Counter-Islamophobia Kit

Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives – The Czech Republic

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Working Paper 6

Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States.

CIK Project (Counter Islamophobia Kit)

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Counter-Islamophobia Kit

CERS
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About the CIK Project

The *Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States* (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the first workstream of the project which was concerned to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. This output comprises eight papers on conditions in individual member states and a comparative overview paper containing Key Messages. In addition this phase also includes assessment of various legal and policy interventions through which the European human rights law apparatus has attempted to conceptually analyse and legally address the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamophobia. The second workstream examines the operation of identified counter-narratives in a selected range of discursive environments and their impact and influence on public opinion and specific audiences including media and local decision-makers. The third workstream will be producing a transferable EU toolkit of best practice in the use of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, the key messages, findings and toolkits will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

<u>Contents</u>

1. Introduction

The aim of this working paper is to describe and explain the discursive content and forms that of Muslim hatred in the Czech Republic. In order to do that, we have conducted a literature review, reported available data related to the anti-Muslim hatred and identified prevailing narratives.

Alongside the elaboration of findings of the existing researches on the Islamophobia, we have conducted discursive analysis of online blogs and Facebook pages of initiatives overtly attacking Muslims or Islam: 01/2015 –01/2016: Martin Konvička's (IVČRN, BlocAgainst Islam) blog – 41 articles; Petr Hampl's (Bloc Against Islam) web page – 88 articles, Tomio Okamura's (SPD) web page – 186 articles. For discursive analysis we have chosen television political debates aimed at general public focusing on migration and minorities, particularly with respect to the so-called migration crisis: *Máte slovo* ("You Have the Floor") (ČT 1), *Partie* ("Political Game") (Prima) and *Střepiny* ("Fragments") (TV NOVA).

The participants were politicians, activists and experts. In case of the debate *Máte slovo,* the representatives of general public also participated in it*.* All of the programs broadcast between 14th November 2015 (marking the terrorist attacks in Paris) and June 2016. At least one of the following key words or their variants was included: *refugee,*[1] *immigration* or *Islam*. A total number of 65 debates and television reports have been analysed.

2. State-of-the-art in research on Islamophobia in the Czech Republic

Typically for the Czech context, we identify the effort to challenge the term Islamophobia and to propose different suitable concepts that would be able to distinguish better among different negative attitudes towards Islam and *Muslim(s)* (see below). Besides, the definitions of Islamophobia, and the competing concepts (*Islamoscepticism, Islamocriticism, anti-Islamism, anti-Islamist politic, anti-Muslim hatred*) are briefly characterized in this part of thereport.

In 2013, Security Information Service (BIS), Intelligence Service of the Czech Republic, mentioned in its annual report the term *Islamoscepticism*, referring to the criticism of „(e)verything generally considered as a manifestation of Islamism[2] in the Czech Republic", particularly „wearing of Muslim

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[1] In the Czech Republic, anti-Islam rhetoric has been part of the anti-refugee reaction. We will explain it later in a greater detail.

[2] In public discourse, Islamism is perceived as unspecified ideology (either politically or religiously fundamental) with massive propaganda and terrorism as its key distinctive features. To avoid the threat of ideological radicalisation, BIS tries to monitor its environment. The quotation below illustrates a close connection between Islamism and terrorism and highlights the main elements of discourse of securitisation: „The Service sees the greatest potential for ideological influence with the main Islamic and Jihadist organizations related in thinking to the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Their propaganda is aimed mainly at dissatisfied individuals from the environment of religious-ethnic groups in some societies, where the majority of citizens are Europeans. Some of these individuals may show certain elements of problematic integration into a major society. The main ideological instrument of terrorist propaganda is false interpretation of events taking place abroad, especially in the Islamic world, which they purposefully blame on harmful influences from the West. The main objective is to manipulate descendants of immigrants who have no connection with events in the lands of their parents' and grandparents' origin and are so inexperienced that they cannot critically recognize this disinformation as an effort of psychological manipulation. Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda want to build a pool of willing sympathizers and volunteers that they can use for financial and other logistic support, for further propaganda, as couriers for non-

scarves in educational institutions; online messages encouraging others to join the Syrian conflict; statements of senior Czech Muslim officials; or the construction of new prayer rooms". According to BIS, „*Islamoscepticism* was manifested only verbally (Security Information Service 2014). In 2014, the category of Islamophobia was used for the first time in the annual reports to criticise media practices, while referring to the Danish cartoons controversy. Even though there is no clear analytical distinction from previously used term *Islamoscepticism*, adopting a new term, however, indicates a shift to more radical attitudes against Islam and Muslims (Security Information Service 2015).

The term Islamophobia has been often used by media referring to the established radical anti-Islamist movements.[3] However, in academia as well as in public debates, its' adequacy has been called in question. Stehlík (2016) claims that the term confuses making a difference between incitement to hatred and legitimate criticism, and what is more, blurs the line between criminal acts and legitimate forms of free expression. Due to specific target, Stehlik stresses the term should not be misleadingly equated with anti-Semitism, racism or xenophobia[4]. Stehlík recommends disaggregating of the term Islamophobia into "anti-Muslim hatred" and "criticism of Islam". The term Islamophobia is also criticized regarding its' inappropriate reference to the clinical psychic diagnosis of phobia as the irrational fear of something, what is usually not dangerous on the one hand (Remeš 2010), or because it evokes only fear of Islam, but not the hostility against it on the other hand (Pfahl-Traughber in Mareš 2015: 9). Ivan O. Štampach (2015: 110) similarly points out that humanities are not competent to deal with this psychological term.

Czech Orientalists heavily discuss the term Islamophobia and its usage. Prokop Remeš (2010) assumes that if 80% of the population share anti-Islamic attitudes we could hardly classify them as "phobic". He recommends the use of terms *Islamoscepticism* or *Islamocriticism* to avoid "unscientific negative labelling" and to capture the attitudes against Islam more concisely. On the other hand, in the same discussion, Pavel Dušek (2010) refuses to classify Islamophobia as an ideological term. He questioned the idea that the broad prevalence of Islamophobic attitudes could be seen less venomous. He understands Islamophobia as collective prejudices targeted specifically at Muslims or Islam that are as dangerous as xenophobia and antisemitism. Referring to Halm, Leokova and Yetik (2007) and Schiffer (2005), Dušek pinpoints the common use of the term Islamophobia in the sociological field. On the contrary, some Orientalists recommend avoiding the term Islamophobia due to its' connotation of negative label for those who are marked by it. A different argument for avoiding the term is proposed by Stehlík who claimed that "Islamist organisations exploit the word to silence opposition against their ideology" (Stehlík 2016).

