like 'extremist ways' or 'democratic ways' and obviously phrases like that... similarly if you look at the language use against 'scousers' [Hillsborough] they are firstly blamed for their own death, they are blamed for their poverty, they are blamed..."

Also highlighting commonality of (potential) experience, Rajina (2017) highlights the existence and relative security of some Jewish schools in Stamford Hill, London where the experience and institutions of the Jewish community provide for her examples of good

practice. In the maintaining of an Eastern-European, Yiddish speaking identity some eight generations or more after arrival in the UK, there is ample scope for Muslims to emulate and government and local authorities to adopt in their approach to Muslims. Rajina points to the fact that there are many schools in that community which are known to be failing schools but which have been largely left alone by the authorities because of the community's 'putting their foot down'. As an example to Muslim communities this is illustrative of how a confident and determined community can face off hostility from the authorities to maintain their access to the institutions without external harassment. Kundnani (2017) highlights that the Muslim community's failure to draw a red line with the government over the Trojan Horse affair was a miscalculation, that has resulted in increased harassment. As a recommendation to civil society, **establishing boundaries over issues affecting the community** is part of a long-term strategy that has in the case of some parts of the Jewish community in the UK been shown to have effect. This example bucks the narrative of minority conditionality imposed by Cameron (2007) as resting upon a critical conversation between the state and racialised minorities. Cameron (2007) claimed that the demands for Muslims to reform had precedent in the conversations between state and non-Jewish communities on one side and the Jewish community on the other fifty years previously over the possible conflicts between their identity and Britishness. It is implied in his speech that an assimilationist track taken by the Jewish community has led to their full acceptance in British society and that this is the route Muslims in the UK must take. This speech forms the basis of much policy developed and rests upon and reproduces various Islamophobic narratives of Muslims as an internal threat, disloyal and incompatible with the nation. It also revives similar anti-Semitic tropes by re-imagining the history of Jewish communities in the UK, as recent, conditional and entirely socialised to the state, and is worthy of examination and more treatment in regard to the rise of anti-Semitism in the UK in other research.

François (2017) highlights also: "the Jewish community; they have then had certain commissions put in place to assess the state of anti-Semitism in the UK and then policies can be devised off the back of those. We know that in the UK that has not been devised by the UK government in the same way for Muslims despite repeated claims to do that..." Williams (2017) see **trends and traits of Islamophobia that mirror the anti-Semitism in Europe of earlier years and asks why lesson are not learned from this.**

A particular sector feeling Islamophobic pressure is civil society. Organisations, whether constituted as charities or not have felt the brunt of a media and political focus that singles them out in a manner distinct from other communities (see Merali, 2017a for a summary). Accountability for this situation is demanded by several respondents, but also forms the basis of expectations of equality of expectation and treatment between minority community charities. Anonymous 2 (2017) highlights a number of cases that have come to his attention of Muslim charities having inquiries and investigations opened against them by the Charity Commission based on media attacks against trustees' possible beliefs or possible damage to a charity's reputation based on confusion as to whether that charity is involved in certain events or not. Anonymous 2 notes that this has resulted in the very least, charities against whom no wrong doing has been found finding themselves at the very least, bogged down in endless rounds of correspondence with the Charity Commission caused by repeated complaints by the same members of the commentariat. At worst they have

trustees removed and replaced by trustees chosen by the Charity Commission and or had assets frozen. Issues that the Charity Commission have raised in this regard include, support for the Palestinian cause, perceived association with comedy events, perceived association with criticism of *Charlie Hebdo*. As Anonymous 2 notes, charities such as UK Torem (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2015) have meanwhile been found to be providing financial support that included funding the purchase of equipment for Israeli Defence Forces whilst they were engaged in military actions that have violated the Geneva Conventions, and in the case of UK Torem have supported illegal settlements (White, 2017), with only minor sanction, and no finding that any of the activities mentioned are in any way contrary to what constitutes charitable aims in their opinion.

Accusations within the third sector have existed for some time that the disproportionality of inquiries, investigations and actions against Muslim charities are an indicator of institutional racism and requires serious, independent investigation (Anonymous 2, 2017).

Accountability for such investigations and inquiries, and the revision of both the operation of investigatory powers, but also the particularities of differential treatment facing charities whose work deals in sole or large part with racialised communities. This is particularly important when the actions of the Charity Commission appear to be pursuing an increasingly political agenda¹⁶.

Currently, without the ability to bring legal challenges against the Commission (curtailed by the issues mentioned above) Muslim civil society and the third sector have no way to challenge the decisions of the Commission. Even when the Charity Commission was forced to accept that it could not interfere (in a manner in which it had) in the funding by Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust or other charities of organisations like CAGE, and despite it being proven that part of this interference came from William Shawcross, the commission's Chair, directly, he remains in place.

A second aspect of the hierarchies of racism revolves around impact and the **making invisible of groups of people**. Ahmed (2017) highlights the plight of people rendered destitute due to the prohibitive costs of immigration applications, and the vicious cycle of being denied the right to work whilst applications are pending. People in this situation are also denied medical treatment and cannot rent properties. The latter means they are rendered homeless (either sleeping on the streets or sofa surfing). This process makes invisible those affected to such an extent that they are rendered almost invisible in any conversation about equalities in the UK. It is not that just conceptually they are considered beyond the pale, they are physically rendered invisible. The making visible of such injustice as projects like Deport, Deprive, Extradite, or the expose work on detention centres and removals (Miller, Corporate Watch et. al., 2013) needs to be continued but **the work of civil society in exposing these injustices requires in the long run, partners within institutions of the state in tackling the structural nature of these injustices** (Ameli et. al. 2004a).

Discriminatory barriers including those that prevent complaints from those who have suffered discrimination being lodged and prevent them from progressing at school or work,

¹⁶ see Merali (2017a) on the accusations of a conflict of interest regarding the appointment of former Henry Jackson Society member, William Shawcross as the Chair of the Commission

are another form of making racialised individuals invisible and groups that require redress. In this regard educational space and workplace cultures have peculiar anomalies in creating hierarchies of racism where anti-racist measures (insofar as they are obliged to exist via equalities policies) are made as a one size fits all and do not always cover issues that are a bar to Muslim participation e.g. socialising and bonding around alcohol after work, participating in school discos or dance classes, uniform requirements that do not take in the diversity of Muslim expectations and beliefs etc. **Finding ways of tackling the different experiences of inequality faced by different racialized or marginalised communities and groups within institutional settings is imperative if existing equalities norms are to be achieved** (Choudhury, 2017). This could include in the school setting, clearer guidance from government on issues such as uniform (currently there is no specific advice from the government regarding the rights to wear religiously mandated clothing); working around issues like times of fasting and breaking fast, prayer times, fasting during exam periods etc. This lack has meant that advocacy organisations are getting increased calls from families where children are now being told to remove hijabs, shave beards or are forbidden from praying at school, or whose children have been referred through Prevent because they asked for a place to pray.

As with the Charity Commission and the question of accountability, similar questions arise as to how there can be accountability for the actions of OFSTED, the schools' inspectorate. It was heavily criticised for its interventions in the Trojan Horse school affair, and its new chair (Amanda Spielman) at the time of writing is facing a campaign calling for her resignation after she issued guidance to inspectors to question pre-pubescent girls who wear *hijab* as to their reasons for wearing it. Spielman's guidance is in violation of both the existing equalities culture (Merali, 2017c) in the UK as well as established human rights norms. An open letter signed by over a thousand academics and activists lambasted this move as racist (El-Enany et. al. cited in Halliday, 2017). As an initiative started by dissenting members of the academy this letter has sent a powerful message to a state institution that their actions are at the very least being held to account in some manner. However, it is battling not just Ofsted as an institution with no accountability but the discursive practice of domination hatred (Ameli, 2012) where narratives cut across political media, educational, social and legal spheres and reinforce each other. The motions behind Spielman's move also originate in the press, as Hooper (2017) notes, in *The Times*. According to him the impact of this: '...is now shaping how parents are interacting with children at toddler age. [T]he challenges are huge and it's very difficult actually at this point to imagine where we'll be in five years or ten years.'

Zempi (2017) also calls for more accountability including from the government which: "is the indirect perpetrator but something should be in place where politicians are held accountable for creating panic. So, lies told about immigrants have gone unchallenged. If I teach my students false information, I will be held accountable. No-one is really challenging them. Maybe a parliament committee or something along the lines can ensure accountability."

In order to tackle these issues, the following were suggested as accepting that there is a pre-existing frame of reference that does not have a logic behind it but is essentially based on privileging by making visible the invisible:

Creating parity between Muslim family law councils and Beth Din courts (Ameli et. al. 2006b)

Parity in state funding and state oversight over Muslim faith schools with, in particular Catholic and Jewish schools.

Full and easily accessible accountability mechanisms for decisions taken by inspectorates (Ofsted, Charity Commission etc.), including more transparency in disciplinary proceedings against officers within these organisations, as well as accountability for the comments, guidance and work for the chairs of the organisations.

Better regulation of the public/private sector and a more robust culture preventing conflicts of interest between media professionals, and politicians, political appointees and their other affiliations, including the increasing number of active think tanks.

Highly visible meetings between institutions of the state with demonized groups.

Addressing differential treatment of racialized minorities by regulatory bodies, e.g. the Charity Commission, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, Ofsted etc.

A thorough review of immigration rules and detentions

A refocus on equalities, or ideas of injustice as the normative focus of the state.

Respondents fell within two broad categories of views regarding the equalities culture in the UK. They can be summed up by Elahi (2017) who saw the best counter-narratives to Islamophobia in existing equalities measures but also the refocusing of the conversation around ‘Muslims’ and ‘social problems’ (much as François, 2017 does) onto issues of socio-economic deprivation and class.

Johnson (2017) and Kapoor (2017) conversely were very cautious about this approach. Kapoor cited above, preferred to use the word ‘injustice’ as conveying the power of the experiences being faced, and also a point of awareness raising amongst wider society. SACC (2017) uses this term in concluding its practical recommendations to the EHRiC: “there needs to be respect for the demands of justice (and recognition of the wider issues of racial justice that are engaged) in responding to Islamophobic incidents.”

Johnson (2017) elaborates on the problematics of equalities’ vocabulary and nostalgia: “I think there were moments of hope maybe... I think that we forget that there was so much violence that led to colonised people gaining their freedom – there was just so much violence. So even to describe that period of time as a potential period of hope is something I’m a little bit hesitant to do.”

Tackling the institutionalisation of inequality under a security discourse has been touched on in section three. A broader expansion of this follows.

The UK’s culture of equalities was hitherto much celebrated in civil society within and outside the UK as one of the most progressive. However, the rise of an anti-multiculturalist narrative and the rise of a nativist discourse have increasingly rendered this history as inimical to British values and a threat to the internal democracy of the UK (Merali, 2017a). In this scenario, Muslims are posited as the vanguards of multiculturalism, who are simultaneously seen to be promoting a segregationist agenda (and therefore are in need of

assimilation/integration) but also as entryists whose civic participation is construed as seeking to advance an ‘Islamist’, ‘privileging’, ‘extremist’, ‘segregationist’ cause. The rise of the obsession regarding **entryism** highlights the extent to which the Muslim ability to project themselves into the future has taken hold, whereby Muslim aspirations based on pre-existing praxis amongst the majority is seen, not as (deferential) emulation and evidence of integration but as something other, by virtue of its ‘Muslimness’ (Merali, 2017b).

Many laws and policies still in existence need bolstering in the legal culture but also the popular imagination. This includes rules regarding employment discrimination (Ahmed, 2017), existing equalities cultures established in education (Choudhury, 2017), the setting up of parliamentary and ministerial oversight committees for controversial or contested regulations or pressing social issues. These needed to be brought to light for a new generation as the normative culture of the UK, as well as brought to bear on issues of accountability for government institutions, in particular but not solely inspectorates (Choudhury, 2017, Ferguson, 2017, #HandsOffMuslimKids (Amalia, 2017), El-Enany et. al. 2017).

Where new rules might be useful they could be incorporated into workplace practice in a manner similar to health and safety rules for smaller companies (Ahmed, 2017) as well as the adoption of Diversity Charters for larger organisations, unions and employment agencies that address discrimination and provide appropriate remedies (ENAR, 2017)

François (2017) describes this **refocus on equalities as a way to cut through demonised narrative** even where there are contentious issues between the community and the state over the state’s expectations of Muslims:

“...whenever there are issues of inequality, those should be tackled head-on and I see a lot of blame on communities being located in cultural arguments like I referred to earlier, so when we talk about Muslims in any way, whether its politicians or journalists, its often a very easy way of locating the source of the problem in their identity as Muslims, so the reason we have certain schools which might be teaching things that the government doesn’t think is acceptable would be down to the religious identity of the individuals and not perhaps the deregulation of education, for example which actually allows any community to set up schools on the basis of curriculum they would devise themselves, this becomes a problem only for particular communities, home-schooling, only a problem for particular communities.”

