A key feature of the Gaza genocide has been the systematic closure by complicit regimes of legitimate avenues to challenge it. Pro-Israeli western governments have engaged in unprecedented crackdowns on civil liberties in order to provide cover to the Zionist state. The latest attack in Britain comes in the form of the newly introduced National Security (State Threats) Act, an insidious piece of legislation that further blurs the line between activism and terrorism, says Faisal Bodi.
After four ambulances belonging to the Jewish volunteer agency, Hatzola, were attacked in the London suburb of Golder’s Green in the early hours of 23 March, the UK government propaganda machine swung into action.
Underlining the seriousness of the situation, Prime Minster Keir Starmer convened a COBRA meeting, the acronym given to high-level UK government committee which meets to coordinate responses to major national emergencies, mostly but not exclusively terrorism-related.
Government friendly media outlets plastered the incident all over their front pages, adding another layer of alarmism: an obscure group calling itself “The Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right Hand” which was linked to the Iranian state had claimed responsibility for the attack.
The chief of London’s Metropolitan Police, Sir Mark Rowley, and his assistant joined the chorus, placing the incident and group within a wider context of purported state-sponsored Iranian attacks on Jewish interests in Europe.
“The rapid growth in recent years of Iranian state threats is grave: hostile state surveillance activity, 20 disrupted plots, and recent attempted attacks on the Iranian diaspora,” Mr. Rowley told guests attending the (conveniently timed) annual dinner of the Community Security Trust the following evening. “None of this is isolated. It is part of a rapidly shifting threat landscape.”
Within a few days, a narrative was established in which this hitherto unknown entity, which was also said to be behind multiple anti-Semitic attacks across Europe, also posed a clear and present danger to Jews in Britain. By any measure, it was a wholly disproportionate reaction to an incident which had caused no injuries and was being treated by police as a racially motivated arson attack, not terrorism.
Apart from being unduly sensationalist, the other problem with this account was that it wasn’t supported by any facts. Firstly, British authorities have never revealed any details about alleged Iranian plots but have increasingly mentioned them as its US and Israeli allies have ratcheted up the rhetoric and aggression against Tehran, hiding behind the curtain of national security to avoid public scrutiny.
Secondly, as Professor David Miller has painstakingly demonstrated, The Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right Hand (IMCRH) appears to be a fiction, an intelligence cut-out that only exists in the hard drives of Western spy agencies and which emerges (very conveniently) at exactly the same time as Britain is providing logistical and intelligence support to the US and Israeli blitzkrieg on Iran. No links to the alleged Telegram channel exist in the public domain to allow for verification. Instead we have to rely on reports about claims of responsibility from two pro-Zionist think-tanks and the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, hardly credible sources. Miller shows that of the 10 attacks on Jewish interests in Europe supposedly claimed by the group, five did not happen. The five that did were all low impact causing no casualties, with arrests made of suspects unconnected to one another with no proof of any relationship with Tehran.
Given that no-one was injured in the Golders Green incident and police declared it to be a racially motivated arson rather than a terrorist attack, the wholly disproportionate official reaction, usually reserved for high-level terrorism attacks, would suggest that it was curated. It was the not so hidden hand of state bringing the mood music against Iran to a crescendo, establishing a fake foreign threat to manufacture consent for unpopular policies that would otherwise be fiercely resisted. From the very outset, Britons have been overwhelmingly opposed to their country’s involvement in the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. In March, a YouGov poll showed that 70% of respondents were opposed to the UK joining any offensive action against Tehran.
This then is the anatomy of the National Security (State Threats) Act: a piece of legislation built on an entirely confected threat posed by the agencies of an allegedly hostile state. With its enactment the propaganda cycle was complete. Having created and then ramped up the threat level with fake intelligence to justify draconian new laws, the introduction of the law itself also served to inflate public concern, making it appear justified.
Shortly after the NS(ST)A was introduced, the press picked up on another alleged threat from Iran. On 15 July police arrested a 39 year-old dual British Iranian national, formally charging him two days later with assisting a foreign regime. According to the few details that are available in the public domain, Vahid Aberi, had allegedly written a letter to the Iranian consulate in London, referring to himself as a “humble servant” and asking how he could assist his “dear compatriots”. How police became aware of this approach is unknown but they responded by deploying an undercover agent to play the role of an Iranian official, directing Aberi to pick up luggage from a designated collection point. He was led to believe the bag contained a drone. Rather than confirming UK government claims of a rising Iranian threat the story gives rise to more allegations of threat fabrication and police entrapment. According to official accounts, Aberi was a freelancer who sought to approach Tehran on his own initiative: he certainly wasn’t approached or invited by Iran. The police sting was designed to indulge him; without it his courting of the Iranian government may well have gone no further (of course, this fact didn’t stop the mainstream media from having a field day and using the incident to reinforce a putative Iranian threat).