It seems that Czech scholars using the term of Islamophobia; at least as a starting point for further elaboration, stem from the definition proposed by the Runnymede Trust (Hesová 2016; Linhartová,

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transparent financial transfers, and in the most extreme cases as potential suicide bombers." (Security Information Service 2011).

[3] See part 4, page 6.

[4] Nevertheless, other authors stress the common features of anti-semitism, racism or xenophoby and Islamophobia (see Barša 2004; Čejka 2010; Kropáček 2002).

Janků 2015; Mareš 2015; Popová 2011).[5] Following the Runnymede Trust's definition, publicly known orientalist Bronislav Ostřanský characterizes Islamophobia as a "wide range of manifestations, expressing an arrogant disdain, sometimes even a hateful resistance to Muslims in general and Arabs in particular" (Ostřanský 2013). Using the term *Islamoscepticism*, Ostřanský distinguishes „between criticism of Islam and Islamophobia" as defined above. In his analysis of the contemporary Czech anti-Islam groups, political scientist Miroslav Mareš (2015) uses the term *anti-Islamic politics* as a covering concept for Islamophobic attitudes (following definition of The Runnymede Trust) and other terms that do not accentuate fear, but critical attitude towards Islam and Muslims (following definition of Pfahl-Traughber 2011).[6]

It is obvious, that the Czech academic community feels uncomfortable with using the term Islamophobia – at least without mentioning the problematic delineation of unjustified fear or hatred on one hand and realistic criticism on the other. The definition made by Runnymede Trust is commonly accepted since meeting demands the adequate distinction. In public media discourse, Islamophobia is usually (and only) mentioned with respect to the political extremist scene, referring for instance to the activicism of Martin Konvička, a leading figure of the Czech anti-Islam movement (We don't want Islam in Czech Republic Initiative).

(1) Research on Islamophobia in media discourse

Sedláčková (2009) employed critical discourse analysis to show how the Muhammad cartoon controversy was represented in the Czech daily paper "Mladá fronta DNES". She documented that the representation of actors involved reflects the ideological square - it highlights West as positive and Islam as negative. Islam is depicted as intolerant and fanatic, Muslims as those who break law and social norms, as "others" who threaten the West. It generalizes "Islamic" attitudes and represents them by "West" interpretations. It constructs binary oppositions of "Islam/West; freedom of speech/religious intolerance; or progress of West/barbarism of "Islam") and thus sets the basis for Islamophobia.

Examining the context of criticism of Islam in the Czech society, Havlíček (2015) analysed content and visual aspects of the posts on Facebook page "We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic", initiative founded by an entomologist Martin Konvička (see below). He identified the page administrators as

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[5] The Runnymede Trust defines Islamophobia as the "unfounded prejudice and hostility" and through the distinction of the *closed* and *open* views of Islam distinguishes it from the legitimate criticism of and disagreement with Islam (The Runnymede Trust 1997: 4). Islamophobic worldview (e.g. "closed views of Islam") comprises 8 key features. It sees Islam as: (1) monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities; (2) separate and other regarding its' aims and values; 3) inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist; (4) enemy – violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'; (5) manipulative – as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage. It also (6) rejects criticisms of the West that are made by Islam; 7) defends discriminatory practices towards Muslims and 8) accepts Anti-muslim hostility as natural and 'normal' (The Runnymede Trust 1997: 5). As main aspects of Islamophobia is identified exclusion, violence, discrimination and prejudice (The Rudynnymede Trust 1997: 11).

[6] Pfahl-Traughber distinguishes (1) hostility towards Islam which is related to the promotion of negative picture of Islam as a whole; (2) critique of Islam related only to the distinguished forms and expressions of Islamic faith (e. g. critique of women rights); (3) hostility towards Muslims as proponents of Islam faith, which leads to their discrimination (4) critique of Muslims limited to the particular problems based on real empirical data (e. g. lower interest in education among German Muslims, which is shown in se several sociological studies

"opinion leaders", who create, together with their followers, a community based on the national identity, defined in the opposition to "Islam" and "Muslims". Havlíček also interpreted these posts as an example of "moral panic". Given the connection to the process of defining national identity, he claimed, that the criticism of Islam also had a considerable political potential. Through the concept of collective memory, Havlíček associated anti-Islamic critique to the historically based imagery of Muslims as "traditional enemies of the Czech society" depicted as "a threat", "intrusions of Muslims into Europe", "clashes between Muslims and Christians" or as "bloodthirsty Muslims".

(2) Representation of Islam in the textbooks

Focusing on the representation of Islam, Čermáková and Topinka (2016) analysed 24 contemporary primary school textbooks. They conclude that the image of Islam is quite balanced there, nevertheless sometimes stereotypical[7], and the interpretation depends heavily on teachers' activity. Islam is associated with poor and underdeveloped countries on the one side, and with pompous richness of sultans, oil magnates and grandiose mosques on the other. Perspectives of faith, culture and ethnicity are essentialised and conflated.

(3) Research on Anti-Islamic politics

Schneider (2006, 2007) identified several specific streams of Czech anti-Islamic scene: (1) Euro-sceptics; (2) Evangelic Christian fundamentalists; (3) secular liberal feminists; (4) Roman Catholic traditionalists; (5) opponents of the Turkish membership in the EU or (6) and proponents of the state-church separation.

Mareš and colleagues (2015) examined contemporary (until the end of 2015) anti-Islamic politics in the Czech Republic. They proposed a categorization of Anti-Islamic political scene into monothematic, right–extremist, right-populist, conservative, left-patriotic and other (religiously/atheistic) motivated movements and showed their mutual relations. Despite several internal divisions and distinctions, according to Mareš et. al., the period of 2014-2015 is marked by the establishment of a vivid grassroot anti-Islamic and anti-immigratory movement.

Elaborating on the ideological roots of Islamophobia, Štampach (2015) distinguishes (1) attitudes based on the Christian churchmanship that do not accept Islam, because it is a "different religion"; (2) non-acceptance of Islam from the nationalist-radical positions, where anti-Islamism goes hand in hand with Anti-Semitism or racism, and (3) non-acceptance of Islam from the liberal positions (focusing on human / women rights).

In the non-academic sphere, in 2005, members of the Islamic Foundation in Brno (Brno Mosque) and Libertas Independent Agency examined the expressions of Islamophobia in the Czech Republic. They divided Czech Islamophobic scene into (1) latent Islamophobia (anti-Islamic public attitudes); (2) political Islamophobia (anti-Islamic expressions of political party leaders); (3) intellectual Islamophobia (intellectuals lobbying against Islam); (4) lobbyists Islamophobia (servers and anti-

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[7] E. g. in the chapter *Cultural plurality of humankind* are briefly mentioned terms Taliban, Al-Qaeda and pupils should define fundamentalism and jihad.

Islamic non-party movements) and (5) terror which supports Islamophobia (e. g. non/verbal assaults) (Libertas Independent Agency 2008).