Dealing with the discriminatory practice of the state also found succour with the equalities narratives from within institutions. Kundnani (2017) highlights: ‘managers at the universities did, for albeit a brief moment, want to push back against Prevent and did so to some extent. They did so in the name of understanding the equalities impact of these policies...’

Participants from within equalities bodies at the IHRC and SACC workshop (2017) highlighted the impact that Prevent had had on schools, with one equalities officer relating that head teachers had approached her office asking for directions and guidelines on how politics could be discussed at school. The report of Dean (2017) also highlighted that Muslim school children suffered inequality and were victims of hate crime, and this became a useful

tool for teachers, parents and equalities advocates in Edinburgh to get a discussion about school culture opened up, and to challenge institutional denials regarding racism.

A locus for a revived equalities culture was also raised by some interviewees with some deeply criticising the Equalities and Human Rights Commission that was constituted to replace discrete equalities bodies that existed previously. Some interviewees mentioned the EHRC simply to say they were not aware of anything they were doing on issues of racism and religious discrimination. Afzal (2017) cites incidents at university when she was involved with the students' union where EHRC reports would be:

“regularly used against any kind of event that I would try and hold the way that the outcomes of the decisions that the university made on trying to fulfil their obligation under Prevent was to stop any kind of discussions on Islamophobia or Palestine or any kind of campaigning issues.”

The need to recognize the concept of hate crime within equalities training was highlighted as imperative (and already implemented in some places in Scotland). This is something that a body like the EHRC should provide leadership on but was felt to be failing on (Jasper, 2017).

Sayyid highlights the problems caused by the constituting of the EHRC:

“The danger then is that this simplification of equality laws and the joining up of the distinct equality strands enables Britain to construct itself as a progressive, ‘post-racial’ liberal society, thus racism becomes invisible and is instead understood as a human rights issue. That is the bringing together of all groups and dispensing with single issue bodies such as the CRE, sustains and strengthens the notion that ‘we are all the same’ and as such reinforces the discourse of colour blindness, universalism and unification which masks the persistence of structural inequalities that remain embedded within contemporary Britain. [Sayyid et al 2013]”

Jasper (2017) called for the **bringing back of the Commission for Racial Equality:**

“Racial inequalities in the UK are widening according to the EHRC. Austerity has amplified racism and the EHRC whilst recording these increases is spineless in challenging Government policy that has seen incidences of race discrimination and race hate spiral. It’s time to bring back the CRE who at least had a track record of reducing racial inequalities and who in their later years, led by Sir Herman Ousley were never shy of challenging Government policy or irresponsible political rhetoric. I want equality in my lifetime and that requires urgent action. Under the EHRC we will still be having these discussion in 50 years-time.”

Accuracy in, agitation for and sanction for failure in delivering accurate representation in particular but not solely media representation.

The media as a source of Islamophobic narratives has been extensively outlined in previous work (Poole, 2002, Ameli et. al., 2007, Ameli and Merali, 2015 etc.). Tackling the impact of this is an ongoing project with a plethora of examples from civil society and alternative media, but considerable lack from the mainstream media and wider political culture. Whilst disproportionately affecting Muslims, the operation of mainstream media is deeply problematized in the wider UK culture, as the Leveson Inquiry (2012) bears testament too,

the business of which remains unfinished with calls for an urgent review circulating at the time of writing (Hacked Off, 2017)¹⁷.

Ameli et. al. (2012) argue that those citizens who have been incited to Islamophobia are also a type of victim of Islamophobia in that they have been pushed into action by media and political discourse. Parkinson (2017) felt that protestors attending far-right demonstrations he had covered as a journalist had been pushed to this by misrepresentation of Muslims in the media.

The recommendations as to how to deal with media cut across narratives but also sites of Islamophobia. The media in particular is acknowledged as underpinning, reinforcing, (re)producing and normalizing anti-Muslim political and public discourse. Poole (2017) describes the situation, the cause and the needed action thus:

“it is so embedded now in so many institutions and it’s become normalised and naturalised so that people don’t recognise it for what it is because if anybody criticises then you get either the idea that, if it’s a Muslim criticising Islamophobia then its extremism, if it’s not then it’s an attack on liberal values. So, there isn’t an easy answer because it’s got to come from political and social context and that doesn’t appear to be changing any time soon.”

Whether the narrative is that of Values and Britishness which then morphs into a state policy of Fundamental British Values which is then the basis of serious diversions from existing equalities praxis and the justification for various derogations from established human rights norms, this process has been repeatedly highlighted not just in the field-work for this research but for many years previously.

Tackling this falls broadly into the categories of:

Civil society initiatives and responses; successes and critiques thereof;

Mainstream and Alternative Media initiatives, media (self)regulation, reform and cultural transformation;

State re-evaluation of media monopolies and laws regulating hate speech.

Civil society

Whilst there has been a long history of Muslim community outreach to the media and calls on the media to interact with a wider representation of Muslims in various contexts (Ameli et. al., 2004a, b, 2005b, 2007), there remains a significant lack in media response to these issues (Narkowicz, 2017, Ahsan, 2017, Winstanley, 2017, Parkinson, 2017, François, 2017, Hooper, 2017, Salih, 2017) with significant critique coming from within and without media circles.

In terms of civil society initiatives, there was qualified support but also critique for initiatives that sought to challenge the media that used existing complaints mechanisms, in particular an initiative to use the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) to challenge misrepresentation of individual Muslims. Whilst this gave some form of redress where successful to individuals targeted e.g. Bouattia (2017, MCB, 2017), interviewees were also concerned that (a) the scope of IPSO was still limited to redress against named individuals

¹⁷ The campaign group Hacked Off is supported by civil society groups, victims of press abuse and public figures.

rather than issues of demonization and racist narratives that target communities, groups or organizations. Sanction by IPSO resulted in published apologies, usually buried in small print inside papers. Where the law was sought as a recourse for libel e.g. Baroness Warsi's settlement with the Jewish News (2017)¹⁸ or Shadjareh with the Times (2008), this seemed to rely on cases where a specific falsehood had been printed rather than the more general demonisation that accompanied the claim meaning pieces written with anti-Muslim bias but which were careful not to directly make false claims about individuals, there was little recourse to the law.

Even where such claims were made, the ability of individuals to seek redress in the courts was hampered by lack of legal and other barriers already highlighted above.

Interviewees were further critical of civil society initiatives that relied on existing broadcast oversight mechanisms like IPSO and OFCOM (though OFCOM was felt to be more robust, it came under similar criticism).

The case of Kelvin McKenzie's attack on Fatima Manji, the Channel 4 News anchor is illustrative of the limits of IPSO, which found in favour of McKenzie whose article in The Sun received over 800 complaints. McKenzie had contended that the sight of Manji in a *hijab* anchoring the news after the Marseilles attacks was offensive and went on to lambast the hijab as a symbol of oppression and misogyny. Its findings, rather than highlighting and sanctioning the racist portrayal of both Manji and Muslims in general, sought instead to incorporate such representations within the frame of debate and reasonable discussion (Greenslade, 2016). Manji and her bosses had argued that the article discriminated against her as a Muslim and also incited hatred against Muslims. Poole (2017) highlights the repeated use of this type of defence as a double-standard used to silence critical voices: "There's a difference isn't there between legitimate criticism and hate speech and offensive speech which is just racist. It seems like any attempt to say 'you can't say that, that's offensive' is an attack on free speech but free speech is just said as a way of protecting privileged rights. It's not legitimate."

As Hooper (2017) highlights, Kavanagh is in fact a board member of IPSO and this conflict of interest has not been raised at any point, and that: '...these institutions need to be examined a little bit more closely by those of us in the media who are attuned to these issues. From a media perspective, I think that's the way to go.' In his opinion the current situation it is only civil society initiatives which are trying to tackle structural racist media representation that are having any effect:

"We've moved from the era when we talked about institutional racism, institutionalized racism notably around the Lawrence inquiry. We can now talk about institutionalized Islamophobia within the media...The Times and The Sunday Times, I think the newspapers that, when I wasn't looking for stories to react to, they served those stories up on a weekly basis for several years, you know, deeply, deeply damaging and unfounded allegations about people so... in terms of challenging that there's been some good work done. I think there's stuff [done]... in terms of complaining to IPSO and raising the profile of Islamophobic media coverage that has been quite useful. I think there are issues that need

¹⁸ The Jewish News agreed to pay substantial damages and print a front page apology for an op-ed that claimed she was a supporter of ISIS.

to be raised about IPSO as well, obviously, the fact that Trevor Kavanagh was on their advisory board... I think there's good work been done by MEND and MPAC and lots of community activism which shines a light on this stuff and highlights it. I think that's all really important and the fact that it is now taking place in a social media environment where things can be challenged very quickly. I think that's very helpful."

Without a longer-term strategy initiatives that sought to use IPSO and other regulatory mechanisms were at risk of re-inscribing a problematic narrative (Narkowicz, 2017) that existing mechanisms were adequate and that Muslims were unable or unwilling to use these to make reasonable claims, or that the findings of the body in cases like that of Manji were acceptable thus normalising deeply problematic understandings of free expression. This also legitimised the idea that Islamophobia in the media where it existed did so in individual cases not as part of a conscious or unconscious culture.

Veteran journalists highlighted that Muslims and Muslim civil society in particular needed to be more media savvy, particularly in dealing with the management of content rather than on issues of individual presentation. Salih (2017) argues that Muslims must learn when and how to interact with the mainstream media.

Tackling the tendency of sensationalism even in high-brow news magazines which tended to pit a so-called liberal Muslim voice (usually from a narrow pool of individuals associated with The Quilliam Foundation and other government backed organisations) and so-called extremist groups like Al-Ghurabah and Al-Muhajiroun against each other. This leaves out the voices of the vast majority of Muslims on any given issue and denies them a voice usually about issues like the securitized state, other community related issues or British foreign policy that are of great and direct concern to them.

Salih (2017):

"It's a way they're framing their programmes, framing their debate, framing articles, just seems very skewed to me. Even when you're doing a so-called balanced debate on a Muslim question that the very premise of the debate is very Islamophobic. There are so many things they could do differently. I guess hire more people that aren't just brown or black faces but who ultimately talk the white man's lingo and won't challenge them but hire people who will actually represent the community. And get rid of the tokenistic approach they have to hire ethnic minorities now."

For civil society, Salih argues that they should be 'encouraging a no platform policy' with both 'extreme' types of unrepresentative voices. Likewise, as a medium to long-term strategy he advocates Muslim understanding that for the media to access news content from Muslims, Muslims themselves are able to set in part the terms of their participation through such strategies. Muslims as the repository for media content are then in a position to recalibrate the relationship between Muslims and the mainstream media in a less skewed fashion.

Poole (2017) believes there are already examples of this happening. Her research has indicated that where there are anti-Muslim social media hate campaigns there are often more social media posts responding with counter-narratives and some of these are being picked up in the mainstream media thus getting through to wider society:

“But you can see examples in... Channel 4, BBC, The Guardian, local media, where its beneficial for those organisations to represent Muslims positively. So, if there’s a demand, then the media are going to start paying attention to that demand... Once organisations realise that they’ve got to meet the requirements of their audience which is getting more and more diverse then that’s when perhaps things might change a bit.”

Sinan Siyech (2017) argues that Google’s Redirect program that redirects users trying to access terrorist materials to so-called ‘moderate Islamic’ sites, should be used as a model to redirect internet users from Islamophobia. Other initiatives include the making more widely known of Google’s suppression of sites reported to them as hateful, deliberately lowering their ranking when searches are made.

However, Poole tempers this with the caveat: ‘You can see progress, you can see that those institutions are listening but in terms of the general representation, then I would say the framework of representation is getting more-narrow. There is more volume of coverage and narrower representation towards the Islamic terror framework.’

Mainstream and Alternative Media initiatives, media (self)regulation, reform and cultural transformation

However civil society practice cannot fix the power imbalance between parties. This idea of not just better representation in personnel but in product as well goes back to the Kerner Report (1967) in the US which highlighted the lack of understanding in the media of issues affecting and impacting black minorities in the US but also how that lack contributed to racist representation in the media. In order to tackle this using Kerner, Ameli and Merali (2015) suggested:

- **Expand coverage of Muslim community affairs and of race and Islamophobia problems** through **permanent assignment of reporters familiar with the issues around these affairs**, and through **establishment of more and better links with the Muslim community**. The Muslim community is a diverse one, and the media needs to engage with that diversity and not promote or rely on sensationalist or apologetic voices that simply help propagate deeply held negative ideas. Williams (2017) summarises thus: “We don’t have enough of Muslims voices invited into the public space. One of the challenges of the media is to look for a greater diversity.”