To the unsuspecting public, the NS(ST)A is a national security imperative. But for those prepared to scratch the surface, it reveals another, more sinister, driving force. The delegitimization of agencies like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has long been a key demand of Zionist lobby groups and the NS(ST)A is designed specifically to give effect to that aim. Indeed, the first act of the legislation, which came into force in June, was to proscribe support for the IRGC. Israeli government mouthpieces in the UK Jewish community such as the Campaign Against Anti-Semitism, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council (JLC) have campaigned relentlessly for sanctions to be applied to Iran. With the start of the genocide in Gaza, their efforts took on more urgency as it became clear that Tehran and the other constituents of the Axis of Resistance would not change course in the fight against Zionism. On 14 April the Board of Deputies and the JLC met with Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper to demand, among other things, “the need for the government to move with urgency to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps”.
The NS(ST)A must be seen in the context of the accelerating Zionisation of British politics in response to the Gaza genocide. Faced with overwhelming public opposition to the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, groups and individuals that claim to represent British Jews but are first and foremost agents of the Israeli state have gone into overdrive to (a) shield Israel from criticism, (b) protect Israeli interests in the UK and (c) dictate the media narrative. Their preferred route has been by bribing British politicians with political donations and all-expenses paid propaganda trips to Israel and packing the corridors of power with Zionists. Some 37% of the current Labour Party and 39% of PM Andy Burnham’s new cabinet are members of the Labour Friends of Israel, a pro-Israel lobby group dedicated to promoting Israel interests and the Zionist cause. Among Conservative MP’s that figure rises to 80%. In the last cabinet presided over by Keir Starmer, 13 out of 25 members received money from pro-Israel lobbyists.
In respect of shielding Israel from the unprecedented criticism it is facing, pro-Israel groups have leaned on the authorities to employ hate speech and anti-terrorism legislation to limit legitimate political expression of a nation state. The examples are too numerous to list. They have also succeeded in criminalising direct action that targeted Israeli arms companies and their supporters with criminal damage to make it too costly for them to continue their role in the genocide. The ban on Palestine Action and the exemplary punishments handed out to its actionists is a key case in point, (interestingly, Palestine Action, has also faced unsubstantiated media allegations of being funded by Iran). And in respect of (c) while the sheer enormity of the crimes being committed in Gaza have made it impossible for mainstream media to hide the truth, there are still enough journalists and media networks prepared to push the case for Israeli innocence and victimhood.
The NS(ST)A was introduced as a standalone piece of legislation but it is effectively an extension of the 2023 National Security Act. The latter targets individuals acting on behalf of foreign powers (Aberi was charged under this legislation) while the former is directed at support of state-linked bodies and non state entities acting on behalf of or as proxies for foreign governments. The keywords in both Acts are “foreign power threat activity” – actions done for, on behalf, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. The NS(ST)A creates three main crimes:
- inviting support for a designated body such as the IRGC
- assisting a designated body
- obtaining material benefits such as money or information from a designated body
As with nearly all “anti-terrorism” legislation, what actually constitutes a “material benefit” is left vague enough to grant authorities maximum leeway in enforcing the provision. According to the head of the Islamic Human Rights Commission’s legal department, Abed Choudhury, the deliberate imprecision allows authorities discretion in deciding at what point receiving a material benefit has crossed the criminal threshold. The focus is likely to be on who it is that performs the act rather than their intention. “So, if someone from the Times obtains information from IRGC it will be viewed as journalism but if it is an anti-government whistle-blower it will be deemed to be criminal.” The other danger to civil liberties he foresees is again one that runs through the entire framework of anti-terrorism legislation: authorities will seek to use secret evidence behind closed doors, hiding behind the cover of national secrecy to avoid public scrutiny.
Deja Vu? Yes, we’ve been here before. Just as anti-terrorism legislation was strengthened and deployed ahead of British forces in the (also illegal) invasion of Iraq in 2003, the NS(SA)A is similarly intended to deal with the fallout of an unwanted foreign intervention. In the days immediately preceding the invasion of Iraq the UK Parliament introduced the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Continuance in force of sections 21 to 23) Order 2003, which allowed it to indefinitely detain foreign “terror” suspects without trial. And following the invasion, it smuggled in another piece of legislation inside the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that extended the pre-charge detention period for terrorism suspects from 7 to 14 days. This Act also included a provision that prohibited the “glorification” of terrorist acts (which conveniently includes acts of self-defence against invading British forces).