 (4) Research on the impacts of the Islamophobia manifestations among Muslim citizens

Linhartová and Janků (2016) have conducted a non-representative survey (85 Muslim respondents) focused on two questions: how is Islam perceived from the point of view of Muslims in the Czech society? What obstacles, related to their Muslim identity, do they meet in the Czech Republic? In the opinion of the majority of respondents, Czechs share closed view on Islam, perceive it as monolithic and radically different the Czech culture, relate it with terrorism and are afraid of it. The vast majority of respondents perceives themselves as the most disadvantaged in relation to their involvement in public life, politics and public declaration of their faith. In contrast to these resentments, they do not feel discriminated in the everyday situations – at school, in administrative departments, at doctors', or when searching for accommodation. However, there is a minority of those who has experienced violence because of their faith: online, verbal and physical attacks. All women-respondents, wearing scarves in public places, experienced verbal attacks or unwelcome staring of bystanders.

3. **Background: Muslim population in the Czech Republic**

The Czech Republic has some of the highest number of atheists in Europe, according to the census, 20.8% of Czechs declared no religious affiliation. The number of Muslims is smaller than in any other nation in the EU and they account for only less than 1% (3358) of the total population. 1363 (41%) of Muslims gave their nationality as Czechs, 143 (4%) Turkish and 119 (3,5%) Bulgarian, 108 (3,2%) Egyptian, 106 (3,2%) Tunisian, 104 (3,1%) are Kazakhs, 96 (2,9%) Uzbeks and 91 (2,7%) come from the Russian Federation. However, experts (see Topinka 2016) consider these numbers unreliable, since the religious identification is optional in the Czech census and people might be reluctant to declare their religion. Using official numbers of foreigners from Islamic countries, Topinka (2016) estimates that real number of Muslims living in the Czech Republic is closed to 22 000.

In comparison with the rest of the society, people who declared themselves to be Muslims in the census are slightly more economically active (45% in contrast to 40% of the total population), there are more job seekers among Muslims (9% in contrast to 5% of the total population) and significantly there are more stay-at-home mothers among them (14% in contrast to 8% of the total population).

In the Czech Republic, Muslim believers live in large cities, such as capital of Prague (1201 people) and the second largest city, Brno (306 people). Beside the metropolitan areas, there are significant higher numbers in areas with factories employing foreign workers (Pardubice, Plzen) and in bath resorts in the North-West Bohemia (Karlovy Vary and Teplice). In Teplice, a small bath resort in the Northern Bohemia, visitors from the Arab countries (notably from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) make up more than 25% of all guests. According to available data (Kantarová 2012), Teplice, the city with 52.000 inhabitants, are attended annually by an average of 5.000 to 10.000 guests from Gulf countries. These numbers correspond with the distribution of mosques and prayer rooms. There are mosques in Prague, Brno, Karlovy Vary and Teplice and prayer rooms in variety cities.

In the Czech Republic, understanding the history of different migration waves can explain the presence of Muslims. The first wave, in the 1960s and 1980s, was made up from people from communist countries within the international scholarship agreement (Libya, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt) coming to study at the Czech universities. From 1950s till the end of communism, Czechoslovakia was a strategic partner for the communist governments of Middle East and Norther Africa functioning as a vehicle of Soviet influence. Student agreements represented a soft component of military policy (Zídek, Sieber 2009). Hundreds of students (mostly males) studied at the Czech universities, some of them found jobs and settled down here. The second wave, in the 1990s, was marked by labour migration from North Africa and asylum seekers fleeing from Bosnia during the Yugoslavian wars. The third wave of migrants has been made up from tourists coming to the Czech bath resorts. In contrast to the previous waves, tourists are temporary and seasonal migrants, with no intention to entry the Czech labour market. However, media reports their plans to buy properties, build residential zones, mostly for recreational purposes.

Muslims are represented by the Centre of Muslim Communities (Ústředí muslimských obcí) which was established in the late 1990s by professor Muhamed Alí Šilhavý, born to a Czech family and converted to Islam, and serves as an umbrella for three Muslim communities in Prague, Brno and Teplice. His chairman, Muneeb Alrawi, speaks regularly on behalf of Muslims in the Czech media.

The Centre of Muslim Communities was officially registered as a religious society in 2004. In the Czech law, there is a two-tiered system of registration for religious organizations. The Centre got the first-tier registration. This registration confers limited tax benefits, it imposes annual reporting requirements and after a 10-year waiting period an organization may apply for the second-tier registration. The second-tier one entitles an organization to a share of state funding, teach religion at state schools, set up its own schools, perform officially recognized marriage ceremonies and serve as chaplains in the military and prisons. To register a religious group in the Czech Republic, the group must have membership equal to at least 0.1 percent of the country's population (approximately 10,000 members). Since 2014, the Centre has been eligible to ask for the second-tier registration, however, there has not been a consensus between members to ask or not with respect to the existing membership (Janků 2016).[8] Even though the Centre has not got the second-tier registration, the lay chaplain regularly visits the Ruzyne prison with the highest Muslim believers – 100 prisoners (Zelenka 2015). In terms of religious wedding, the Centre recommends either a ceremony in a Muslim country when one of newlyweds is foreigner, or to make a religious ceremony following a civic marriage (e-Islam 2015).

In addition to the Centre, various Muslim non-governmental organizations operate in the Czech Republic. The charitable projects are run by *the Islamic Foundation in Prague* and *the Islamic*

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[8] Despite no declared intention to change the registration, the mere existence of this legal possibility gave a raise of petition against the second-tier registration for the Centre. The petition addressed to the Czech Parliament was organized by the *We don't want Islam in the Czech Republic* initiative and it was signed by 24 500 people. In reaction to the petition, the populist party the Dawn Party (ÚSVIT) proposed the amendment which would restrict to give the second-tier registration to the organization threatening national security interests or public order. The proposal was refuted by the Parliament.

Foundation in Brno (Klapetek 2008). The Islamic Foundation distributes a financial social support, provides a support in asylum seekers centres (financial support, clothing, religious activities and education) and support Muslim prisoners. The Foundation cooperates with the Czech NGOs and the Prison Service of the Czech Republic. Charitable activities are also the main concern of *the Muslim Union in the Czech Republic* which, specifically, focuses on funeral ceremonies.