- **Integrate Muslims and Muslim activities into all aspects of coverage and content**, including newspaper articles and television programming. The news media must publish newspapers and produce programmes that recognise the existence and activities of Muslims as a group within the community and as a part of the larger community (adapted from Kerner, 1967). Ameli et al (2004a and 2007) **emphasise the idea that a dual space for minorities is essential for any society to foster a sense of citizenship among minorities**. To do this, a space for minorities to call their own is essential and a media that is supported in the conceptual sense by dominant society is essentially a part of that.

- Recruit more Muslims into journalism and broadcasting and promote those who are qualified to positions of significant responsibility. Bodi explains further that media

institutions should: '[h]elp nurture Muslim journalistic talent within mainstream media settings to promote inclusiveness to combat institutionalised Islamophobia.' Recruitment should begin in high schools and continue through college; where necessary, aid for training should be provided (Baig, 2017, Salih, 2017).

- Accelerate efforts to ensure accurate and responsible reporting of news concerning Muslims and all minorities through adoption by all news gathering organisations of stringent internal staff guidelines, but also as part of a more accurate representation of so-called 'foreign affairs' (Winstanley, 2017).

- Cooperate in the establishment of and promotion of any existing privately organized and funded independent institute(s) to train and educate journalists in Muslim affairs, recruit and train more Muslim journalists, develop methods for improving police-press relations, review coverage of Muslim related issues, and support continuing research in these fields. Bodi (2017) takes this further and argues for: 'Support [for] education initiatives for senior mainstream media personnel around issues of Islamophobia and how to avoid it.'

Johnson (2017) highlights the case of an individual Imam in Denmark in the run up to and subsequent to the Danish cartoons affair, and its resonance for now in a post-Brexit culture. The lack of redress for the individual in this matter is eclipsed by the **need for the media to understand how its vilification of someone who simply tried to start a dialog on an issue of concern and avoid conflict is indicative of a supremacist culture within the media, which reinforce state narratives:**

"...he had actually spoken to the people who ran the newspaper *before* it became an issue – before it became an international issue – and tried to get them to apologize, tried to get them to engage in a discussion. And they refused. And *then* he started talking about it internationally. And the Danish media just *hounded* him. It was really horrendous. To the extent that even after he passed away a lot of the news media were like, oh "Radical Muslim Has Now Passed Away." It was one of those moments where you realize, even this man who you know... who is really just trying to tell people "hey, the ways in which this language is perpetuating is really unfortunate" has been *hounded* from that point in time until the end of his life, which is incredibly sad. And then now, it's another moment where I've seen a lot of young Muslims, young people of colour more broadly and young Muslims specifically, thinking about what it means to grow up in Britain post-Brexit."

Silencing

This repeated experience of Muslims, either as victim or as witness, sharply critiques the media and wider culture's self-perception of a free, fair and balance media. The experience of the Imam as well as the experience in curtailing of the work of Muslim journalists is set in sharp contrast with the argument that free speech is one of the fundamental values of the society we live in. Additionally, this claim ignores the heavy hand of the law to curtail and criminalise speech under anti-terrorism laws. A combination of actual criminalisation and a culture of fear, means that Muslim voices are silenced, even when they are expressing thoughts and ideas no different from non-Muslim peers which go unsanctioned. It is the media's role to highlight these anomalies at the very least, and to campaign for a more open space for dialog rather than pursue restrictive practices in framing stories and curtailing the ability of journalists, particularly Muslim journalists from pursuing stories within the mainstream (Baig, 2017, Salih, 2017, Bodi, 2017).

Truth-telling and Tackling Bias

Berger's critique (2016) of the functionality of current news media as reporting a political discourse 'emptied of any meaning', which presents and classifies the world with the 'jargon and logic of management experts' is particularly revealing of the challenge faced by counter-narrative work that seeks to tell 'truth' or be 'accurate'. In Berger's analysis of the news as the showing of a succession of spectacles, 'deprived of context, in numbing succession' coming as shocks not stories is a reflection of the critique of many interviewees of how Muslims, Islam or related issues are portrayed, the cumulative effect being to shock and scare rather than to make known.

Winstanley (2017) highlights role of Electronic Intifada, Salih (2017) the role of 5Pillars.com in trying to report accurately on issues that have been very much skewed in their framing in the mainstream media. Whilst Salih claims there is no such thing as an 'independent media' and there should be no pretence regarding this, Winstanley and Hooper (2017) argue that the reporting of truth is the main way to tackle the issue of negative framing in the mainstream media. Winstanley highlights the operation of anti-Muslim narratives in political and media discourse on Palestine, as Palestine is a Muslim majority nation: "one of the main narratives against the Palestinians by Israel and its supporters in the West is that they're Islamic extremists, Palestinian organizations are Islamic terrorists and Palestinian resistance movements are terrorists. The issue is Islam is negative and negative portrayals of Islam in this country come up a lot in those portrayals. There's quite a big crossover between the pro-Israel lobby and what's often termed counter-jihad movements... quite often they cross over quite a lot with pro-Israel organizations."

Likewise, Hooper (2017) highlights work at Middle East Eye that tries to 'present the Middle East in a more intelligent way that reflects the reality on the ground more than traditional narratives'. However, he notes pessimistically that this issue of framing or creating wider counter-narratives may not be something within the remit of journalists. He sees the role of journalists and civil society intertwining to raise awareness of Islamophobia and the problems of framing. To that end:

"The racism paradigm is useful in the sense that a lot of people who may have been racist in a fairly unthinking way perhaps thirty or forty years ago, I suppose there's a positive social trend in some aspects and we just need to continue pushing ahead with that in terms of how Islamophobia is framed but the key to that is obviously addressing issues with foreign policy."

Parkinson's (2017) work on the rise of the far-right in the UK over a number of years is another example of building a significant body of work for short and medium-term awareness raising, particularly when through one media outlet.

Mills (2017) extends this to wider issues with regard to the role of the BBC in promoting a widely pro-government narrative in its output. Both and numerous others emphasise the need to persist with such narratives despite attacks from anti-Muslim commentators, as an essential part of creating and maintaining alternative/Muslim space for expression and agency. Salih and others acknowledge that this will not in itself address the hegemony of ideas in the mainstream. Indeed, there is an increasing view that responding to, lobbying and negotiating with the media is not a useful long-term strategy, whilst such methods must

be employed in order to fulfil short term functions like the highlighting of discrimination case victories (Ahmed, 2017), or to get redress for personal violations (Bouattia, 2017). Parkinson (2017) expresses the frustration of many including within journalism at the failure of the post-Leveson culture. Whilst there are many fines given to newspapers there: “[has] got to be more accountability and more punishment towards the people in that profession when they do something like that. It’s not happening. If a journalist makes up a story or completely misrepresents a story and it aids and abets a racial or hatred angle, I’m afraid they should probably lose their job and they shouldn’t be employed again because they have broken the golden rule of the ethics of journalism.”

Anonymous 3 (2017) and Anonymous 4, journalists, spoke of the impact of the Cathy Newman affair as highly demoralizing for journalists of colour in mainstream settings, as well as journalists close to the Channel 4 news team.

In 2014, scandal hit Channel 4 News when its presenter Cathy Newman was found to have lied about a negative encounter at a mosque. Parkinson describes the responsibility of journalists and the failure highlighted by this incident:

“any news outlet can be guilty of that, some more than others. I mean, for instance, what I would consider probably one of the best go-to news outlets would be Channel 4, but remember what Cathy Newman did and made up a story about when she went to the London mosque and she was told to leave because she was a woman. They released video footage that showed her going in and leaving on her own accord. I mean, why would you do something like that? As a journalist, you have a responsibility to make sure you’re not making up stories, you’re not actually helping a racist or a hatred narrative. It’s our job to be there to show things that are really going on.”

Parkinson (2017) highlights the **need for unions to take a more active role in lieu of more regulation**, using a case where a Paparazzi had been expelled from the National Union of Journalists after appearing on a TV show. Whilst unions tackling major newspapers and their staff would probably require a legal fighting fund, the possibility has been proven. Resources for media to help news media transform itself exist aplenty, with UNESCO, the Fundamental Rights Agency, the Ethical Journalism Network and various Muslim civil society groups having issued recommendations, guides, best practice exemplars on a number of issues, however the uptake remains small. These guides vary in their approaches with many highly sympathetic to the ‘dilemmas’ faced by the mainstream media (Ethical Journalism Network, 2012). Others provide sophisticated analyses, case studies and good practice guides on issues like the reporting on terrorism that avoids making generalisations that promote anti-Muslim or more generally demonising narratives. These guides are an existing form of counter-narrative that enriches the media environment should the mainstream media decide on self-evaluation and cultural transformation on this issue as they have done on other issues, notably the reporting of sexual orientation (Ameli et. al., 2007).

A caveat offered by Hooper (2017) is worth noting with regard to the role of journalists charged with exposing Islamophobia as being an essential short-term aim, but which does not work without longer term thinking and wider support regarding the transformation of the media culture:

“Going forward, in terms of how we address it, I suppose journalistically, my interest is always in finding stories that expose the inconsistencies, the hypocrisies; how this Islamophobic ideology surfaces in terms of public policy or how people are treated and journalistically, that’s quite straightforward, we just keep finding the stories that tell us that that is happening. That’s absconding responsibility a bit because it leaves it for others to think about what we do with that. I think there’s an inherent danger in that, as well, in the sense that if my career depends on finding examples of Islamophobia and reporting them then I’m going to continue...”

Beyond this a **genuine dialogue between mainstream media and Muslims**, whether through a broad range of civil society organizations or outreach to the grassroots that is based on Kerner principles of identifying Muslim issues as part of the news media landscape, rather than in a sensationalist fashion.

The **strengthening of existing complaints mechanisms** (Hacked Off, 2017, Bouattia, 2017, Ameli and Merali, 2015, Parkinson, 2017, Baig, 2017) is a short-term demand which itself will only fulfil the function of widening scope for redress as a short-term strategy. Without partnership from main media organisations, the cultural shift that is needed is unlikely to happen.

Poole (2017) argues that there are existing accepted levels of regulation of broadcast media and also regulations for social media that can be a starting point for printed press regulation:

“...there’s lots of opposition to that but it could be regulated like broadcasting is. The problem is the media is becoming more fragmented so more difficult to regulate, but there are some steps to regulate it. So, with the internet, there’s been more pressure put on digital companies to regulate content that appears on their platforms. So, it is possible to put pressure on companies to do that.”

Bouattia (2017) argues that one of the functions of organisations like IPSO must be to **monitor media representation of minorities both in the case of where individuals are targeted by negative media complaints, but in terms of general trends of representation of minoritized groups**. As much research already exists on the representation of Muslims in the media pre-dating 9-11 (see e.g. Poole, 2002, Poole and Richardson, 2006, Richardson, 2004) as well as a substantial research post that date, it seems clear that external pressures are needed to make the mainstream media engage with these findings. Whistleblowers from inside the profession, reference cases where news media have cynically stoked anti-Muslim hatred even where inaccuracies exist. Despite this being revealed in the Leveson Inquiry into media practices, the resulting body set-up to replace the existing press complaints mechanism (IPSO) has no mandate to initiate complaints against papers when such issues are exposed, or tackle wider issues of demonization, monitoring etc. Part of this lack has been attributed to the setting up of IPSO as a holding organization until the **second part of the Leveson Inquiry is completed**¹⁹. However, the political backing for the second part of the Inquiry seems to have dissipated and campaigners are worried that despite

¹⁹ This part of the Inquiry was delayed for criminal proceedings against certain newspaper personnel were complete. Now completed there has been a delay in announcing the start date from the government, and there have been rumours that the government does not want it to restart (Hacked Off, 2017).

previous assurances, no such Inquiry will now be completed (Hacked Off, 2017). Whether via Leveson Part II or some other form of Inquiry, the outstanding issues raised in that report like the demonization of groups, need to be addressed.