Also in keeping with all recent anti-terrorism legislation, the NS(ST)A is politically motivated rather than security driven. Its purpose is to create and amplify a threat to seek legitimacy for pre-planned foreign policy decisions and impose yet more infringements on fundamental freedoms. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, I would aver that IRGC related activity in the UK is non-existent or negligible, certainly not serious enough to warrant a whole new body of legislation. Its designation then serves another purpose, which is to close off one avenue of opposition to imperial aggression, in the same way that the proscription of Palestine Action seeks to shut down a principal avenue of opposition to Israel.
By design, modern anti-terrorism laws are intended to be dragnets, scooping up all and any opposition activity that might pose a threat to state interests. Their draconian scope and provisions are designed to be a deterrent. This is borne out by the statistics. Of all the terrorism related arrests made since 2001, the year in which the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force, only 42% of all terror-linked arrests have resulted in a charge, and of those charged, 65% faced explicit terrorism-related charges. Last year saw a dramatic spike with over 3000 people arrested on suspicion of expressing support for Palestine Action. In July this year, the Draconian absurdity of anti-terror laws was highlighted when a number of people supporting 1500 people charged under the Terrorism Act 2000 for protesting the 2025 proscription of Palestine Action were themselves arrested under the same legislation for attempting to read poems in solidarity with the inhabitants of the besieged Gaza Strip. Comparisons with the effect of anti-terror laws during the Troubles in Northern Ireland is not misplaced. Just as no further action resulted from the majority of arrests under the Northern Ireland laws – while they were in force, the Emergency Provisions Act of 1973, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 were used to drag an estimated 60,000 overwhelmingly innocent people from their beds – so too are more recent ani-terrorism laws instruments of victimisation and criminalisation.
The NS(ST)A is a continuation of the slow drip removal of the fundamental right to dissent that started around the turn of the Millenium. It is part and parcel of the same regulatory regime that has brought us policies like PREVENT aimed at deterring and snuffing out certain types of dissent before they arise by identifying ‘suspect’ behaviour, akin to the “thoughtcrime” proscribed by the Party in Orwell’s 1984. It should be remembered that when it was introduced in 2003 (another product of the so-called War on Terror) PREVENT was a non-statutory government programme. It only got a statutory footing in 2015 when the new Conservative government made its implementation a duty for public sector bodies such as hospitals, schools and local authorities. PREVENT has had a devastating impact on the Muslim community which it was mainly designed to target, pulling innocent people into a huge security dragnet which is so wide as to consider even innocuous actions as indicators of extremism and future terrorism.
In 2016, a four-year-old boy in Luton was threatened with a Prevent referral after nursery staff misheard his pronunciation of “cucumber” as “cooker bomb”. The case went to a local social services panel, which took no further action. In 2021, another four year-old boy was referred to PREVENT by his after school club for saying his father had guns and bombs in his shed – it transpired he was talking about the popular video game Fortnite. Also in 2021, a Muslim primary school pupil aged 11 was referred after a teacher mistook the word “alms” for “arms” during a classroom discussion. Prevent effectively polices the non legislated space, serving as a deterrent against anti-state criticism by creating a new category of pre-crime. Despite repeated calls by IHRC among others, for it to be scrapped, it remains a key part of the security state panopticon.
It is also difficult to argue that in designating the IRGC, Britain will add to the political pressure being applied on Iran by a body of other states to have proscribed it, the most significant of which are the US, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia and most recently the EU. The US designation of IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation goes back to 2019 and is probably the most sweeping anti-Iranian sanction anywhere. It not only prohibits people in the US from dealing with the IRGC but also anyone, anywhere in the world (it tackles the problem of extra-jurisdictionality by way of secondary sanctions against offending entities). However, despite its far-reaching scope, the ban has not had the desired effect of forcing the Iranian government to impose restrictions on its civilian nuclear programme nor has it halted Tehran’s support for regional resistance movements. In fact, it has been so ineffective that the US and Israel have had to resort to the last-ditch measure of military action against Tehran. War is diplomacy by other means and clearly all other means have failed.
In conclusion, like its recent antecedents both preceding and during the “War on Terror”, the NS(ST)A is both a propaganda stunt and an attack on civil liberties. Mired in the immorality of its decisions to militarily and politically support the genocide in Gaza and the illegal war against Iran, the British government is resorting to the tried and trusted tactic of invoking national security to crack down on dissent. The price is the further erosion of our right to protest state praxis. History attests that when states remove fundamental rights in the name of national emergencies, they seldom restore them.
Faisal Bodi is a commentator and former journalist. He has written extensively for the Guardian and Independent as a specialist on Muslim affairs and has also worked for Aljazeera. He currently works for the Islamic Human Rights Commission, the longest standing Muslim led rights advocacy group in the UK, and is co-editor of The Long View.