4. Background: the formation of anti-Muslim hatred

In the first decade after the fall of communism, Islam did not play any important role in public discourse (Čermáková, Janků, Linhartová 2016). The Czech media occasionally referred on spa resorts guests or Muslim asylum seekers. Islam was mentioned in foreign news concerning the Middle East or Yugoslavian wars. The first years of the new millennium changed the dominant frame and gave a raise of new style of reporting on Islam. Because of terrorist attacks (New York in 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005), Czech media describe Islam as a security threat (Křížková 2007). Whereas, in 1994 and 1996, 33% of the Czech population worried that migrants would introduced a new religion to the Czech Republic, ten years later (in 2004), there were 56% Czechs who shared this kind of fear (GAC 2004). The authors of this research associated this change with rising fear of Islamic fundamentalism and fear of terrorist attacks. The decrease of tolerance for other religions corresponds with this trend. Whereas, in 2003, 8% of Czechs did not want a neighbour with a different religious affiliation, in 2017, 19% share this kind of rejection (see following chart).

Not to want any person with a different religiosity as a neighbour
(CVVM 2017a)

In the last couple of years, Public Opinion

Research Centre of the Czech Academy of Science have been measuring attitudes toward different nationalities and ethnic groups – including 'Arabs' as representatives of Islamic world. In the Czech discourse, 'Arabs' are ssociated with both newcomers and people with a migrant background living in the Czech Republic and serve as synonyms for Muslims. 'Arabs' score very low in measures of prejudice of Czechs towards different nationalities (CVVM 2017b). Czech public perceive Arabs,

together with Roma, as the most unfriendly ethnic group.[9] 75% of Czechs consider Arabs as friendly (41% perceive them as very unfriendly). The following chart depicts attitudes of the Czech citizens towards foreigners (Arabs are compared with Roma, Vietnamese and Ukrainians – two biggest groups of migrants in the Czech Republic, and Poles).

The analysis revealed three clusters of countries of origin regarding attiudes of the Czech society (CVVM 2017). Arabs belong to the first group (with Roma, Ukrainians, Albanians, Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians), which is strongly associated with migration, labour, illegal residence and crime.[10]

In 2015, the representative survey (Glopolis 2017) revealed a general pattern that Czechs do not see Islam as a cultural threat (a total of 19% of Czechs feared that their culture is threatened by Islam and Muslim culture), but they consider Islam to be incompatible with Czech culture (this attitude is shared by 84% Czechs). The authors of this report attribute this attitude to a lack of direct experience in integrating migrants into society, combined with a lack of information. For example, there are virtually no migrants' zones in the Czech Republic and alleged reports on this subject (especially in France) are very often the subject of misinformation.

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[9] Respondents were shown a list with 17 nationalities and they were asked to evaluate these nationalities with marks from 1 to 5 according to their sympathy for these nationalities (1 – very friendly and 5-very unfriendly). Public Opinion Research Centre of the Czech Academy of Science started to question opinions on Arabs in 2014.

[10] The second group (Jews, Greeks, Serbs, Vietnamese and Chinese) is characterised by the sympathy associated with mainstream society, as well as antipathy associated with otherness. The third one (Slovaks, Poles, Czechs, Germans and Hungarians) is associated with the Central European space, the tradition of the neighbourhood or the common state.

Majority of Czechs (61%) would ban residence permits for Muslim families (Topinka 2016). Support for radical solutions (e.g. support for a ban on Islam) could be related to misconceptions of the attitude of the Muslim majority toward terrorism. People, who greatly overestimate how many people in the Muslim world regard terrorism as acceptable, mostly support a ban on Islam and on its public practice. Respondents, who roughly accurately estimated the prevalence of support for terrorism, were in the minority among those who favoured a ban on Islam, even immediately after the attacks on the Bataclan Theatre in Paris.

The lack of knowledge about Islam among Czech public was proved by Novotný and Polonský (2015), who researched the Czech university students. In comparison to Christianity, students see Islam as more dogmatic, expansive, less socially sensitive, less tolerant. When students were supposed to compare Muslims with "ordinary Czechs", Muslims were portrayed as fanatic, impulsive, less respectful to women, but on the other hand, Muslims were also seen as less selfish and less immoral. Generally speaking, both negative and positive characteristics are associated with the image of a traditional, non-modern society.

For long time, Islamophobia was not the issue of concern for the police. However, the discourse changed in relation to so-called migration crisis. In relation to this crisis, Islam has been serving as a symbol for a great number of images (and fears) associated with the refugee/migrant other (Glopolis 2017). For the first time, Security Information Service mentioned Islamophobia as a problem in 2014 (Security Information Service 2015). Compared to previous years, the increase of Islamophobia can be associated with a major decrease in anti-Roma activities. No larger anti-Roma demonstrations took place at that time and relations between the Czech majority and the Roma minority were less tense. T An example of conflict between Muslims and Czechs, is the issue reported by media about wearing Muslim veils at state schools or in spa resorts by the visitors from the Gulf States that provoked a wide-range discussion on the matter.

"Czech Muslim representatives became a more frequent target of criticism expressed by Islamosceptics and Islamophobes on social networks. Over the course of 2014 the emphasis on collective guilt and the number of vulgar attacks carried out by radical Islamophobes significantly grew. Therefore, Muslim representatives took a back seat and limited their communication with the media. Vulgar verbal attacks were often aimed at non-Muslims who criticise Islamophobes. Islamophobes and some controversial politicians attempted to exploit Islam in order to attract the attention of the media and to pursue their political goals." (Security Information Service 2015)

The Facebook page 'We Don´t Want Islam in the Czech Republic (IVCRN), established in 2009 and gained widespread popularity in 2014, served as a space for expressing intolerance, hatred, playing random YouTube clips or presenting news. The page was used to mobilise followers of anti-Islam demonstrations and had over 164.000 followers on the peak of its popularity in 2015. In 2016, the group was blocked by the Facebook company. The social media phenomenon was transformed into the political movement 'Block Against Islam' which was led by associate professor at South Bohemian University in České Budějovice and entomologist Martin Konvička. In 2015, the Czech President Miloš Zeman, known internationally for his Islamophobic remarks, stood on the podium with Konvička for

the celebration of 17th November, the country's National Day. The president's support met with a heavy critique from several politicians, university rectors and students. Apart from Martin Konvička, one can name Petr Hampl, sociologist and founder of the Alternative for the Czech Republic 2017, as another key public Islamophobic speaker. There is also the women's section of 'We don't Want Islam in the Czech Republic' called the Angry Mothers. Apart from the anti-Muslim rhetoric, they oppose to feminism and foreground of mothers' and traditional families' responsibility to pass the world to next generations. Another important propagator of xenophobia and Islamophobia is a Member of Parliament Tomio Okamura, who was born in the Czech-Japanese family. His party was the only anti-Muslim party succeeded in gaining votes in the regional election in 2016.

Even though anti-immigration rhetoric increased significantly and anti-Islam and anti-immigration stances were the primary topics for all right-wing extremist groups, the police did not report any serious attacks related to this matter took place (Security Information Service 2015). Even though several offences occurred – for example right-wing extremists poured pig blood on a halal shop, the main arena for the Czech Islamophobic discourse is the Internet. Islamophobic servers did not succeeded even in mobilizing people to demonstrate. In the biggest anti-Muslim and anti-refugee demonstration convened in 2016, up to 3000 people participated. However various Islamophobic, xenophobic and nationalistic initiatives, parties and groups failed to form a coalition before elections, there is an increasing penetration of Islamophobic agenda into mainstream politics.