State measures

Breaking up / preventing monopolies

Aside from Muslim critiques of the operation of the mainstream media, there is a more general critique about the power of certain figures and corporations in monopolizing newsmedia. The role of the state in ensuring that there are no monopolies of ownership (Ahsan, 2017 and Parkinson, 2017) goes some way to minimizing damage caused by the trends in certain media that work in tandem with political discourse and policy development. Bodi (2017) conceptualizes it further to clarify how imbalance of power that impacts minorities affects the idea of media equality and balance. He advises that the government must: **'[t]ake steps to resist the trend towards consolidation in the media industry as minority groups do not have the financial clout to buy into conglomerates.'** Poole (2015) advises that there are measures that grassroots civil society can and do take the lead on: **'small measures from the ground up, you're talking about educational measures, about lobbying certain organisations that are willing to listen like the BBC and Channel 4, The Guardian.'**

This does not of course prevent cross-cutting narratives of Islamophobia pervading when there is a ubiquitous culture of anti-Muslim hatred. The Ethical Journalism Network (2012 onwards) has provided a guide to Hate Speech for journalists, however this relies on self-regulation, which has been demonstrably inconsistent and unaccountable. This raises the spectre of the need for tighter and consistent hate speech laws. Whilst issues like the 'glorification of terrorism' and 'incitement to religious and racial hatred' are covered in parts of the anti-terrorism and existing criminal law, their extend seems to be heavily biased towards prosecuting Muslims and racialized groups. There is an argument that such laws must either be used against non-racialized perpetrators including those given a media platform e.g. Katie Hopkins whose columns and social media comments have been heavily criticized for demonizing Muslims, migrants and other minorities²⁰. Whilst curtailing speech is always a controversial demand, the current situation where the speech of Muslims is criminalized but that of those who call for a 'final solution' against Muslims is not, cannot be allowed to continue. Either there is consistent application of these laws, or their total repeal or a total review to make effective the boundaries that have always existed regarding what is and is not hate speech and can and cannot be allowed. As Narkowicz (2017) explains:

" It's like when you think about women and it's not okay to say certain things about women, it's not okay to sit on morning TV and say all women are stupid and they're less intelligent... in the UK that is not acceptable because it is not acceptable in the mainstream... it is unacceptable and why. Well we allow hate speech in the media and we don't punish hate speech like Katie Hopkins', why doesn't she get punished? I don't understand why she wouldn't be charged for her hate speech or spreading hate. So when people see the media and celebrities doing it it is becoming okay and I don't think we can expect the media to

²⁰ Hopkins had called for a 'final solution' after the Manchester Arena attack in 2017, and had previously called migrants 'cockroaches.' (Topping, 2017)

change much but it is the government that should lead on this, the government should say these are not our values, we don't promote hate speech, the rest have to catch up with that."

Bodi (2017) sums up his concerns by: '[u]rg[ing] member states to **enact anti-hate speech legislation to criminalise Islamophobia and other forms of hate expression** in the media.'

A cultural shift in understanding who is part of the national, and how national histories have been intimately intertwined with Muslims and Muslim cultures and nations over centuries.

In her critique of the academy Rajina (2017) highlights how at the outset of her PhD research she found that work on the Bengali community focused on their perceived problems e.g. socio-economic issues rather than their views. Tied to this was the failure to look at the relationship between that community and its existence in the UK physically and in the long durée imagination where the histories of the UK and Bengal are intimately intertwined. More **academic but also cultural review of these histories** is a way of resetting the collective imagination as to who is part of the nation. These attempts are not necessarily in and of themselves a panacea and those attempting to do this need to be mindful not to reproduce cycles of exclusion of Muslim and other racialized voices. Thus recent attempts to address the critique of the British penchant for costume dramas undermining black representation, by having a more diverse set of walk on parts as well as minor characters (see e.g. *Howards End*, 2017, *Doctor Who* (Orthia ed., 2017) and *Gunpowder*, 2017) has also come under fire from both critics of the exclusion and critics of the inclusion. Whilst the latter attempt to hold on to the fallacy that no such diversity existed (and have been refuted in de Lisle, 2017 and Turner and Diver, 2017), the former hold that the inclusion of visual diversity without then also factoring what the impact of racialization meant in those contexts is another way of sanitizing a history fraught with the inequalities created by empire. Making sure that there is better consultation in cultural production obviates some the above problems and indeed those created and discussed around the National Youth Theatre's cancelling of *Homegrown* discussed above. The idea of immigrants and migrants being outside the accepted understanding of what is the nation, also needs challenging by cultural and news media, not least the histories averred to by Sivanandan above regarding the creating of British nationals out of the peoples of the empire and their subsequent expulsion from that category. Efforts like those of *Forgotten Heroes* (*Forgotten Heroes 14-19*, 2017) that highlight the Muslim contribution in terms of manpower in the First World War are a civil society initiative with very little uptake by the mainstream imagination that is itself being moved into new and restricted narratives of that episode in history. This shift in narrative regarding the Great War is indicative of a wider trend to disassociate not just groups of people but groups of ideas from that of Britishness. Where once there was a thorough and almost commonplace critique in cultural production, education and newsmedia of the First World War as a largely imperial war that saw much unnecessary slaughter of young European men (itself a critical history from which Muslim and other racialized bodies are erased), there is now in its place an idea that this as a war fought for human rights and that any dissenting narrative of that war is somehow anti-British (Merali, 2014). That these narratives come from the same narrow political stables is again a cue to the question of accountability and control of the major institutions in the UK narrowing, with less opportunity for dissenting voices to be heard.

Afzal (2017) reflects on such initiatives as being conflicted and suggests that Muslims themselves need not take this track to prove their worth:

“If we want to talk about the Muslim contribution then it’s fine to talk about it in ways that highlight that this happened and the fact that it’s hidden or covered up and it’s not mentioned and it’s an erasure of history, that much I can understand. But what I don’t understand is this need to go so much further and act like we’ve got something to prove because we don’t.”

Rather than having an *Indigenes*²¹ moment in the UK, there is instead a pushback against that history with Christopher Nolan’s film *Dunkirk* coming under heavy criticism for its erasure of non-white faces from its retelling of that moment. The **attempts to interrogate historical erasure**, even in the most conformist manner (*Forgotten Heroes* does not challenge current narratives of the First World War) are left almost entirely to civil society and there must be **uptake amongst wider cultural producers, rather than the rise of a culture of erasure**.

This erasure reiterates the narrative of Muslims as invaders (Merali, 2017a), which finds realisation in policy and media discourse around immigration and the taking in of refugees. The need to **delink the ideas of migration and invasion** is imperative. The EIS’s three booklets for schools on ‘The Myths of Immigration’ are an example of how this can be practically achieved at a young age (2017). Ahmed (2017) outlines how the effects of immigration rules on racialized communities include: destitution, exclusion from services (medical, educational), and homelessness. This comes as the result of dehumanization and the work of campaigners and journalists like Anonymous 4 (2017) tackle this narrative but have no working partner at the level of the state. As Kapoor (2017) and Kundnani (2017) contend, there is a need for organization outside of advocacy with the state which tries to (re)connect the idea of the ‘other’ be it Muslim, immigrant, migrant or any other type or combination of types of racialized ‘other’ with members of wider society. This **widening or equalizing of what it means to me part of the nation** should have an inevitable knock on effect on legal interpretations of rules (Ahmed, 2017) just as the converse is currently seen to be true in equalities related law and policy.

Johnson argues that beyond this type of inclusivity there is a need for ways to deal with white supremacy within political and cultural discourse. This in and of itself need not be a specific project. The almost accidental impact of TV personality Nadiya Hussain has been highlighted by many interviewees as one which has had an almost entirely positive impact on the story of what it means to be part of the story of the UK (Hamid, 2017, Rajina, 2017, Johnson, 2017). Hussain won a reality baking show and has since gone on to present many programmes dressed in hijab. This **process of normalization of Muslim symbols and faces in the cultural life** of the nation, is not without problems (Johnson, 2017). This in itself is an **indictment of what Johnson (2017) describes as the liberal self-perception of the state that requires further exploration in cultural circles**. Liberalism has been reimagined by both proponents (Huntington, 1996, Ferguson cited in Skidelsky, 2011) as a strict adherence to a certain set of values rather than as a system of tolerating different views and values (Farron, 2017 and Williams, 2017).

²¹ The 2006 film *Indigenes* (Days of Glory in the English version) The deals with the contribution of North African soldiers to the Free French Forces during the Second World War and, controversially, with the discrimination against them. The film's release contributed to a partial recognition of the pension rights of soldiers from former French possessions by the French government

Without this cultural shift, the type of Islamophobic harassment from colleagues and even managers that Ahmed (2017) reports as the daily log of calls to his practice, are considered by the perpetrators to be entirely normal and indeed liberal acts. As Bouattia (2017) and various others have indicated, there has to be more sustained work on exposing this contradiction at the heart of the self-perception of the state as liberal, in order to tackle the normalization of right-wing ideas under a liberal garb.

Aked (2017) referencing Kundnani's (2017) call for a new peace movement, sees the recapturing of liberal arguments as a way of reimagining Muslim rights:

"when he [Kundnani] says radicalism [is] not necessary being a bad thing... at root it can mean political engagement and again it is a liberal narrative to say that political engagement is the right of Muslims as much as anyone else... [it is] a positive narrative to put forward that not many people would not deny... The fact that now if people are organizing against Prevent, that itself is now deemed as suspect of extremism, but it comes down to democratic values. I am speaking in broad terms, but I think those are the three key words, democratic values, equality, anti-racism,..."

The debating of fascism and fascists is reported by various as a particularly alarming development.

Poole (2017) describes the situation where far-right voices are finding a platform on mainstream media through the idea of 'balance':

"...this idea of a neutral mainstream that's been normalized and these other groups with other voices were operating outside of that kind of mainstream so if you get one from one side and one from the other then you've got a balance. But that is deceiving because it covers over the fact that a lot of these views are being related in the mainstream but the way they're being discussed is perhaps less sensationalist in terms of the way they're framed so... that's not an example of balance."

In November 2017, LBC contacted the chair of IHRC to discuss the Defence Secretary's comments that British born Daesh fighters should be killed by drones. Shadjareh (2017) writes that he:

"asked, 'are you saying the discussion is 'should we use drones to assassinate British citizens on nothing more than a level of suspicion rather than using due process?'... The LBC producer failed to understand that persisting with such a discussion perpetuates the idea that only certain people are thought of as human enough to be worthy of due process."

Addressing this shift in the values of the reporting center or of balance between extremes that allows far-right narratives to be normalized needs to be urgently addressed by editors. Poole (2017):

"...it is problematic **the media and the government** don't listen to, **engage with certain parts of academia because there is the research there that could... be tapped into**, the government said they want to deal with extremism and radicalisation and yet they don't listen to all the studies that are out there, they only listen if it fits into their idea of what needs to be done and that communication between academic and state institutions like the media, that's where a lot of progress can be made but they don't want to see the problem. **It's not that there is no knowledge being produced. It just isn't being listened to.**"

Sheridan and Gillett (2005) make similar demands with regard to their work and Bar-Tal and Labin's (2001) where they establish a link between a rise in racism and racist attacks post-large scale events (Sheridan and Gillett's study looked at 9-11), however there appears to be no obvious take-up of this as an issue worthy of policy.

Recapturing and creating further space for Muslim narratives of being

The need for movement building (Kundnani, 2017 and Bouattia, 2017) has already been averred to. The role that such movements have includes creating spaces for those marginalized to be able to not only speak freely but to take control of their own narrative and participate in movement building on the terms set by those narratives. In lieu of a sympathetic state that encourages / protects the spaces needed, this role must fall onto nascent movements. This is not something that can be adequately fulfilled by the workings of individual or small groups of civil society organisations.

The spaces needed within such movements suggested by respondents cross-cut sectors, but include arts spaces (Rajina 2017, Ahsan, 2017), alternative media (Winstanley, 2017, Salih, 2017 and Hooper, 2017), spaces for self-care which include the ability to create alternative narratives to the ‘constant cognitive abuse’ that Johnson (2017) identifies as the state of the post-9-11 generation which does not know of any other type of narrative except the types outlined in the introduction above. Kassam (2017) describes this need based on his own experience as a *raison d’être* for the creation of The Muslim Vibe (a media hub that straddles news and cultural stories for Muslims):

“I have discovered my identity but for us growing up at least my generation it was a very difficult time and space that we were in and now there are so many conflicts... So, it’s important to create spaces where people can actually champion this identity... growing and developing themselves.”

Examples of how this could work include the aforementioned example Homegrown. How could a movement (a) step in in cases where a play like Homegrown was effectively censored / pulled? Is there or can there be made space where such a work could be performed with the support, financial and otherwise, outside of the mainstream. This support would need to include the ability to withstand political and (pseudo)legal pressure e.g. through Prevent mechanisms or the anti-terror laws, as well as the support required of any artistic production.

The erasure, not only of ‘Islamic’, or ‘Muslim’ voices, but histories is not simply a local or regional one. Hoskote (2007 in ed. Merali, 2008) describes the portrayal of the ‘House of Islam’ post-9-11 in the global media as a ‘politics of image which presents the House of Islam as a repository of horror, showing it chiefly through images of violence, terror, desolation, the unreason of the mob, the intolerance of pulpiteers – the model of reportage from zones of crisis and conflict.’

Hoskote continues:

“The tendency to reduce Islam’s richly variegated tradition to... bigotry ... and violence..., the reflex of picturing it as a breeding-ground for fire-breathing *ayatollah* and kamikaze martyrs, obscures the fact that Islam was - for nearly a millennium – a vibrant cultural framework that linked South and West Asia with North Africa and West Europe, synthesising Arab, Greek, Persian, Indian, Turkish, Mongol and Chinese influences. During this millennium, civilization was embodied by the House of Islam (with its emphasis on the illumination of learning, urbane sophistication, social and geographical mobility, and a mercantile economy)...”

As Ameli and Merali (2015) note:

“That tendency to reduce can only be tackled through serious reassessment of how representation is produced. It is not enough (though much needed) to simply refrain from negative stereotyping. There has to be the enrichment of representation that humanises all subjects, and in the cases of out-groups like Muslims, this can only come from the presentation of the idea of a ‘House of Islam’ that has historical context and civilizational meaning.”

This contextualization can only come in the present circumstances within wider political movements that understands the wider global as well as the local context of this erasure and this history. There exist many arts projects that require further support from movements including, the Khidr collective, Oomk, Variant Space and the Khayaal Theatre Company. An arts fund to support such initiatives Amal has been recently set up and provides support that is less tied to established funds which have or are perceived to have political conditions attached. The Saqi gallery and publishing house is an older example of this praxis with similar initiatives in Muslim civil society e.g. Kube publishing, IHRC Gallery and Bookshop, Algorithm, Amrit publishers, Turath, Islamic Texts Society and other publishing houses and galleries.

Existing projects already work in hybrid political spaces sometimes working within the mainstream and at others within discrete sections of or wider sections of movements. Better understanding of the nuance and thus the power of this diversity can form the basis of kinder and more egalitarian movements (Salih, 2017), Kassam, 2017 and Ameli and Merali, 2015).

Likewise the proliferation of alternative and semi-alternative media provides a basis for creating narratives and spaces for existing or marginalized narratives of being (Bodi, 2017). Whilst these do have and should have more impact on the mainstream media, it does not have to be the prime aim of such initiatives (Salih, 2017). Having a space of recognition (Kassam, 2017) has a palliative effect on those whose voices have been suppressed. Attacks on any part of these spaces need to be understood as an attack on all (Salih, 2017). In particular the independence of those initiatives, whether from state interference and engineering (Salih, 2017) or attack or usurpation by other states, (notably Saudi Arabia, Salih, 2017b and Williams, 2017). Salih (2017b) describes the quandary of a ‘Muslim’ media currently, with some becoming: ‘irresponsible sectarian mouthpiece which is only good for advancing western/Saudi/Qatari foreign policy and destroying other countries’. Having a media that report on politics, rather than becoming involved in propagandizing for any state or project is the pre-eminent challenge for movements.

Whilst the above again rely on civil society to take the burden for what should be the normative and transformative project of the state, the meta-narrative of accountability remains. As Bouattia notes:

“...it’s an incredibly incredibly worrying time to be Muslim and the more that I travel and meet with other groups, the greater the problem [I see]. And whilst I’m under no illusion that, in relation to the state or, big institutions and their roles and intentions – I think there needs to be pressure and accountability around questions of what the hell is happening around Islamophobia around the world. And there needs to be an international recognition of some of those things, and at least processes and spaces where you can challenge and start to have real pushbacks on the kind of international policies that we are seeing and the treatment of Muslims in every space.”

A strong peace movement (Kundnani, 2017) cannot challenge injustice without being attacked itself. The type of attacks that even ‘mainstream’ figures in the political establishment have faced e.g. former cabinet member Baroness Warsi and London Mayor Sadiq Khan are indicative of the need for counter-narratives of normalization of Muslim presence (Williams, 2017). Both Warsi and Khan were attacked for links to or sharing platforms or facilitating entryism of ‘extremists’ and by dint of, somehow evidencing extremism themselves. Extremism and radicalization as terms are easily bandied about in the current culture of securitization and their instrumentalization in Islamophobic narratives has been discussed in Workstream 1 (Merali, 2017b). According to Williams (2017), these types of attacks are a:

“...major distraction because it draws us back to the particularist question i.e. if you are a Muslim then you must have this agenda and if you don’t have this agenda it’s only because you are concealing it very successfully... it’s a bit like the way historically in Europe people have talked about Jews in public life... I think there’s quite a bit to be learned from the history of anti-Semitism... I have just been reading Simon Schama’s ‘History of the Jews: Volume 2’ and page after page have sparked in my mind regarding Islamophobia...”

“We need to make those connections more publicly because those who have learned something from the history of anti-Semitism need to be prodded to do something about Islamophobia.”

This dovetails with the liberal self-perception of the state (Johnson, 2017), which at the moment stands exposed as a myth to many of those interviewed. To those that share this self-perception, the liberalism of the state has been undermined by its commitment to the Prevent programme and its failure to tackle Islamophobia and other forms of racism, and its undermining of the institutions and culture that hitherto provided some protection from and sent a normative signal about racism at the individual and structural level. The wider question of whether the abuses of minority rights, as well as the structural and individual violations of civil and political rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights by the praxis and increasingly the overt ideology of the state (under successive governments) cannot be solved within civil society. Whilst this is the locus of a vociferous debate, itself targeted and often silenced by state forces, it is ultimately the institutions that make up the state and the wider institutions that legitimize the power of nation states as arbiters of social mores to address both violations of these norms but also how accountability and recompenses can be affected in the short and the long term. Until then, the despondency of many of those interviewed, that there will be and cannot be anything of use offered from state institutions will remain.

Conclusion

Two recurring concerns came across in this research. Firstly, a sense that engagement with government, media and other main institutions was in large part futile, and where warranted was to be done with little expectation of reciprocity. The British Muslims’ Expectations Project (Ameli, et. al., 2004 – 2007) had reported that despite very negative experiences, and low levels of satisfaction, Muslims in the UK (and indeed those interviewed as experts, both Muslim and non-Muslim) had believed in and advocated greater participation in political and educational fields, and even (though the media was cited as the

main cause of Islamophobia at that time) with the media. By 2015, in terms of Muslim responses, this faith in the political process had collapsed (Ameli and Merali, 2015) and this is mirrored here. The narrowing of representations of 'Muslimness', the gradual exclusion of Muslims from public and political space by accusations of extremism and entryism, and the rise of a nationalistic and nativist discourse around Britishness that constructed its identity against various tropes of 'Muslimness', all served not simply as barriers to Muslim participation in the life of the nation, but as markers of expulsion of the Muslim subject from equality as citizens and protection from and equality before the law. Arendt's description (Ameli and Merali, 2015) of the transformation of the state from the instrument of law to the instrument of nation pertains in this regard to describe a process of identity formation (Fundamental British Values) that when interrogated, has little or no coherence, but which is mobilised against racialised others, in particular by the instrumentalization of Islamophobia. Migration and the so-called migrant crisis, immigration and equal citizenship for racialized minorities are all subsumed under the overwhelming banner of Muslim problems and distract from the crisis at the heart of British society (Kundnani, 2017).

The second concern was that despite more than twenty years of conversations, research and advocacy on the issue of Islamophobia, not only was there little or no significant progress from institutions or the state in tackling the problem, there was a marked downward turn. Islamophobia in British society was universally considered to be normalised to the extent that the sense of hopelessness in mainstream institutions and the political process was in many cases directly a result of this normalization. The state had presided over and reproduced through various legal measures including but not solely anti-terrorism laws and policies a state of exception, wherein not only had a group of people been dehumanised enough to become a 'hated society' (Ameli, 2012) but that the process of creating 'hated societies' is one that is legitimised by the state. In this scenario where the legitimisation of an 'environment of hate' has not only trumped internal and external perceptions of the UK as a multicultural state, but has become part of the fabric of a national story of what it means to be British. Not only is Britishness navigated through a denial of 'Muslimness', it is also represented through the articulation of supremacism as a normal facet of law and nation.

Almost twenty years after the McPherson Inquiry gave rise to the term 'institutional racism' the UK, rather than moving towards a culture and praxis that embraces the need for developing analysis and praxis based on this idea, has regressed to a stage analogous not simply to pre-McPherson but even pre- the Scarman Report (1981 cited in Lea, 2003). The Scarman report, undertaken by a Conservative peer under the auspices of a Conservative government which looked into the riots of 1981 by largely black youth, expressed sentiment that would be crystallised in the term 'institutional racism' by Macpherson nearly two decades later. Scarman wrote of practices which are 'unwittingly discriminatory against black people.' (Scarman 1981 para 2.22) and 'police attitudes and methods have not yet sufficiently responded to the problem of policing our multi- racial society.'" (Scarman 1981 para 4.70) (both cited in Lea, 2003). Scarman saw the riots as an expression of 'a demand for inclusion in social citizenship rights by those who had become marginalised through a combination of racial discrimination and economic decay. His proposed reforms were directed to this end.' (Lea, 2003). In the wake of riots in 2011, the UK government did not call for an inquiry, instead setting up a cross-party panel whose findings cited criminality and

poor character amongst rioters as a causal factor, again ignoring the possibilities of there being pre-existing structural and institutional problems (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

Acknowledging the problem of Islamophobia and its structural nature were demands to the state and institutions that formed the crux of existing and possible counter-narratives to Islamophobia. Normalising the possibilities of 'Muslimness', in whatever form without continuous sanction and engineering from the state, and admitting to the diversity of the nation formed the next most powerful counter-narrative strand. Self-analysis by the state and its institutions to its claims of liberalism but also the charges levelled against it of institutional racism (including Islamophobia) as an urgent project upon which policies and laws must be based, enacted, reviewed and or repealed formed the third strand. The final strand rested on the idea that the state and institutions' obsessions with 'Muslimness' needed honest reflection and appraisal and failing that the mechanisms for accountability for what ultimately was the experience of individual and group vilification and demonization at the hands of an ever-narrowing political agendas needed to be made more robust where they existed and needed to be created where there was an absence.

These four strands also contained recommendations for civil society (in lieu of and in parallel with any institutional counter-narratives). Creating and or developing the existing movement(s) for social justice, with an emphasis on alliance building between other marginalised groups. Within this 'internal' solidarity, building between disparate Muslim groups and also different regions was highlighted. Using the arts and creating and developing existing alternative art spaces was another recommendation. Likewise, the need to strengthen advocacy and legal support services from within the community and develop more alternative media (in parallel with but of less significance than entering mainstream media) were highlighted. However, developing and asserting Muslim autonomy in all its diversity was seen as both with precedent (with many seeing this as the route parts if not all of the Jewish community in the UK had taken) was seen as key in fending off the encroaches of institutionalised forms of Islamophobia on the daily health and well-being of Muslims and other marginalised groups in the UK.

Whilst the feeling was in some ways pessimistic as to the trends of state and the region as a whole, the determination to struggle for justice for everyone suffering the crises of modern Britain was pre-eminent and agreed upon as the urgent project of civil society.

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APPENDIX D



Counter-Islamophobia Kit

Key National Messages - UK

Ms Arzu Merali
September 2018

Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States.

CIK Project (Counter Islamophobia Kit)

Ms Arzu Merali

Key National Messages - UK

CERS, 2018

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Counter-Islamophobia Kit



About the CIK Project

The *Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States* (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the third workstream of the project which was centred on describe the key national messages pertaining to Islamophobia and countering-Islamophobia in each context considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. The key national messages, findings and toolkit, the Counter-Islamophobia Kit (CIK) will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

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Key National Messages – UK

Arzu Merali

Executive Summary

The last two decades have witnessed a steep rise in anti-Muslim prejudice, discrimination and violence in Britain. Studies such as those by Ameli and Merali (2015) have all shown an increase in anti-Muslim antipathy to the extent that it can be said that the experience of Islamophobia has become almost universal for Muslims. While Islamophobia is indeed a relatively new term it bespeaks a phenomenon that is centuries old and has its roots in racial discourse. As victims of racialisation and racialised discourse Muslims are thus victims of institutional racism in the same manner as Jews. The study found that narratives of Islamophobia in Britain are subsumed under four overarching meta-narratives:

- 1. Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis).**
- 2. Disloyalty and the threat to internal democracy**
- 3. Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’**
- 4. Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)**

In effect, Islamophobia has become part of the fabric of a national story of what it means to be British. Not only is Britishness navigated through a denial of Muslimness, it is also represented through the articulation of supremacism as a normal facet of law and nation. Therefore, for counter narratives to be effective they need to operate at every level of society, most crucially the state and media, and confront issues such as structural racism that are wider and more-deep rooted than Islamophobia per se.