5. Categorical list of most dominant narratives of Muslim hatred

The described frameworks and narratives were identified on the basis of a discourse analysis of TV debates for (broadcast both on public and private TV channels),[11] nationwide newspapers and internet, blogs and Facebook pages of Islamophobic initiatives. In this report, a narrative is understood as the representation of numerous randomly sequenced events in a coherent story (Hájek, Havlík, Nekvapil 2012: 202), i.e. spoken or written succession of events. Narratives describe a certain version of the past defining the causes of contemporary problems, the character of the current problem and a future image towards which current situation is leading. Following Greimas's logic (see Cooren 2000), we describe narratives with respect to six categories of roles: (1) subject – main character of the plot, (2) object of value, (3) sender who starts mission of the subject, (4) receiver who accomplishes the mission, (5) helper – different actors who help the subject, (6)

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[11] We chose television debates aimed at the general public: *Máte slovo* (ČT 1), *Partie* (Prima) and *Střepiny* (TV NOVA). The television programs *Máte slovo* and *Partie* have a classic debate format with invited guests. On the *Máte slovo* program the individual sides of a debate are always represented by around three people (two experts, politicians, etc. and one representative of the general public). Members of the audience composed of people who chose to attend the program as well as invited guests from certain ideological camps also contribute to the debate. The program *Partie* is usually based on the moderator's interview with one or two invited guests, in exceptional cases up to five. The discussion is supplemented with occasional taped reports on the individual topics of discussion. The format of the *Střepiny* program can be described as a series of commentated reports on one narrowly defined topic, followed by one or two invited guests speaking on the given topic. All of the programs broadcast between 14th November 2015 (marking the terrorist attacks in Paris) and June 2016 with at least one of the following key words or their variants were included: refugee, immigration or Islam. A total of 65 debates or television reports were analysed.

opponents – different actors who constitute obstacles for the subject. We identify also the key emblematic issues for each narrative.

We distinguish (1) Islamophobic and (2) Muslimophobic narratives. We define Islamophobia as a hostility towards practices and tenets of Islam and inimical to Islam as a religion. *"Muslims may be nice, one may like talking to them, but as a part of collective they behave as they do. Thus, according to Islam."* – the Czech women anti-Islamist initiative "Angry Mothers" (Naštvané matky) In case of Muslimophobia, the hostility is targeted towards Muslims as incapable of adapting to Western societies. "In this sense, Muslimophobia overlaps with both the racism that links biology with cultural characteristics, and the racism in which cultural and behavioural traits or dress of lifestyle habits become essentialised and racialised." (Cheng 2015: 6) Consequently, people with Arab or Turkish origin may be called 'Muslim', even if they are not. Religion, in this case, is linked to physical appearance or ethnicity as an identity marker.

In the following part of this report we introduce eight main tropes, with their specific narratives:

1. Islamophobic narratives: (A) Islam as an anachronistic/uncivilised culture; (B) Islam as an expansive violent religion; (C) Islam as a homogeneous antidemocratic religion.

2. Muslimophobic narratives: (A) Muslims as terrorists; (B) Muslims as Gypsies (parasites); (D) Muslims as sexual predators.

In each narrative, we distinguish three dominant dimensions: (1) political discourse, (2) media content, and (3) experience of discrimination in everyday life. We assume that each narrative penetrates all these three areas and their strength comes from their mutual interactions.

Indeed, each narrative have a different strength and different prevalence in public discourse. Following chart ranks them according to their prevalence in our data corpus. The most prevalent narratives are those describing Muslims as a security risk and Islam as a danger to democratic societies.

Ranking	Narrative
1	The narrative of radicalization (Muslims as terrorists)
2	The failed multiculturalism narrative (Islam as an antidemocratic religion)
3	The slippery-slope narrative (Islam tends to change our society – Islam as an antidemocratic religion)
4	The anachronistic religion narrative (Islam as an anachronistic/uncivilised culture)
5	The violent religion narrative (Islam as an expansive violent religion)
6	The Women oppression narrative (Islam as an anachronistic/uncivilised culture)
7	The Muslims as Gypsies narrative
8	The barbarian narrative (Muslims as a natural hazard, Muslims as parasites – Islam as an anachronistic/uncivilised culture)
9	The sexual predators narrative
10	The narrative of organized invasion (Islam as an expansive violent religion)

1. *Islamophobic narratives*

A. Islam as an anachronistic/uncivilised culture (Emblematic issues: stoning to death, women oppression, ritual slaughtering)

This narrative replicates the same trope what Edward Said (1978) described as orientalism in his seminal study. Islam is portrayed as instinctive and animalistic and Western culture is seen as secular, superior and progressive. These narratives emphasise on the different culture and mentality of the Muslims in contrast to modern and secular "Europe". It ignores the fact that Muslims might be also Europeans and it mixes up religious and supra-national affiliation. Islam works predominantly as an object of the narrative. In contrast to orientalised Islam, "Western civilisation" works as the subject

for the narratives – it should defend "Europe" against Islam's animosity or civilise Islam societies. According to these storylines, Islam and Muslims need to be civilised by Western culture and Western values, for example Muslim women or children need to be liberated.

Since secularism is an important part of the Czech identity *the anachronistic narrative* resonates very strongly with the Czech public opinion. On the other hand, Islam presents an instinctive or natural part of human existence, which over-civilised Western culture has already lost. In this sense, Islam might be seen both dangerous and fascinating in the same time. These narratives are built upon the static nature of the Islam: "Muslim civilisation is unique, since it has developed an arrangement combining the perfect control with no possibility for change" (Petr Hampl).

Specific attention is paid to the relation to women. The narrative of Muslim women as oppressed is an important part of this rhetoric. Eva Hrindová, the founder of the anti-Islam women initiative Angry Mother, claimed that despite her attitudes towards Islam, she felt compassion for poor oppressed Muslim women.

This rhetoric also relates to *the narrative of barbarians* with an emphasis on their instinctive behaviour. Another specific characteristic of the narrative is the perception of Muslims as a natural danger (the use of metaphors such as swarms, waves, floods and invasions). The current migration situation is often described using insect metaphors (swarms of grasshoppers, swarms of immigrants or annoying blood-sucking insects), in which the image of an insect implies something unpleasant and incessant that occurs in massive numbers. Comparing refugee camps to jungles works in a similar way.