The study also identified the ten most important counter-narratives in the UK context:

- 1. Decentring conversations on Islam and Muslims from current institutionalised narratives.**
- 2. Diversifying the understanding of what, who and how is a Muslim, and the acceptance of this plurality within a plural understanding of the nation.**
- 3. Contextualising the nature and level of ‘threat’ posed by political violence per se by reviewing the epistemology of current security policies.**
- 4. Acknowledging structural issues and racism(s)**
- 5. Acknowledging Islamophobia as a form of violence that is relational to both recent and colonial history and current events in various Westernised settings that refer to each other in order to perpetuate each other.**
- 6. Removing hierarchies of racism and acknowledging Islamophobia as a form of racism**
- 7. A refocus on equalities, or ideas of injustice as the normative focus of the state.**
- 8. Accuracy in, agitation for and sanction for failure in delivering accurate representation in particular but not solely media representation.**
- 9. A cultural shift in understanding who is part of the national, and how national histories have been intimately intertwined with Muslims and Muslim cultures and nations over centuries.**
- 10. Recapturing and creating further space for Muslim narratives of being.**

Developing effective counter-narratives is essential in order to stem the tide of Islamophobia sweeping the nation. Counter-narratives must reset the parameters of conversations about Islam and Muslims, unconditionally including Muslims in the national conversation on their own terms. The casting of Muslims as somehow living outside the idea of 'Britishness' needs to be challenged in a way that allows for a pluralistic conception of the term in opposition to the narrow and exclusivist conception that has gained traction in recent years.

Worryingly however this study found a sense that engagement with government, media and other main institutions was mainly futile because they are seen as presiding over and reproducing Islamophobic narratives. The narrowing of representations of Muslimness, the squeezing out of Muslims from public and political space by accusations of extremism and entryism, and the rising of a nationalistic and nativist discourse around Britishness that constructs its identity against various tropes of Muslimness all serve as markers of expulsion of Muslims from equality as citizens.

This report into counter-narratives to Islamophobia is necessitated by the exponential rise in anti-Muslim prejudice, discrimination and violence in Britain over at least the last two decades and its acceleration since the turn of the decade.

While Islamophobia is indeed a relatively new term it bespeaks a phenomenon that is centuries old and has its roots in racial discourse. Therefore, our approach understands Muslims as victims of racialization and racialized discourse and thus victims of racism in the same manner (and often through the same performative functions) as Jews are victims of racism.

Grosfoguel's work has identified the origins of British anti-Muslim racism in the transatlantic slave trade which brought the nascent imperial power into direct colonial contact with Muslim subjects. Skepticism with respect to the humanity of the indigenous would be transposed and readapted to the African slave (Maldanao-Torres, 2014). This fundamental questioning of the humanity of those enslaved forms a basis for discourses of 'subalternisation' in the modern era (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006) that finds expression in British narratives of 'otherness'.

The collapsing of the idea of Muslimness and Blackness, and Muslimness and barbarity, viewed through the European conceptualization of 'Saracen' in the context of the Crusades and the rise of the Ottoman caliphate provide a context for a sustained narrative of the Muslim as subaltern. The colonization of India by the British gave rise to another set of interactions where political expediency demanded another set of justifications for control and subjugation. Indeed, the term 'mussulmanophobic' was coined by one official to explain the Indian Civil Service mindset in 1857 at the time of the Indian Mutiny (Padamsee - undated), which seen by the imperial power as a conspiracy by Muslims to whose 'treachery' it also ascribed fanaticism, bloodthirstiness and the idea of wider Muslim complicity based on bonds of faith.

Thus, Islamophobia as a form of racialization that not only discriminates against Muslims but negates Muslim agency and aspiration, forms the crux of an understanding of how Islamophobia functions in the UK context. Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only manifested in the labour market, education, public sphere, global war against terrorism, the global economy, but also at the epistemological level where Muslims are denied their own agency, negated as legitimate actors with legitimate concerns because 'the thinking that comes from non-Western locations [that] is not considered worthy of attention except to represent it as "uncivilised," "primitive," "barbarian," and "backward".' (Grosfoguel and Mileants, 2006).

The demonization of Muslims has been both latent in Anglophonic culture but also part of a cycle of policy and narrative over the course of centuries where such tropes have served politically expedient purposes. 'Islamophobia' as a neologism emerging in the post-Rushdie context is therefore not the name of a new problem but the articulation of a term that can capture the experiences and dehumanization long felt by Muslims as a result of particular interaction with, in this case, British institutions and the British state, whether as citizen or colonial subject or slave.

It is significant that there has been a consistent feeling that political discourse has worsened with regard to Islamophobia and racism, particularly after the 2016 murder of MP Jo Cox. It is

alarming not least because a survey of Muslims in 2014 by the IHRC found that between the 2010 and 2014 (Ameli and Merali 2015) results for the question, “How often have you heard Islamophobic comments by politicians?” had significantly worsened. This finding is set against the backdrop of a rise in anti-Muslim antipathy on every single measure since the survey was last conducted in 2010, suggesting that by the middle of the decade the experience of Islamophobia had become almost universal for Muslims.

This first report (Workstream 1) identifies the **ten most dominant narratives of Islamophobia** in the UK.

(i) Disloyalty and the Threat to Internal Democracy

The rise of the narrative of Muslims as disloyal (and therefore in need of social engineering and state intervention), and its development into a narrative of Muslims as ostracized and outliers who perfect strategies of entryism as a means to inveigle themselves into institutions and positions of power has picked up a pace in recent years. This has then been used to imply that there is a substantive threat to internal democracy from Muslim participation in civic life which then feeds further into the idea of Muslim deviance and threat, and undergirds policies that seek to curtail Muslim engagement in civil institutions as well as silence their protests regarding any number of issues.

(ii) Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’

Muslims cannot be expected to conform to national mainstream values of the (white native) majority. This narrative, which is often manufactured with the help of state-engineered moral panics, legitimises state intervention and social engineering, ostensibly to bring Muslims into the mainstream but in reality to justify their subjugation. The most prominent recent example was the Trojan Horse affair which raised the spectre of a concerted plan by ‘Islamists’ to take over several state schools. Reported thus in the media, it was picked up by government which launched the above litany of investigations at huge public expense, none of which found any wrong-doing on the part of those involved (bar one example of inappropriate language being used in a private messaging group amongst some teachers). What was obscured in the reporting and even the investigations was that those involved were being judged on the basis of their actions and aspirations set within otherwise acceptable norms with regard to education in the United Kingdom.

(iii) Muslims and 'extremism'

While there is no accepted definition of 'extremism' advanced by the state and deliberately so, the idea is often defined in opposition to practices misleadingly presented as uniquely or largely restricted to Muslims such as female genital mutilation, paedophilia and radicalisation. In 2009, a leaked document said that “government and civil servants were planning to widen the definition of exactly what beliefs constituted extremist views.” It specifically mentioned the following markers of extremists:

- “• They advocate a caliphate, a pan-Islamic state encompassing many countries.
- “• They promote Sharia law.
- “• They believe in jihad, or armed resistance, anywhere in the world. This would include armed resistance by Palestinians against the Israeli military.

- “• They argue that Islam bans homosexuality and that it is a sin against Allah.
- “• They fail to condemn the killing of British soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan.” (IHRC, 2009).

(iv) Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis).

The most evident example of this can be seen in the drawing up and implementation of The Preventing Violent Extremism policy (PREVENT) which has been in operation since 2005. Academics (Sayyid 2010a, 15 as argued by Sian, 2013) have described it as ‘the disciplining of Muslims by reference to an antagonistic western horizon’. From its inception human and civil rights groups have seen PREVENT as a social engineering and spying exercise to transform attitudes in the Muslim community and gather intelligence on its members. As an integral part of discriminatory anti-terrorism legislation Prevent has become an aggressive tool for the state to control the community.

(v) Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman

Various tropes are subsumed in this narrative that harks back to the idea of the seraglio (Progler, 2008) and the women of the harem. Whilst the idea of the sexuality of the Muslim woman has transformed from the harlot of the harem (Ameli and Merali, 2015) to that of sexually oppressed/submissive (with the veil as a symbol of this), there continues to be a concurrent dissonant narrative of Muslim women as dangerous and criminal, as well as the cultural and physical vanguard of the supposed ‘Islamisation’ of society.

(vi) Muslims as subhuman and unable to socialize to ‘human’ norms

The markers of sub-humanity of Muslims are not particular to Muslims, and have been instrumentalized by negative policy discourse against various communities at different times. These include the ideas of Muslims as intrinsically violent, as lazy, as illiterate (either willfully or intrinsically), un-Enlightened (inherently so) and sexually deviant.

(vii) Muslims as segregationists

Muslims are posited as both gender segregationists internally, but crucially segregationist vis a vis issues of integration. This runs through ideas of Muslim no-go areas promulgated and platformed by both far-right groups but also mainstream figures such as Bishop Nazir Ali (Wynne-Jones, 2008 and Brown, 2009) and the Henry Jackson Society (Treptow and Stuart, 2015), despite regular debunking of the idea that such areas exist. The issue of dress, in particular but not solely the niqab, has been a recurrent narrative that claims inter alia the idea of emotional separateness of Muslims. Likewise, the desire for Muslim faith schools has been historically pathologized, despite the existence of faith schools across religious spectra.

(viii) Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)

The trope of a segregationist anti-integration Muslim society within British society continues to find expression in media and political discourse, leading to policy interventions that fuel the cycle of negative discourse. The launch of the official Casey Review into Integration and Opportunity in December 2016 supposedly looked at the challenges faced by communities. It was widely lauded by UKIP, some government ministers and politicians, and various parts of the commentariat. However, it was also deeply criticized for methodological failings, and an obsession with Islam and Muslims, with the word Muslim used 249 times in a 200 page report (with the Polish community mentioned only 12 times), and Islam mentioned over 100 times.

(ix) Immigration and the demographic threat

Immigration as demonized discourse in the UK can be traced back several decades. In the 1950s - 1970s the marking out of immigrant communities as problematic was largely based on biological racism and the marking out of 'national' cultures. Anti-Muslim / Islamophobic specificity in various discourses arose in two distinct scenarios: the idea of second and third generations of British citizens who were also Muslim and could not be targeted as the first generation as 'immigrants; and those who arrived as asylum seekers and refugees in the 1990s and onwards.

(x) Muslim spaces as incubators

Mosques, Islamic centres, Islamic schools or Muslim majority schools, madrasas, shariah councils, cemeteries and potential Islamic spaces have been frequent targets of hate crimes. Conceptually however they have also been targeted by government, media and legislative oversight as spaces that incubate all of the foregoing tropes. The violation of Muslim spaces, in particular mosques and schools, speaks to the idea of being able to 'touch', in this case Muslim space, in the name of desegregation.

The ten narratives are subsumed (with some crossover) between the following four overarching themes, listed in order of prominence and impact.

- Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)
- Disloyalty and the threat to internal democracy
- Islam as a counter to 'Britishness' / 'Fundamental British Values'
- Muslims in need of integration (assimilation).

Counter-narratives to Islamophobia

1. Decentring conversations on Islam and Muslims from current institutionalised narratives.

Muslims find themselves continuously having to defend themselves against the pathologised narratives constructed of them as extremists, traitors, different and outsiders. Simply reproducing cultural forms in order to provide counter-narratives to the problems caused by that perpetuate the problem. Counter-narratives need therefore to reset the parameters of the conversations about Islam and Muslims whether this is in academia or in policy-making. The national conversation and the national story needs to recognise Muslims' humanity and independent agency and include Muslims regardless and without conditions. Muslims being seen to interact with other issues, not just Muslim ones, is a way that the media and political realms can send messages to wider society about the place of Muslims in the UK, where "... Muslim commentators in the media are seen to be addressing other intelligent and resourceful issues not just religious ones ... that is surely one of the things that would make a difference. This [Muslims] is a set of resources, identities, convictions that can contribute to a general civil discourse, not just one about religion, but about justice, poverty, the environment etc." (Williams, 2017)

2. Diversifying the understanding of what, who and how is a Muslim, and the acceptance of this plurality within a plural understanding of the nation.