The narratives of anachronistic Islam can be associated with a refusal of scarf or ritual slaughtering as incompatible with the Czech, respectively European, culture. In 2015, nationalist spilled pig blood on kebab stall in Hradec Králové.[12] The far-right Defence League warns against halal products in Czech supermarkets and calls for boycott of these products. There is a Facebook group called STOP HALAL.CZ. The populist politician Tomio Okamura suggested not to buy any halal food to defend Czech way of life. From a secular standpoint, the ban of halal meat is promoted by the Civic Association of Atheist Czech Republic (Linhartová 2016).

This topos was spread intensively through right-wing blogosphere. In 2016, Islamophobic and right-wing servers published a testimony of a school teacher complaining that her Muslim pupils are not allowed to sing, dance, draw and paper cut. "I cannot stand it. My husband asks me to hold back since they might cut my head somewhere in the park. But I was inviting the parents a couple of times, finally, a woman who was covered up and barely knew Czech, came and told me that she had to ask her husband on everything … just a brainwash," servers quoted anonymous teacher.[13] This quotation, probably faked, illustrates very well the discursive contradiction between *our modern*

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[12] In this sense, a pig is a very symbolic animal. The pig which is considered as *haram animal* in Islam is a cornerstone of Czech national cuisine.

[13] http://eurabia.parlamentnilisty.cz/Articles/30346-zpoved-ceske-ucitelky-ucim-2-muslimy-a-nesmi-kreslit-vystrihovat-vybarvovat-modelovat-zpivat-vytleskavat-rytmus-tancit-a-nesmi-zobrazovat-nic-co-souvisi-s-krestanstvim.aspx

institutions and *backward Islam*. Bloggers also refer to legitimate slavery under Islamic law and inadequate corporal punishments.

The conflict between secularist state and anachronistic Islam also drove the first (and only) Czech hijab debate, when two students, one from Somalia and one from Afghanistan, decided to leave the nursing school after having been forbidden to wear hijab. The ban was justified by the safety and hygiene rules. "We have to have hair tied, we must not have gel nails, we must not be too naughty, we cannot have any dangle earrings. It is not, therefore, possible for anyone to come covered from head to foot," media quoted a representative of school.[14]

B. Islam as an expansive violent religion (Emblematic issues: the clash of civilizations, Islam as an ultimate threat, Islam hates Europe)

Islam is perceived as predatory and militant. In contrast to the previous topos, Islam is the active subject of narratives. It works under the assumption of the hegemonic character of Islam as a political religion: "In my opinion, Islam is at a point where, if it is in some large community, it wants to have a dominant standing – brutally dominant" (discussant in FB debate). Islam is represented by *the narrative of a violent religion* manifested in cruelty and aggression as intrinsic qualities. Speakers using this narrative might accept that not all Muslims are Islamic warriors but stress the significant share of belligerents among them. According to the advocates of this narrative, the media and political elites are helpers who downplay the situation and, along with the authorities, refuse to provide the objective information.

The topos was strengthened by media coverage of recent terrorists' attack and Islamophobic statements of the Czech president Miloš Zeman. Zeman claimed the large influx of refugees was an "organised invasion", which Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood was responsible for – he later added. The President told the Czech Radio: "The Muslim Brotherhood cannot start a war against Europe, it doesn't have the power, but it can prepare a growing migrant wave and gradually control Europe."[15] This *narrative of organized invasion* also resonates across the blogosphere and social media.

It seems that so-called refugee crisis has been working as a crucial trigger for the dissemination of *I*slamophobia. The research below represents the elaboration of the media representation of the "refugee crisis". Tkaczyk, Pospěch and Macek (2015) have mapped the media coverage of the refugee crisis for the period from 4th March 2015 to 30th September 2015 in two main TV news; on Czech Television and TV Nova. They showed that security perspective and representing refugees as an administrative problem worked as main topics. Interior minister was the most frequent spokesman. Muslim refugees were portrayed either as a security threat (with the excessive use of specific metaphors: 'flood') or as victims with no control over their own fate. This agenda setting could evoke

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[14] http://www.blesk.cz/clanek/zpravy-politika/427986/reditelka-ktera-zakazala-muslimce-hidzab-s-satkem-z-baru-pujdete-operovat.html
[15] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/milos-zeman-czech-president-says-integrating-muslims-is-practically-impossible-a6818491.html

feeling of threat and the willingness of short-term and solutions based on using the power against refugees.

Even though there are no evidence of radicalization of Muslim in Czech Republic (see above), the dramatic police raid of two Islamic centres in Prague put the spotlight on Muslim radicalization in 2014. The reason given was a publication of the Czech translation of Bilal Philips' The Fundamentals of Tawheed two years before the raid and suspicion that those in prayer halls had weapons. The harsh police raid at the time of Friday prayer and the arrest of 10 to 20 Muslims, who were acquitted shortly after, was criticized as a deliberative demonstration of the fight against Islamic radicalism. Police accused a Czech convert Vladimír Sáňka of spreading racist publication through Phillips' book. Sáňka was not convicted and he was freed by the court in 2016.

C. Islam as a homogeneous antidemocratic religion (Emblematic issues: *a threat for freedom of expression*, *prohibition of homosexuality*, *Islamic antisemitism*, *Islamisation of Europe*, *Muslims do not recognize Czech laws but only shari'a/Islamic law*)

This topos presents Islam as a homogeneous antidemocratic religion. Similarly, to the previous one, Islam is an active object competing with democratic principles of Western societies. According to the proponents of this topos, the Czech Republic does not need to worry since there are only a few of Muslims, however, Islamophobic prophets warn that if Muslims' numbers increase, they will abolish democratic constitution in favour of sharia. A lawyer, Klára Samková, at a seminar in the Czech Parliament in May entitled "Should We Fear Islam", stated the following: "Islam assumes the right to build a parallel legal system, the foundation of Islam is criminal, Islam is the same as Nazism, fascism, and communism, it's a state crime and criminal ideology".[16]

The slippery-slope narrative tends to be an important part of this story. The Czech Republic does not face problems as other European states with a large Muslim minority (Germany, France, UK, Sweden or Denmark) so far, however, when Muslims come in higher numbers it will be too late to do anything. For these reasons, proponents of anti-Islam movement demand stopping the migration to the Czech Republic now and propose a zero tolerance to Muslims demands. This rhetoric is not use only anti-Islam movement, but it has been adopted also by mainstream politicians. This trend can be seen behind decision of Prague District VIII. not to allow for a Muslim cemetery in 2014. "I might exaggerate it but it comes from my long-term experience. The first will be a cemetery, then a small sanctuary and it will not take a long time and Muslim community will be flourish within boundaries of our district. I don't want to see Prague VIII. to be the same as Marseille in France, where police are afraid of coming in several parts of the city. … It would happen once that there would be someone in your living room saying: you don't live here anymore, go away," vice-mayor Vladislava Ludkova wrote on her official web page.[17]