The rise of the idea of Britishness (Workstream 1, and Ameli and Merali, 2015) and the narrative of Islam as a counter to 'Britishness' and 'Fundamental British Values' (FBV) has narrowed the conversation around what is the nation. Both 'identities' are homogenized in a false manner, creating a fictitious dichotomy between British and Muslim, both imaginings of which are projected AT Muslims. With Muslims considered beyond the pale the expectations of Muslims from the government, media and wider society is beset with a conditionality not expected from any other citizen, be they from a minoritized community or the majority community. An effective counter-narrative needs to address this failure to include Muslims whether as individuals or groups within the story of the (one) nation. This extends not just to understanding the diversity of Muslims, but also in naming the problems Muslims face and also the problems of society in general. The idea of who or what is a Muslim and the problems society faces are not so easily collapsible as the current narratives of Islamophobia claim, and recognising this in the production of public discourse is a first step. As Arun Kundnani says: "...what's important [is] to have alongside that some more radical counter-narratives that in the end... will be necessary to really get to the root of this issue. Those ultimately take us to questions of empire and the economic system that we live under... that's one of the roots by which the discussion about Islamophobia connects over to issues of both class and issues of foreign policy and makes it part of the conversation that is ultimately a deeper crisis in British society. That part of the conversation is often neglected because it feels like it's starting to sound conspiratorial or it feels like it's starting to sound like the usual accusation of being apologist or terrorist. But I think it's a necessary part of the conversation."

3. Contextualising the nature and level of 'threat' posed by political violence per se by reviewing the epistemology of current security policies.

Securitization haunts every discourse regarding Muslims. Denied acceptance and thus the rights and assumed dignity of citizenship, Muslims are not considered to be British (Workstream 1). This perverse logic followed through sees them projected as living or existing not in Britain but in 'Islam' or 'Islamism whatever that may be' (François, 2015 in Workstream 2) in a public discourse that allows them to be excluded from equal citizenship in the wider public psyche. Opposition to the tropes of the narratives that undergird the securitization of Muslims, and the exceptional praxis of law and state against them has been framed largely by civil society calling for at the very least a review of the Prevent policy and its introduction into law since early 2016, to an all-out call for the repealing of ALL anti-terrorism laws. Qureshi (2017 in Workstream 2) believes one effective counter narrative to the securitization discourse can be found in the approach taken by Marc Sageman who uses Bayesian probability analysis to make an assessment about what the actual threat is that is posed to non-Muslims by Muslims in the Western world. "According to him, it ultimately boils down to one Muslim per million per year. That is the threat that is posed to the Western World...That's what we should be saying. All of this exceptional policy, this securitization, exists despite the fact that 999,999 Muslims out of one million pose no threat at all to the West," says Qureshi. The call for a review of Prevent being taken up in some political circles is an achievement, however what is more significant is that the new independent reviewer of the anti-terrorism laws, Max Hill QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has spoken of the ideal scenario where there would be no anti-terrorism laws, and crimes of political violence would be prosecuted using the existing gamut of criminal law, confirming that in this instance a

counter-narrative to (Islamophobic) securitization that was much maligned when expressed by Muslims and civil society alliances has found mainstream acceptance.

4. Acknowledging structural issues and racism(s)

Islamophobia needs to be seen as part of the wider crisis of institutional racism in British society. Whilst the UK has been celebrated (or demonized) for its equalities culture in the past, that culture has found itself under attack as a result of unbridled Islamophobic narratives normalizing racism in society once more. As the Macpherson inquiry report (1999) phrased 'institutional racism' moves beyond the accumulation of the prejudices of individuals, the 'bad apples' seeing racism as structural, 'institutional racism'. This manifests in a variety of ways, but notably with regard to taking-action for redress against injustice or simply accessing the structures and rules of the state, the following issues are hugely restricted for Muslims:

- (i) Accessing justice
- (ii) Immigration rules
- (iii) Accumulation of debt around (i) and (ii)
- (iv) The roll out of functions of the state to the private sector
- (v) How hate crimes are recorded, investigated and prosecuted.

Economic and other barriers to the justice and legal system such as the withdrawal of legal aid need to be removed. Police officers must receive better training in how to deal with race and/or Islamophobically motivated offences. There needs to be serious revision of the epistemologies of anti-racism and equalities within institutions to prevent Islamophobic discourse from becoming mainstream and accepted practice, such as in the requirements imposed by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 for public sector employees to refer anyone they suspect of extremism to the police. The setting up of more community initiatives and the community and independent funding of civil society organisations providing advocacy services and legal support for individuals needing support is an increasingly needed support strategy.

5. Acknowledging Islamophobia as a form of violence that is relational to both recent and colonial history and current events in various Westernised settings that refer to each other in order to perpetuate each other.

To challenge the dark form of exclusivist nationalism which we've seen take over in Brexit we need alternative national conversations which look back at the history of the UK, not in an exclusivist or racist way, but in one which acknowledges the history of the multiple peoples who now inhabit this island and acknowledges the multiple ways in which the UK historically was intertwined with other cultures and civilisations. There is a need for academia and government and its institutions to acknowledge ongoing histories and reframe not just current 'problems' but question the framing of the problems themselves. Existing counter-narratives that have been deployed in this regard have included the following:

- (i) responding to government consultations on laws and policies (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2015);
- (ii) increasing Muslim participation in the academy, and other institutions, services and professions;
- (iii) individual and community projects that try to show Muslims in their 'true' light;
- (iv) inter-faith and outreach work;
- (v) awareness raising events, third party reporting projects and projects around street level Islamophobia and discrimination.

However, these are all short-term strategies, which when operating without more long-term strategic vision, can serve to simply reinforce the cycle of exclusion. All the above respond directly to narratives of Islamophobia and thus risk what Malik (2014) identified as reinforcing their connection with and thus validating narratives of Islamophobia. Counter-narrative work cited as examples of good practice and work which address the long-term aims of countering Islamophobia begin with the need for they type of barrier breaking interventions in the public space as well as civil society groups led by those working with and giving voice to those directly affected. In the words of the UN Rapporteur on Religious Freedom "it is not the Government's role to look for the "true voices of Islam" or of any other religion or belief. Since religions or communities of belief are not homogenous entities it seems advisable to acknowledge and take into account the diversity of voices. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that the contents of a religion or belief should be defined by the worshippers themselves." There is also an overwhelming case for a well-balanced religious and cultural studies syllabus to look at how religious 'others' are constituted and set up and essentialized.

6. Removing hierarchies of racism and acknowledging Islamophobia as a form of racism
The call for parity between minoritized and / or religious communities i.e. the acceptance of minority identity and the 'benefits' that go with it should be on a par across major religious minorities, or indeed across major religions (Beth Din courts, the Synod, Muslim arbitration). This can provide (i) examples of good (state) practice; (ii) a marker by which to measure the treatment of Muslims by the state; but counterintuitively (iii) can inhibit the improvement of the situation of Muslims but also (in this case) Jews, by using certain aspects of recognition of 'Jewish' identity as the final point of good practice regarding religious and or racialized communities in the UK. A particular sector feeling Islamophobic pressure is civil society. Organisations, whether constituted as charities or not have felt the brunt of a media and political focus that singles them out in a manner distinct from other communities (see Workstream 1 for a summary). Accountability for this situation is required and also forms the basis of expectations of equality of expectation and treatment between minority community charities.

The invisibilisation of racialized individuals and groups also requires redress. In this regard educational space and workplace cultures have peculiar anomalies in creating hierarchies of racism where anti-racist measures (insofar as they are obliged to exist via equalities policies) are made as a one size fits all and do not always cover issues that are a bar to Muslim participation e.g. socializing and bonding around alcohol after work, participating in school discos or dance classes, uniform requirements that do not take in the diversity of Muslim expectations and beliefs etc. Finding ways of tackling the different experiences of inequality faced by different racialized or marginalized communities and groups within institutional settings is imperative if existing equalities norms are to be achieved. This could include in the school setting, clearer guidance from government on issues such as uniform (currently there is no specific advice from the government regarding the rights to wear religiously mandated clothing); working around issues like times of fasting and breaking fast, prayer times, fasting during exam periods etc.

7. A refocus on equalities, or ideas of injustice as the normative focus of the state.
The UK's culture of equalities was hitherto much celebrated in civil society within and outside the UK as one of the most progressive. However, the rise of an anti-multiculturalist narrative

and the rise of a nativist discourse have increasingly rendered this history as inimical to British values and a threat to the internal democracy of the UK (Workstream 1). In this scenario, Muslims are posited as the vanguards of multiculturalism, who are simultaneously seen to be promoting a segregationist agenda (and therefore are in need of assimilation / integration) but also as entryists whose civic participation is construed as seeking to advance an 'Islamist', 'privileging', 'extremist', 'segregationist' cause. Many laws and policies still in existence need bolstering in the legal culture but also the popular imagination. This includes rules regarding employment discrimination (Ahmed, 2017 in Workstream 2), existing equalities cultures established in education (Choudhury, 2017 in Workstream 2), the setting up of parliamentary and ministerial oversight committees for controversial or contested regulations or pressing social issues. This refocus on equalities is a way to cut through demonized narrative such as the pushback from managers at universities, albeit a brief moment, against Prevent on the basis of the equalities impact of these policies.

Current equality laws presided over by Equality and Human Rights Commission suffers from systemic problems associated with "a simplification of equality laws and the joining up of the distinct equality strands (which) enables Britain to construct itself as a progressive, 'post-racial' liberal society, thus racism becomes invisible and is instead understood as a human rights issue. That is the bringing together of all groups and dispensing with single issue bodies such as the CRE, sustains and strengthens the notion that 'we are all the same' and as such reinforces the discourse of colour blindness, universalism and unification which masks the persistence of structural inequalities that remain embedded within contemporary Britain. [Sian et al 2010]". The implication, therefore, is that the equalities law enforcement needs to be overhauled to take account of the diversity and particularity of racialized/minoritized experiences.

8. Accuracy in, agitation for and sanction for failure in delivering accurate representation in particular but not solely media representation.

Whilst disproportionately affecting Muslims, the operation of mainstream media is deeply problematized in the wider UK culture, as the Leveson Inquiry (2012) bears testament to, the business of which remains unfinished with calls for an urgent review circulating at the time of writing (Hacked Off, 2017). The media in particular is acknowledged as underpinning, reinforcing, (re)producing and normalizing anti-Muslim political and public discourse. Tackling this falls broadly into the categories of:

(i) Civil society initiatives and responses; successes and critiques thereof;

The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) is ineffective in challenging misrepresentation of individual Muslims. The scope of IPSO is still limited to redress against named individuals rather than issues of demonization and racist narratives that target communities, groups or organizations. Without a longer-term strategy initiatives that sought to use IPSO and other regulatory mechanisms are at risk of reinforcing a problematic narrative (Narkowicz, 2017 in Workstream 2) that existing mechanisms were adequate and that Muslims were unable or unwilling to use these to make reasonable claims.

(ii) Mainstream and Alternative Media initiatives, media (self)regulation, reform and cultural transformation; However civil society practice cannot fix the power imbalance between parties. This requires an expansion of coverage of Muslim community affairs and of race and Islamophobia problems through permanent assignment of reporters familiar with the issues around these affairs, and through establishment of more and better links with the Muslim community. The Muslim community is a diverse one, and the media needs to engage

with that diversity and not promote or rely on sensationalist or apologetic voices that simply help propagate deeply held negative ideas. It requires the integration of Muslims and Muslim activities into all aspects of coverage and content, including newspaper articles and television programming. The news media must publish newspapers and produce programmes that recognise the existence and activities of Muslims as a group within the community and as a part of the larger community. The media must recruit more Muslims into journalism and broadcasting and promote those who are qualified to positions of significant responsibility. And the industry should support education initiatives for senior mainstream media personnel around issues of Islamophobia and how to avoid it.'

(iii) State re-evaluation of media monopolies and laws regulating hate speech. With media self-regulation having been proven to be worryingly ineffective it falls on the state to enact anti-hate speech legislation to criminalise Islamophobia and other forms of hate expression in the media. Whilst issues like the 'glorification of terrorism' and 'incitement to religious and racial hatred' are covered in parts of the anti-terrorism and existing criminal law, their extend seems to be heavily biased towards prosecuting Muslims and racialized groups. There is an argument that such laws must either be used against non-racialized perpetrators including those given a media platform e.g. Katie Hopkins whose columns and social media comments have been heavily criticized for demonizing Muslims, migrants and other minorities. Whilst curtailing speech is always a controversial demand, the current situation where the speech of Muslims is criminalized but that of those who call for a 'final solution' against Muslims is not, cannot be allowed to continue. Either there is consistent application of these laws, or their total repeal or a total review to make effective the boundaries that have always existed regarding what is and is not hate speech and can and cannot be allowed. The monopolisation of media ownership also needs tackling. The government must take steps to resist the trend towards consolidation in the media industry, both for reasons of free speech and because minority groups do not have the financial clout to buy into conglomerates and are therefore at risk of further exclusion.