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[16] http://zpravy.idnes.cz/islam-je-jako-nacismus-rekla-samkova-a-turecky-velvyslanec-odesel-p9l-/domaci.aspx?c=A160518_122208_domaci_kop
[17] http://migraceonline.cz/cz/e-knihovna/mistostarostka-prahy-8-hrozi-pred-islamizaci-nasich-obyvacich-pokoju

The narrative is based on purposeful selection of religious texts. The way how media reported on Bilal Phillps's book correspond with this cherry-picking. "A faith in the unique worship of Allah asks for sharia Islamic legislation, especially in countries where Muslims make up majority of the population. Allah's law must be also re-introduced in the so-called Muslim countries, where governments govern under imported capitalist or communist institutions," media chose from the text of the book.[18]

Similar cherry-picking can be observed when media reported on situation in European countries with significant Muslim minorities. _The narrative of failed multiculturalism_ resonates very well in both mainstream and tabloid media. In the beginning of 2017, the interview with Swedish writer of the Czech origin Kateřina Janouchová raised a public controversy. Janouchová openly criticized the Swedish multicultural policy. She pointed out the increase of crime in some areas of Swedish cities, hopelessness of Swedish police and disappointment of Swedish citizens. She also advised a strict migrant policy against newcomers from the Muslim countries. Janouchová's description of Swedish situation was refuted by a Swedish journalist Jiří Pallas as inaccurate and biased. Ingmar Karlsson, former Swedish ambassador to Czechoslovakia, reacted to the interview on Facebook in a similar vein: "The purpose of this interview was to confirm a construction, which had been created by the Czech media for several years now, namely that Sweden is a country where jihadists roam freely. The purpose of this interview was to confirm that the current Czech immigration policy is correct."[19]

2. Muslimophobic narratives

A. Muslims as terrorists (Emblematic issues: _Muslims as security risks_)

In this topos, Muslims are perceived as actual or potential terrorists. Muslims, or a significant share of them, are coming to Islamise us. Muslims are identified with young men prone to radicalisation. The Czech president Miloš Zeman is a strong proponent of _this narrative of radicalization_. In his case, there is discursive association between Islam and Nazism. "In the 1930s, the overwhelming majority of Germans were decent people, the nation of Goethe and Schiller and so on. In a few years, they became Nazis, even fanatic Nazis. And the radicalisation of the – till these times – moderate Muslim population might be like the case of the German population. It might be easier than the German population, [because] you have a very radical ideology based on a religion," Zeman said with an interview with Guardian.[20] Czech President Milos Zeman urged citizens to arm themselves against a possible "super-Holocaust" carried out by Muslim terrorists. The term of "super-Holocaust" further stresses the connection between Islam and Nazism.

The concern is believed to have prompted the unprecedented introduction of metal detectors to screen foreign tourists that visit Prague castle each day and contributes to the debate of possessing firearms. The narrative of radicalization helped to legitimize a constitutional amendment would enable Czechs to acquire and possess a gun for security purposes in 2017. The amendment was

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[18] http://echo24.cz/a/wy6jg/exsef-prazskych-muslimu-jde-pred-soud-hrozi-zakaz-cele-obce#MJcQVrKHACDVzq2e.01
[19] https://blisty.cz/art/85229.html#sthash.P4FFygGg.dpuf
[20] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/14/milos-zeman-czech-leader-refugees

backed by the minister of interior Milan Chovanec from the Social Democrats, the main coalition party. The right to be armed could be included in the Czech constitution. This controversial proposal was discussed by the Czech government this week, with the proposed EU Firearms Directive being mentioned frequently in the debate.

It seems that relationship between this narrative and securitization of entire society exist. Muslims living in the Czech Republic complain about the stigmatization deriving from association with terrorism. "I live normally here. I know nothing about terrorist attacks, I did not even know there had been bombs in France. But people feel that I also have something to do with it. My name is Muhammad and the person who threw the bomb was also named Muhammad," a young Muslim migrant recounted in the Czech newspapers.[21] On the other hand, Czech media have contributed to this stigmatization very significantly. A clear majority (76%) of media articles on Islam associated Islam and Muslims with extremism, fundamentalism, fanaticism or radicalism (Přikryl 2011). Rarely did media give = a voice to Muslims and use limited sources of information, while referring to Islam and Muslim issues (Vaňková 2016).

B. Muslims as Gypsies Emblematic issues: *the adaptability of people, benefit scrounges, petty crime, high fertility, ghettoes*

In context of the recent migration crisis, speakers started to make analogy between the unsuccessful integration of Muslims in Western Europe and the unsuccessful integration of Roma in the Czech Republic. The both groups were portrayed as culturally distinct and unadaptable – even though Roma has been living for decades in the Czech Republic. *The Muslims as Roma narrative* got a special popularity because the attitudes toward Roma has been stable and they are shared by clear majority of society. Furthermore, anti-Roma rhetoric has been used and spread by representatives of mainstream parties. As the anti-Roma narrative is regarded as universally shared and entrenched, references to it help speakers legitimise the use of the same image about immigrants. Muslim refugees, who symbolize all refugees coming to Europe, are portrayed here as lazy, crafty, unwilling to work, abusive of the generous social system and, above all, ungrateful; they make no effort to adapt, despite being repeatedly offered a helping hand. They come mainly to take advantage of welfare payments. Taking the advantage of welfare payments represents a core of the entrenched and relatively widely shared anti-Roma narrative, which has been present in public discourse since the fall of communism. The Roma example illustrates well the stability of such prejudice. Although Roma used to live in the Czechia before the Second World War and majority of families, living recently in the Czech Republic, came to the country from Slovakia at the beginning of 1950s, there are still very strong symbolic boundaries between Roma and rest of the society.

Racial and ethnic explanation mainly accentuate the insurmountable impact of racial origin and the incompatibility of the life with the style and rules of mainstream society. However, those who demand full adaptation to Czech culture and society also tend to emphasize the racial and ethnic interpretation of differences. Čada (2012) describes it as a schizophrenic loop of the Czech

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[21] http://www.blesk.cz/clanek/zpravy-uprchlicka-krize/402699/muslimove-o-zivote-v-cr-islam-se-nerovna-terorismus-nejsme-usamove.html?kapitola=510089

integrational discourse combining emphasis on unchanging racial and ethnic difference with demand for adopting the Czech way of life. The situation corresponds with Gregory Bateson's (1972) concept of the double bind, which refers to a paradoxical form of communication in which individual (or group) receive two conflicting messages, with one negating the other. This explanation belongs to the repertoire of cultural racism, first identified by Paul Gilroy in his commentaries on post-imperial Britain (1979), in which the images of skin and physiognomy are displaced in favour of behavioural attributes that are made to appear inherent (large families, lack of disposition to work, criminal proclivities).