9. A cultural shift in understanding who is part of the national, and how national histories have been intimately intertwined with Muslims and Muslim cultures and nations over centuries.

The history of the UK is intimately intertwined with those of some of its minority ethnic and religious communities. More academic but also cultural review of these histories is a way of resetting the collective imagination as to who is part of the nation. These attempts are not necessarily in and of themselves a panacea and those attempting to do this need to be mindful not to reproduce cycles of exclusion of Muslim and other racialized voices. Efforts like those of the Forgotten Heroes Foundation that highlight the Muslim contribution in terms of manpower in the First World War are an example of a successful civil society initiative challenging the 'otherness' and 'unBritishness' of Muslims. The attempts to interrogate historical erasure, even in the most conformist manner (Forgotten Heroes does not challenge current narratives of the First World War) are left almost entirely to civil society and there must be uptake amongst wider cultural producers, rather than the rise of a culture of erasure. This widening or equalizing of what it means to be part of the nation should have an inevitable knock on effect on legal interpretations of rules (Ahmed, 2017 in Workstream 2) just as the converse is currently seen to be true in equalities related law and policy. The willingness to engage fascism and give fascists a public platform in the media is a particularly alarming development. Far-right voices are finding an outlet on mainstream media through the idea of

'balance'. Addressing this shift in the values of the reporting center or of balance between extremes that allows far-right narratives to be normalized needs to be urgently addressed by editors.

10. Recapturing and creating further space for Muslim narratives of being

There exists a need for movement building which includes creating spaces for those marginalized to be able to not only speak freely but to take control of their own narrative and participate in movement building on the terms set by those narratives. In lieu of a sympathetic state that encourages / protects the spaces needed, this role must fall onto nascent movements. This is not something that can be adequately fulfilled by the workings of individual or small groups of civil society organisations. Likewise, the proliferation of alternative and semi-alternative media provides a basis for creating narratives and spaces for existing or marginalized narratives of being. The above again rely on civil society to take the burden for what should be the normative and transformative project of the state and the meta-narrative of accountability remains. The liberalism of the state has been undermined by its commitment to the Prevent programme and its failure to tackle Islamophobia and other forms of racism, and its undermining of the institutions and culture that hitherto provided some protection from and sent a normative signal about racism at the individual and structural level. The wider question of whether the abuses of minority rights, as well as the structural and individual violations of civil and political rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights by the praxis and increasingly the overt ideology of the state (under successive governments) cannot be solved within civil society.

Conclusions

Developing effective counter-narratives is essential in order to stem the tide of Islamophobia sweeping the nation.

To this end defensive reactions such as apologetics and/or reproducing cultural forms are not enough only end up perpetuating the problem because they reinforce the Islamophobic agenda being created by hate-inspired misrepresentation, misinformation and political expediency. To the contrary counter-narratives must reset the parameters of conversations about Islam and Muslims, unconditionally including Muslims in the national conversation on their own terms. The casting of Muslims as somehow living outside the idea of 'Britishness' needs to be challenged in a way that allows for a pluralistic conception of the term in opposition to the narrow and exclusivist conception that has gained traction in recent years. This cannot be achieved without a ditching of a governmental policy that has helped create and perpetuated a 'Muslim bogeyman' to sell unpopular anti-liberal and undemocratic policies at home and abroad.

It is also clear from the research that the way Islamophobia is understood on both a popular and official level needs to be revised. Islamophobia should properly relocate within epistemologies of anti-racism and equalities in order to prevent Islamophobic discourse from becoming mainstream and accepted practice. Islamophobia is and must be seen as part of the wider crisis of institutional racism in British society.

Counter-narratives must also challenge a media that is acknowledged as underpinning, reinforcing, (re)producing and normalizing anti-Muslim political and public discourse. The huge power imbalance between Muslim media and mainstream media means that there is no alternative to the integration of Muslims and Muslim activities into all aspects of coverage

and content. Mainstream media must recognise the existence and activities of Muslims as a group outside the normal reference points of 'otherisation'.

Two recurring concerns came across in this research. Firstly, a sense that engagement with government, media and other main institutions was in large part futile, and where warranted was to be done with little expectation of reciprocity. The narrowing of representations of Muslimness, the squeezing out of Muslims from public and political space by accusations of extremism and entryism, and the rising of a nationalistic and nativist discourse around Britishness that constructed its identity against various tropes of Muslimness, all served not simply as barriers to Muslim participation in the life of the nation, but as markers of expulsion of the Muslim subject from equality as citizens and protection from and equality before the law.

The second concern was that despite more than twenty years of conversations, research and advocacy on the issue of Islamophobia, not only was there little or no significant progress from institutions or the state in tackling the problem, there was a marked downward turn. Islamophobia in British society was universally considered to be normalized to the extent that the sense of hopelessness in mainstream institutions and the political process was in many cases directly a result of this normalization. The state had presided over and reproduced through various legal measures including but not solely anti-terrorism laws and policies a state of exception, wherein not only had a group of people been dehumanized enough to become a 'hated society' (Ameli, 2010) but that the process of creating 'hated societies' is one that is legitimized by the state. In this scenario where the legitimization of an 'environment of hate' has not only trumped internal and external perceptions of the UK as a multicultural state, but has become part of the fabric of a national story of what it means to be British. Not only is Britishness navigated through a denial of Muslimness, it is also represented through the articulation of supremacism as a normal facet of law and nation.

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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are undernourished has increased from 600 million to 800 million (FAO 2001).

There are a number of reasons for this increase. One of the main reasons is the increase in the world population. The world population has increased from 5 billion in 1987 to 6 billion in 2000, and is projected to reach 9 billion by 2050 (FAO 2001). This increase in population has led to an increase in the demand for food, which has led to an increase in the number of people who are undernourished.

Another reason for the increase in the number of people who are undernourished is the increase in the number of people who are living in poverty. The number of people living in poverty has increased from 1 billion in 1987 to 1.2 billion in 2000, and is projected to reach 2 billion by 2050 (FAO 2001). This increase in poverty has led to an increase in the number of people who are unable to afford the food that they need to survive.

A third reason for the increase in the number of people who are undernourished is the increase in the number of people who are living in rural areas. The number of people living in rural areas has increased from 3 billion in 1987 to 4 billion in 2000, and is projected to reach 5 billion by 2050 (FAO 2001). This increase in rural population has led to an increase in the number of people who are unable to access the food that they need to survive.

There are a number of ways in which the number of people who are undernourished can be reduced. One of the main ways is to increase the production of food. This can be done by increasing the number of people who are working in agriculture, and by increasing the amount of land that is used for agriculture. Another way is to reduce the number of people who are living in poverty. This can be done by increasing the number of people who are employed, and by increasing the wages that they receive.

A third way is to reduce the number of people who are living in rural areas. This can be done by increasing the number of people who are working in other sectors of the economy, and by increasing the amount of land that is used for other purposes. Finally, it is important to ensure that the food that is produced is distributed in a way that ensures that everyone has access to it.

There are a number of challenges that must be overcome in order to reduce the number of people who are undernourished. One of the main challenges is to increase the production of food. This is a difficult task because of the limited amount of land that is available for agriculture, and the limited amount of water that is available for irrigation. Another challenge is to reduce the number of people who are living in poverty. This is a difficult task because of the limited amount of resources that are available for social development.

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APPENDIX E

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The Birmingham Trojan Horse affair involved claims that there was a plot to infiltrate Birmingham schools and to recruit children to Islamic extremism in Birmingham. However, a different view is emerging. A successful view is that the schools were infiltrated by a small group of people who were not motivated by any religious or ideological agenda, but who were simply seeking a better life for themselves and their families. This view is supported by a number of factors, including the fact that the schools were not infiltrated by any large group of people, and that the schools were not infiltrated by any people who were motivated by any religious or ideological agenda.

The affair was subject to scrutiny by the House of Commons, including by the Education Select Committee. Yet there are grounds to believe that the evidence presented to the House in the [select committee](#) was not fully accurate. This is because the House of Commons was not given the full picture of the affair, and the House of Commons was not given the full picture of the evidence that was available to the House of Commons at the time. This is because the House of Commons was not given the full picture of the evidence that was available to the House of Commons at the time.

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APPENDIX F

“Yes, another white man is UK’s terror watch dog - but diversity is nothing without reform”

Kiran Mevani
Published: 2017-07-13 11:01 AM | Last updated: 13 July 2017 11:01 AM

When it comes to the fight to prevent the rising tide of terrorism, diversity is a crucial element on policy leadership doesn't matter.



Diversity - despite everything I think most of us would agree, whether we are white or black, is a good thing. It is a good thing because it is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power. It is a good thing because it is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power. It is a good thing because it is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power.

London bomb plot prosecutor named as UK terror legislation watchdog

Without a doubt, diversity is an essential element of any organisation. It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power. It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power. It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power.

Why is it that we cannot accept even the meekest criticism of Present, let alone a more critique for the need or lack thereof of anti-terror laws?

British MP says things should be referred to Present when he visits UK

Different faces, same narratives



It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power. It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power. It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power.

The media have not followed the same path as the rest of the world. It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power. It is a good thing to have a diverse range of people in positions of power.

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Terrorism: A history of violence

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Beyond diverse faces

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APPENDIX G



Home > 1 October > Authorities must not get ahead in mainstream media terror incitement

■ 30 March 2017

Comments made in the wake of the New Zealand terrorist attack by British's reaction-terrorist chief, Neil Hanley, that the mainstream media is responsible for radicalising for right extremists are highly toxic.

Basic criminal offences such as Mail Online which uplinked the "backlash" of the gunman in the terrorist attack in Christchurch and the Sun and Mirror which called to upland clips of footage filmed by the gunman as he attacked two mosques in Christchurch.

"The reality is that every terrorist we have dealt with has sought inspiration from the propaganda of others, and when they turn to social media, YouTube, Telegram or Twitter they only have to turn on the TV, read the paper or go on one of a myriad of mainstream media websites - including to compare with these platforms." The source is an open letter to the media.

While British criticism is accurate, it is selective and should have been made many years ago when organisations such as ISIS were warning that have spread to the mainstream and online media and creating a toxic environment that is now seen feeding people for anti-Muslim hatred, including such of physical violence as we have witnessed in Christchurch. For decades, western mainstream media and publicists have both consciously and unconsciously promoted Muslims as religious groups to "reconvert" and "convert" reality to the point where a headline, volume article or talk show pointing to a problem or dispute created by the failure of Muslims to conform to so-called western liberal values.

The result is that Muslims have become targeted in the popular press as the "other", a "problem" and the enemy within. This has had legitimised and normalised attacking Muslims in the name of anti-Islamic terrorism which almost invariably reflecting the thought process which unconsciously directs Muslims to be guilty of things they did not do. Media indoctrination has created and normalised a widespread casual racism that has made it further normalised the Islamophobia and inspires violent attacks against Muslims.

Basis cited the 2017 attack by Darren Osborne who drove a truck into a crowd of Muslim worshippers leaving a mosque in Finsbury Park, London, but what he failed to mention was the identification badge of an openly displayed support for the Al-Qaida. The demonstration on June 16 that provoked the attack in the national and Jewish media. Osborne's original target was the Al-Qaida Day demonstration in London, but he was forced to change his plan after being unable to gain access to the mosque.

The man who charged with assaulting the New Zealand mosque attacks cited Osborne in his so-called media-bias: "I suspect many of those that take a stand against ethics and cultural genocide: Louis Theroux, Anders Birkhoff, Dylan Roof, Anton Lindqvist Patterson, Darren Osborne and."

Here are a selection of articles denouncing the attacks and those taking part, and offering peaceful demonstrations with support for terrorism.

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According to reports, Osborne was thrown out of the Holywell pub in Perthshire, near his home, for wearing Islamophobic rhetoric and mentioning the Al-Qaida Day March, that the attendees were supporting terrorism and that "terrorist" needs to be something about it.

Article: Finsbury Park attack: Support may have wanted to target pro-Palestinian rally in London

Finsbury Park terror suspect Darren Osborne read messages from Tommy Robinson days before attack, court hears

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On a previous occasion, when we complained to The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards about MP Matthew Offord's claims against the Al-Qaida Day rally of allowing support for ISIS, and eventually requiring his apology to Muslims with terrorists, it seems back that they did not believe it was something they could investigate.

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It is not enough for officials and politicians responsible for the security of British citizens to talk about rejecting the terrorism and extremism who seek to divide us. Such words amount to empty rhetoric unless they are translated into real and concrete policies to protect vulnerable communities from extremist attacks. The responsibility for terrorist attacks against Muslims lies not only with those who pull the trigger but also those in the media who play the most crucial role in this.

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