This narrative associates Muslim with characteristics which have been traditionally ascribed to Rome: impossibility of integration, illiteracy and low IQ, instinctively driven behaviour, unemployment, high fertility, high criminality, petty crime or misuse of social benefits. Proponents of this narrative use Roma example to justify hostility towards migrants from Muslim countries. "I do not understand the initiatives that call us to be friendly to migrants. When we are all friendly, then they will eat us. Roma have been living here for hundreds of years and most of them have not been integrated yet. Migrants from Africa will be far worse."[22] Muslims are presented as parasites personified by young males coming to exploit European welfare states generosity. This narrative resonates very strongly across right-wing blogosphere and social media.

On the other hand, leading figure of the Czech anti-Islam movement Martin Konvička attempted to mobilize Roma against Muslim. He challenged the Muslims as Roma narrative by the backward religion narrative. "Islam means a danger for everybody. Islam would ban your music, your dance. It would bring the end of beauty and love. … We are all in this together. It is a mistake when some NGOs tries to put Roma and Muslims together. Islam is a danger for all."[23] This statement corresponded to Konvička's previous discursive strategy to define his position against traditional racism focusing only on Muslim and Islam. This positioning helps Konvička to construct Islam as a distinctive and unprecedented danger for all and the distance from traditional forms of racism allows him to make an impression of objectivity and expertise.

C. Muslims as sexual predators (Emblematic issues: *young males coming to rape European women, animal sexuality)*

Proof for the Islam's anachronism is the treatment of women (a main object of this narrative) by Muslim men (a main subject of this narrative). The subordination and marginalisation of women cannot be ascribed to Islam as ideology but also to nature of Muslim men. Muslim men are thought to be incapable of adopting the European approach to women, while the risk of immigrants from Africa is seen in their heightened sexuality based on the notion of barbarianism and backwardness rendering them incapable of controlling themselves.

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[22] http://www.rukojmi.cz/clanky/526-romove-tady-ziji-stovky-let-a-vetsina-z-nich-se-nikdy-neintegrovala-bezenci-to-dokazi.

[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REfuxyZ8mi0

Tabloid press plays the crucial in spreading this narrative in the Czech Republic. *The sexual predators narrative* was particularly strong after New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne in Germany in 2015. Tabloid described *Taharrush* (open group raping) as a specific and common Muslim tradition. The Czech media also referred about Muslim authorities who approve raping women and use rape as a punishment.

Discourse of Islamophobic initiatives is strongly sexualised. Martin Konvička published a book called "Sex, drugs and Islam", in which he provides readers with his psychosexuology of Islam. "Islam is particularly attractive to women whose sexual fantasies reveal motives of helplessness, captivity, abduction, physical pain, discipline, and passive acceptance of their fate. These are the women who were attracted by belly dancing in early puberty ... but also a mysterious kidnapper on a white horse, with a firm embrace." Konvička as an associate professor of evolutionary biology capitalizes on his sociobiological knowledge to weave his theories. He sees Islam as a sadomasochistic, male dominated and pathological culture.

5. Concluding remarks

The number of Islamic followers is smaller than in any other nation in the EU and the Muslims account for only less than 1% (3358) of the total population. However, experts consider these numbers unreliable and estimates that real number of Muslims living in the Czech Republic is close to 22 000.

Muslim believers live in large cities, such as capital city of Prague (1201 people) and the second largest city, Brno (306 people). Beside of metropole areas, there are significant higher numbers in areas with factories employing foreign workers (Pardubice, Plzen) and in spa cities in North-Western Bohemia (Karlovy Vary and Teplice).

In the first decade after the fall of communism, Islam did not play any important role in public discourse. The first years of the new millennium changed the dominant frame and gave a raise of new style of reporting on Islam. Because of terrorist attacks, Czech media describe Islam as a security threat.

Together with Roma, the Czech public perceives Arabs as the most unfriendly ethnic group. 75% of Czechs consider Arabs as friendly (41% see them as being very unfriendly). A total of 19% of Czechs fear that Czech culture is threatened by Islam and Muslim culture and 84% Czechs thinks that Islam is incompatible with Czech culture.

Muslim representatives became a more frequent target of criticism expressed by Islamosceptics and Islamophobes on social networks. The Facebook page 'We Don´t Want Islam in the Czech Republic (IVCRN), established in 2009, however, become known in 2014, served as a space for expressing intolerance, hatred, playing random YouTube clips or presenting news. The page was used to mobilise followers for anti-Islam demonstrations and had over 164.000 followers on the peak of its popularity in 2015.

In the political field, political scientists identified several specific resources of Czech anti-Islamic scene: (1) Euro-sceptics; (2) Evangelic Christian fundamentalists; (3) secular liberal feminists; (4)

Roman Catholic traditionalists; (5) opponents of the Turkish membership in the EU or (6) proponents of the church-state separation.

The Czech academic community feels uncomfortable with using the term Islamophobia – at least without mentioning of problematic delineation of unjustified fear or hatred, on one hand, and realistic criticism on the other.

We distinguish (1) Islamophobic and (2) Muslimophobic narratives. We define Islamophobia as a hostility towards practices and tenets of Islam and inimical to Islam as a religion. In case of Muslimophobia, the hostility is targeted towards Muslims as people arguing that Muslims are incapable of adapting to Western societies.

The most prevalent narratives are those describing Muslims as a security risk and Islam as a danger to democratic societies. The security narratives are heavily supported by media referring on Islam and Muslim in context of terrorism and radicalism. Security narratives are reinforced by orientalising narrative stressing anachronism of Islam and the narratives portraying Muslims' inability to integrate.

We introduce eight main topoi, with their specific narratives:

1. Islamophobic topoi: (A) Islam as an anachronistic/uncivilised culture (*the anachronistic religion narrative, the narrative of Muslim women as, the narrative of barbarians);* (B) Islam as an expansive violent religion (*the narrative of a violent religion, the narrative of organized invasion)*; (C) Islam as a homogeneous antidemocratic religion (*the slippery-slope narrative, the narrative of failed multiculturalism)*

2. Muslimophobic topoi: (A) Muslims as terrorists (*the narrative of radicalization)*; (B) Muslims as Gypsies *(the Muslims as Roma narrative)*; (D) Muslims as sexual predators (*the sexual predators narrative)*

Even though anti-immigration rhetoric increased significantly and anti-Islam and anti-immigration stances were the primary topics for the all right-wing extremist groups, no serious attacks related to this matter took place.

According to the Czech Muslims, Czechs share close view on Islam. Muslims perceive their possible involvement in public life and politics or public declaration of their faith, as the most problematic. On the other hand, they do not feel much discriminated in everyday situations – at school, in administrative departments, at doctors', or when searching for accommodation.

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